The Media Map Project

Ukraine
Case Study on Donor Support to Independent Media, 1990-2010

by Katerina Tsetsura
(with Anastasia Grynko and Anna Klyueva)
About the Author

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Kyiv cityscape (credit: iStockphoto)
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Journalist students from Shevchenko University (credit: Internews)

The Media Map Case studies were completed in November 2011.
The field of media development assistance – support provided by foreign donors to promote independent, professional news media in developing and transitionizing countries – dates back at least to the 1950s. Almost never recognized as a sector in its own right, media development is a relatively tiny portion of overall development assistance.\(^1\) Despite this marginal status, media development veterans passionately believe that their work plays a critical role in improving the governance and development of the countries where they work. Successful support to local media should facilitate its independence from government and other outside influences, promote freedom of information, represent the public’s needs to decision-makers, and improve the quality of the news that is produced. In turn, by maintaining a free-flow of information, improved news media should keep government transparent and hold it to account, give life to the market economy, and provide citizens with the information they need to make all kinds of critical decisions that impact them as individuals, and their families, communities, and countries.

In theory then, media development supports all other development, both directly and indirectly. However, media development stakeholders have not always been able to make a compelling, evidence-based case to the greater development community that what they do matters critically for both governance and development. Former World Bank president James Wolfensohn, Nobel prize-winning economists Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz, and many other policymakers have made a strong case for the media’s importance, but this has yet to be translated widely into systematic incorporation of media development support into aid policy and budgets. The Media Map Project was created to interrogate the evidence on the connections between media and development, as well as to make global data on the media sector more accessible to researchers, policymakers, and practitioners.

This series of case studies addresses more specific questions regarding the impact of donor interventions that support the media in developing countries.\(^2\) The following key questions focus on the last two decades of donor support to independent media in seven countries: Who are the major actors? What are the major activities? Which activities have a positive impact? Which activities fail? Why? Finally, we go beyond the reflective exercise of “best practices and lessons learned” to offer evidence for donors interested in improving the effectiveness and relevance of their media support. These studies are intended for donors, policymakers, and media development practitioners alike.

In a perfect world, we would have been able to identify all of the donors supporting media from 1990-2010, precisely outline their activities, goals, partners, and budgets, collect monitoring and evaluation reports, and, armed with nationally representative data measuring the many facets of the health of the media sector,\(^3\) we would have been able to determine precisely which projects had impact, the return on investment, and perhaps even the collective impact of all projects. Given the constraints of a pilot project, and the limits of the donors’ own documentation, we were not able to perform exhaustive research. Instead, our methodology was designed to build a solid foundation for understanding each country’s media development history, illuminated by rich, revealing detail. Further, we have carefully out-

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\(^1\) Estimates of current spending on media development are extremely difficult make with precision, due to poor donor documentation, and range from 0.3% of all U.S. aid (the United States is the largest bilateral donor to media development) (Mottaz, 2010) to 0.6% of all aid (as estimated by D. Kaufmann in a presentation entitled “On Media Development & Freedoms in a Governance Context: An Outsider’s Reflections, with Some Empirics,” presented at OECD DAC GOVNET meeting on June 7, 2011.)

\(^2\) The vexing question of how to define impact of a particular media development intervention, and further, how to measure that impact, is addressed in another report for the Media Map Project (Alcorn et al., 2011).

\(^3\) The Media Map Project defines the health of the media sector: “The health of the media sector refers to the extent of its development. A healthy media sector is independent from both government and business, generates quality outputs that reach citizens, and engages them to make informed decisions that impact their own lives and the lives of their community” (Roy, 2011a: 3).
lined any remaining gaps in the research. Building upon this work, we have proposed a design for quantifying the impact of donor support to the media that could be undertaken in a subsequent phase of the research.4

The original design of the project included four or five countries as case studies. We selected the countries to represent a range of development challenges, political situations, media development history, and geography (with a slight emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa). In consultation with the Media Map International Advisory Board, we selected Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Peru, Ukraine, and Indonesia. As the project progressed, we formed partnerships that enabled us to add Kenya (Center for Governance and Human Rights, Cambridge), and Cambodia (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). The basic research design includes:

1) Qualitative desk research providing context on each country’s development, political, historical, and media landscapes

2) Quantitative desk research creating a portrait of each country’s media sector progress over the last 20 years, to the extent that data is available, also some comparison between the country and its region

3) Primary data collected from in-country fieldwork, which includes interviews, focus groups, and observation

Pilot projects come with constraints, but they also come with great opportunities for exploration and creativity, and we have pursued the case study research very much in this spirit. However, while each of the countries contains all of the above components, and thus a consistent line of inquiry, there is some variation across the studies. First, as to format, the lead researcher for each country was provided with a template meant to structure the report. All of the reports cover the key areas in the template, but they do not share a perfectly uniform structure. Both the template and sampling guide are provided at the end of this report. Model discussion guides for interviews were provided, adapted for language and context, and used to guide semi-structured interviews and focus groups during the field work.

Mali and Peru were chosen to coincide with two of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) Governance Network’s (GOVNET) case studies that lay the groundwork for improving donor support to domestic accountability. We provided GOVNET with summary reports on these two countries focusing on the media’s role in domestic accountability in support of GOVNET’s preparation for the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 in Busan, Korea.

To the Peru and Ukraine case studies, we added Network Analysis, a social science methodology that investigates connections among organizations to probe relationship patterns in areas such as information sharing, prestige, and trust. In Peru, we also piloted a methodology called Participatory Photographic Mapping, a technique that has been used principally in the U.S. and Canada to investigate community health and safety issues. This produced visual, oral, and textual data showing where people get their information and what sources they trust. The experiment yielded some insights about information sources, but was even more useful as a process to refine the methodology appropriately for future research.

In recent years, news media have been evolving and significantly overlapping with the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. An overview of the Internet and mobile phones is included in the media landscape portraits. The question of new media and social media was included in the primary research to the extent that donors support these areas. We excluded any donor assistance consisting of pure infrastructure provision. In recognition of the rapidly shifting information landscape, we chose to focus the Kenya case study more pointedly on the convergence of old and new media, and on what donors are focusing on today, rather than conducting an extensive review of the past.

Finally, each of the individual case studies is meant to illuminate the specificity of each country context, but also feed into a broader evidence base of why and how better to support the media sector around the world. Out of this research, our aim is to identify clear guidelines for donors about the best approaches to media support across a variety of contexts. The final Media Map Project report will assimilate findings from all of these components, including the seven case studies, an econometric study that demonstrates that a healthy media sector has a positive impact on political stability in the sub-Saharan Africa region (Roy, 2011b), and a study of donors’ approaches to assessing the impact of their media development projects. All of these reports, the quantitative data used in the reports, and a wealth of other data that can be used to further investigate the role of information and media in governance and development is freely available on our project website, www.MediaMapResource.org.

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4 See Roy and Susman-Peña, 2011.
Executive Summary

- Western donor interventions to establish and develop an independent media landscape in Ukraine have been successful overall.

- Multiple Western donors have helped to support the development of civil society in Ukraine and the development of its independent media system.

- The political landscape, specifically the fact that between 2005 and 2010 the Ukrainian Government did not interfere with independent media development and the fact that journalists and the editors enjoyed relative freedom encouraged the further development of the media. Some claim that the pro-democratic political regime was instrumental in ensuring that independent media flourished after the Orange revolution. However, this development would not have been possible without Western donor investment in the independent media and in journalism training that have been made in Ukraine from the early 1990s until the present.

- Most importantly, over the last six years, because of a pro-democratic leadership and indirect political pressure from the European Union on Ukraine, which wants to join the European Union, Ukrainian media and NGOs have been able to develop and flourish and are having a clear, visible impact as government watchdogs and as a barometer for the development of civil society. However, after 2010, since the beginning of the Yanukovich presidency, these watchdog functions started to diminish.

- Civil society in Ukraine, although still fragile, has made significant progress in recent years, and media outlets and NGOs have played a central role in its development. Donor support has been influential in the establishment and the development of the vast majority of media monitoring organizations, media and journalist training organizations, media NGOs and to a lesser extent, independent media outlets in Ukraine. Many independent media in Ukraine today exist because of the grant aid they received over the years.

- Donor support has also been instrumental in establishing and supporting a number of media freedom watchdog NGOs, media monitoring NGOs, and the independent media, that have functioned with various degrees of success. But with the current political situation in Ukraine, many media can hardly be called completely independent.

- The biggest problem with media NGOs in Ukraine is their weak organizational structure and limited interest in investing time and resources in organizational development.

- Most independent media and media NGOs in Ukraine enjoyed generous Western donor support between 1990 and 2005. Between 2005 and 2011, this support continued by targeting multiple project-specific programs, such as media and journalism training programs, media education programs, and regional media development instead of organizational structure or training support.

- Although some NGO and media representatives said that they would like to see the donor money invested “in NGO structure,” the vast majority agreed that at this stage in Ukraine the money should be invested “in people.” Specifically, future donor money should be invested, according to participants, into media business training and professional, specifically secondary and graduate/post-graduate journalism education.

- On the whole, media NGOs have either poorly developed or outdated websites; almost no information that they produced as a result of multiple grant projects (including media monitoring, resources) is publicly and readily available online. Organizations should regularly update their websites and ensure that all training materials as well as the results of studies, monitoring, and surveys should be publicly available online.

- The problem of sustainability is particularly prominent for many donor-sponsored projects. Once these projects are completed, nothing or very little has been done to support the sustainability of the
achieved results and to disseminate information, such as research results, in forms of widely available electronic books, articles, brochures, or other materials. Generally, weak capacity of NGOs (lack of human resources, time, experience and sometimes understanding of the concept of sustainability) also includes the lack of good skills and understanding how to best work with information, how to effectively pursue knowledge management, publicize results, and engage in systematic public outreach. Once one project is finished, NGOs often look for new projects and do nothing to support the results or promote its previous activities (or do not have opportunity to do so). It often looks like the race for getting money for specific projects overshadows continuing work for long-term results.

• Ukrainian media have lacked strong business models. The media representatives interviewed unanimously agreed that in the future, donor money should be spent on educating media managers and media business owners on how to run a sustainable, profitable media business. Unfortunately, answers to this question are not readily available in Ukraine or elsewhere in the world today as many media outlets around the world are struggling to find new business models. Many in Ukraine agree that the future lies in digital and online media and journalism. Thus, many educational and training programs currently put together by the media NGOs for the Ukrainian media and sponsored by the Western and local Ukrainian donors are focused on online media development, such as training editors and journalists to work online and training academics to teach courses on digital media.

• Donors agree that at this stage, the majority of grants should go toward media business training, training of media managers, professional journalism training for current and future journalists and editors, particularly in the regions of Ukraine outside Kiev, and to supporting professional journalism programs, particularly at the Masters level, and continuing education training for working journalists. Additionally, support for programs of education for educators is also needed to teach university professors and other faculty to teach journalism in light of new market demands and digitalization and to improve existing traditional approaches to journalism education that are isolated from real-market conditions. Some interviewees indicated the need for a stronger graduate school of media and communications research in the country to provide resources for quality research and analysis and to professionally conduct publicly available research on media markets, audiences, and professional practices.

• In short, donor interventions have changed the landscape of media freedom in Ukraine. In particular, the independence, readiness, and articulate voices of Ukrainian media NGOs have greatly contributed to the development of independent media in Ukraine and have helped to support many independent journalists and editors.

• Foreign donors and grant administrators currently active (as of 2011) in Ukraine in the area of media development include: European Union, Council of Europe, USAID, Open Society Foundations - International Renaissance Foundation, Media Development Fund – U.S. Embassy, the Netherlands Embassy (MATRA), Internews Network, IMS, NED, and IREX. Indirectly, other organizations such as PACT also contribute to the development of the independent media landscape in Ukraine.

• Current (as of 2011) areas of support: legal issues and media law and regulations; media business management training; education and training in new media; media literacy; advanced media research (theoretical/academic and applied) at the university level; NGO-based research think tanks capable of producing publicly available quality media market research; PhD education in mass communication with highly qualified internationally competitive professors, with access to newest books and publications; and education for educators training programs to teach new media and new journalism studies at the university level.
Media Overview

Historical Background of Ukraine

This section provides an overview of political, social, and economic events and trends that have shaped the Ukrainian media environment over the last two decades (between 1990-2011) and highlights contemporary challenges the Ukrainian media business faces today.

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe, which occupies 603,628 km² and is the second largest country in the European continent. Kiev (or Kyiv) is the capital and the largest city in Ukraine. Much of Ukraine’s history is associated with the European empires and powers in the region, including the Kingdom of Poland, Austro-Hungary Empire, and the tsarist and then Soviet Russia. Because Ukraine was a part of the USSR for most of the 20th century, Ukrainians share much in common with others who lived in the Soviet Union, particularly with people from neighboring nations. The country borders Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary as well as the Black and Azov seas.

About 78 percent of the almost 46 million people in Ukraine are ethnic Ukrainians. Other ethnicities include Russians (second largest ethnicity, with about 17 percent), Crimean Tatars, and other ethnicities (The State Committee of Statistics in Ukraine, 2011; United Nations Figures, 2011). Ukraine is a well-developed European nation-state with a literacy rate of 99.7 percent (Ukraine is ranked 9th most literate country in the world, according to UNDP, 2011) and a well-developed infrastructure. Although economic problems persist for many Ukrainians, according to the World Bank, “Dynamic and sustained growth of the Ukrainian economy drove the national poverty rate down from a peak of nearly 32 percent in 2001 to less than 8 percent in 2005, and data on real wages suggest that this trend continued in 2006” (World Bank, 2007: 1).

Settlements in the modern territory of Ukraine are one of the oldest in the region as the medieval state Kievska Rus (which was established in 9th century by Varangians) successfully functioned for the next two centuries (until the 12th century). In the next several centuries, much of Ukraine was divided among several powers, including Poland and Austro-Hungary. By the 19th century, much of Ukrainian territory had joined the Russian Empire. After the revolution of 1917, Ukraine became a Republic of the Soviet Union after several failed attempts to claim independence between 1917 and 1921. Finally, Ukraine became a newly independent state in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the last few years, Ukraine has been active in pursuing a path to European Union integration. Although there are many obstacles to Ukraine’s complete integration, the country is a priority partner within the European Neighboring Policy. Much of the contemporary political landscape and decisions in Ukraine are shaped by its closeness to the European Union as well as its continuous strong ties with Russia.

Leonid Kravchuk was the first president of independent Ukraine, and assumed the post after being a leader of the Soviet Ukraine in the 1980s (he was in power between 1989 and 1994). The first elected president of Ukraine was Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004). The 2004 presidential elections were marked with allegations of electoral fraud. As a result of the controversy, the so-called “Orange Revolution” national protest called for new presidential elections in December 2004, when Victor Yushchenko was elected the next president (2004-2010). The most recent presidential elections in Ukraine took place in 2010. Victor Yanukovych, a former Prime Minister of Ukraine under President Kuchma, won the 2010 presidential election. Since Yanukovych came to power, democratic initiatives of Ukraine have been slow and patchy. Close ties between Putin’s Russia and the Ukrainian government have generated much criticism in the last two years from citizens as well as Ukrainian media and media-related NGOs (IMI and Telekrytyka, among others). NGOs and public activist groups have been successful in calling attention to the trend in Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy towards authoritarianism and ties with Russia, for the first time since the Orange Revolution took place in 2005. The new government’s policies of tightening con-
trol over the media and the latest trial and conviction of the former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko have indicated a clear shift in Ukrainian policy away from strong democratic reforms. Concern over the turn toward authoritarianism is shared by many activists and organizations within and outside Ukraine.

**Economy of Ukraine**

Hryvnia is the official currency in Ukraine, with the exchange rate about 8 hryvnas per 1 USD. Since 2008, Ukraine has been a member of the World Trade Organization. The GDP of Ukraine was USD $306.5 billion in 2010 (est.), putting it 40th in the world (IMF, 2010). According to the World Bank and International Finance Corporation, the score for the ease of Doing Business in Ukraine is low at 152 (where 1 is best and 183 is the worst, worldwide) (World Bank and IFC, 2012). The economic development of Ukraine has mirrored many former republics of the Soviet Union. Although Ukraine was always one of the most profitable republics in the USSR, after the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine experienced a sharp downturn. Economic hardships played a key role in the slow pace of the development of democracy in the early 1990s, as citizens were not as concerned about democracy and freedom of speech as they were about their economic welfare and survival.

The main sources of energy in Ukraine are nuclear power and coal. Coal mining has always been one of the main industries and it continues to be so today, along with nuclear power plants. The 1986 nuclear plant disaster in Chernobyl provoked many protests and slowed down the development of the nuclear industry in Ukraine. However, according to the World Nuclear Association report in 2007, the Ukrainian government planned to build 11 new reactors by the year 2030, doubling the current amount of nuclear power capacity.

Much of Ukrainian history has been defined by its closeness to Russia and by its unique geopolitical location, with rich soil and access to the Black sea. During Soviet times, it was often called the “bread basket” of the USSR. To this day, agriculture is a big part of Ukrainian GDP but the most significant GDP contribution in Ukraine comes from industry. Having been a central industrial center for the USSR, Ukraine has also retained many heavy machine-based industries.

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1 DB (Doing Business) is an aggregate of indicator-sets that measure and benchmark regulations applying to domestic small to medium-size businesses through their life cycle and calculate the ease of doing business from 1 (best) to 183 (worst) among the countries in the world.
As in many other countries of Eastern Europe, the rapid accumulation of capital has been central to the 1990s and the early 2000s. The so-called shadow economy, in which taxes are hidden from the authorities in order to maximize the profits, has dominated the economic landscape over the last 20 years. To date, many companies and organizations have multiple accounts to deal with complex, poorly understood and vague taxation laws. This is particularly true for nonprofit organizations: the current law in Ukraine, for instance, does not allow NGOs to earn any profit. That means that any money that NGOs make can only be used to cover expenses. This is true for many non-taxed NGOs around the world with one major exception: NGOs are allowed to make a profit as long as it is used to further develop and move the organization forward. However, Ukrainian law creates a situation in which NGOs cannot possibly make any profit if they want to keep their non-taxable status. This becomes a major difficulty and creates a situation in which NGOs are forced to be creative, nontransparent, and cautious about keeping and disclosing their accounting books and records. Indeed, official world indicators show that taxation is one of the biggest challenges for Ukrainian business development.

Many Ukrainian NGOs and media companies see each other as competition (either for donations or advertising dollars), and many efforts at collaboration have largely failed.

Another major issue is accessibility for foreign investors. Only recently, most notably after the Orange Revolution, have Ukrainian companies and organizations started to understand and reflect on the importance of being transparent and honest about their business practices—because potential foreign investors expect disclosure of financial information on a regular basis. Thus, discussions of transparency, accountability, and financial sustainability have dominated the Ukrainian economical and financial discourse over the last few years. Companies now understand the importance of disclosure; however, many are still struggling with the basic premise of sharing this information with competitors. This is especially true for Ukrainian NGOs that compete with each other for donations; media companies also see other media companies as competition for advertising dollars. This creates problems in terms of sustainability and collaboration among NGOs and among media. To this day, any attempts to induce NGOs and media in Ukraine to collaborate on projects, to increase sustainability have largely failed. Some, however, cautiously noted that the true intentions of Ukrainian companies to be transparent and honest in their business practices may only be superficial. The process of changing to more transparent business practices is slow and rather evolutionary than revolutionary at this point.

### Media Development in Ukraine

The date that Ukraine became newly independent was effectively the start of media development. As from 1991, many realized that all of the most experienced journalists and the employees of the best national newspapers, magazines, and quality broadcasting media had been based in Moscow, the former capital of the USSR. Although multiple Ukrainian media outlets (in both languages, Russian and Ukrainian) existed in the Soviet Union, the function of the media was largely as a channel for communicating decisions of the regional and local government, and, like all Soviet media, was controlled from the top down. Thus, the newly independent Ukrainian media needed to create its own national press on short notice (Baysha & Hallahan, 2004). At the beginning of the 1990s, however, many newspapers and magazines vanished as they struggled to become economically and politically independent in the turbulent political and economic times. Many stopped functioning simply because of the lack of experienced journalists and, more importantly, because of the lack of professional media business managers capable of leading the media through the market changes. While the circulation of print media increased to 1,493,210 copies in 1988, compared to 1,417,090 copies in 1986, in the early 1990s the print media experienced a rapid decrease in circulation (Gabor, 2006).

Between 1995 and 1996, Ukraine experienced a second wave of press development, but the circulation of newspapers in Ukraine increased only after 1999 (Tetrosura & Grynko, 2009). During that period, newspapers such as Den, Zerkalo Nedeli, (“Mirror of the Week”) the tabloid Kievskie Vedomosti, (“Kiev News”) and others appeared. The next wave started in 1998-1999 when the largest, best-selling national tabloids such as Segodnia (“Today”), Fakty i komentarii (“Facts and Commentaries”), Vechiini visti (“Evening News”), Stolychnye novosti (“Capital News”), and other so-called metro/street newspapers were introduced to the mar-
The 2000-2001 period united Ukrainian journalists across the country and contributed to active resistance of the independent media against the lingering Soviet-style government pressure and censorship. This resistance was a response to the disappearance of a popular opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze, a widely recognized media personality. His decapitated body was found soon after his disappearance. The brutal killing of a famous journalist generated a strong wave of protests in the media across the country. Ukrainian media covered the protests that became major news at the time. Protests became possible because journalists wanted the truth and were able to say it (Kucheriv, 1993; Pikhovshek et al., 1997).

Gongadze’s murder united journalists of different mass media, in spite of their different political and business views. But at the end of 2001, the state started to use administrative means to influence the media and to re-introduce censorship (or temnyky) (Ligachova & Ganzha, 2005). These political pressures on the media and direct attempts to censor and influence content existed until 2004. At the time, the TV news channels were full of censored programs, and educators, editors, and journalists agreed that it was particularly hard to speak freely about the most critical issues in Ukrainian society.

But the journalistic community, which had already breathed the air of freedom, felt the need to create a counterbalance to state mechanisms and administrative pressure. Media representatives decided to create a self-regulatory democratic system that would be responsible for media work and would not let the state intrude into journalism. Leading journalists spearheaded a number of professional nonprofit watchdog organizations and these efforts were actively supported by Western media donors who saw a great potential in the ability of these organizations to foster change in the Ukrainian media landscape through continuous monitoring of any violations, censorship, and other inappropriate influences in the media. Over the last decade, several groups of active journalists in Kiev created media-monitoring organizations, including Telekritika (Natalia Ligachova); Institute for Mass Information (IMI) (Victoria Sumar); Svidomo, a bureau of investigative journalism in Ukraine (Egor Sobolev), Republic (Iryna Chemerys); and Charter-4 (Olexandr Kryvenko, Julia Mostova, Serhiy Rakhmanin, Mykola Veresen, Taras Kuzmov, Olena Prytula). All of these organizations (and many more created at that time) received international donor funding at their inception. Among the major donors of this period were USAID and George Soros’ Open Society Foundations. As a result of these organizations’ efforts, on 16 September 2001, the first anniversary of Gongadze’s disappearance, a new group, “Ukrainians – for Transparent Elections,” held its meeting in Kiev. About 120 journalists from all over Ukraine took part in this action. The goal was to develop and reinforce journalists’ ethical standards during the coverage of the parliamentary election campaign in March 2002. At the meeting, participants adopted the program document that became the first version of the Ukrainian Journalists Ethics Code. The Code was signed by 78 journalists and the staff of the Journalist Ethics Commission, which later became an executive organ of “Ukrainians – for Transparent Elections” and now is an independent institution (Commission on Journalism Ethics of Ukraine, 2006).

The next important phase in the development of the independent media in Ukraine was the journalists’ revolution, which started in October 2004 and was directly connected with the Orange revolution in Ukraine. Although some argue that the role of journalists in the Orange revolution was limited, most agree that journalists have played a large role in contributing to information exchange during the Orange revolution. On October 23, 2004, a few Ukrainian media watchdog organizations, most notably Telekritika, initiated a protest to support the journalists of TV Channel 5, which was under strong political pressure at the time. On October 25, the journalists of Channel 5 began a hunger strike as a protest against this political pressure. Later, other journalists joined the action to demand their rights to work without temnyky (direct governmental pressures that dictated content of news coverage). On October 29, 2004, 19 Ukrainian TV companies supported anti-censorship protests (Kucheriv & Odarich, 1993; Ligachova & Ganzha, 2005) although Channel

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2 The Ukrainian programs are handled through its local implementer “Renaissance Foundation.”
3 Yevhen Fedchenko, personal communication, January 17, 2012.
5 was the only channel that had an editorial policy that allowed resistance to the government control at that time. The protests brought the desired results: on November 21, Channel 5 began broadcasting the events in Maidan square, the central location of the Orange revolution, where more than 20,000 Ukrainians came to support Yushchenko, a presidential candidate from the opposition. These protests were also supported by international journalists’ organizations.

The success of the Orange revolution in 2005 brought many changes to the country and to the Ukrainian media landscape. The Orange revolution has been widely celebrated as a victory of civil democratic society in Ukraine and a victory for the Ukrainian people.

Figure 1 shows Freedom House’s scores for press freedom in Ukraine, as compared with the rest of the Europe and Central Asia Region (ECA). The transition from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” from 2004 to 2005 matches the Orange Revolution timeline.

Many foreign donors saw the Orange revolution as a logical outcome of their investments in the development of civil society in Ukraine. As a result, when it brought a new president and government to power, many donors withdrew from Ukraine and turned towards other countries. That also meant that many programs that supported organizations that helped the development of civil society, including the independent media organizations, media monitoring organizations, and media and government watchdog and think-tank organizations stopped receiving donations from foreign donors. The shift in donor emphasis led to the disappearance of some organizations, many of which were small, because they only existed and survived thanks to foreign donor support. These organizations had never invested in the infrastructure and sustainability over the years of receiving funding.

Figure 2 shows the press freedom indicators mentioned above overlaid with levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The spike in FDI could possibly be an effect of the Orange Revolution.

The nonprofit organizations that disappeared as soon as the funding stopped triggered worries among foreign donors. Increasingly, donors started asking for sustainability plans in any new applications for funding. Organizations now had to demonstrate their past success in completing certain tasks and in serving civil society. They also had to clearly demonstrate how they would sustain their existence after funding ceased. Many organizations were simply unprepared for these new requirements, as they had never invested in their infrastructure and institutional capacity development. As a result, many of the NGO organizations that were active in Ukraine in the beginning of 2000s had practically disappeared from the NGO scene by the late 2000s.

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4 See Freedom House, 2011. For detailed methodology see http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2011. Freedom House’s scores have been rescaled here, so that better scores are higher numbers because Freedom House gives countries a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst).

5 FDI data is from the World Bank Indicator database. See World Bank, n.d.a.
The active development of communication practices and Ukraine’s continuous desire to integrate into the European Union create the necessity for honest and transparent coverage in the media.

Media Challenges for Ukraine: Lack of transparency in the Media

Media “non-transparency” (or jeansa, slang for media bribery in Ukraine) can be defined as direct or indirect payments to or influences on journalists or editors to publish information that outside sources provide to the media. Media non-transparency has been at the center of the debate on the nature of publicity materials and media practices for a long time (Hobsbawm, 2006; Holmes, 2001; Kruckeberg, Tsetsura, & Ovaitt, 2005). The practice of offering and paying cash for publishing news releases and other publicity materials is common in many countries, particularly of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Bloc (Harro-Loit & Saks, 2006; Kruckeberg, & Tsetsura, 2003).

Russian communications practitioners were the first to call attention to the problem of media bribery (Holmes, 2001), and Polish public relations practitioners sponsored the first empirical study of media bribery (Tsetsura, 2005). In 2003, the global index of media bribery ranked Ukraine 19 (in the middle of the index out of 33 ranks for 66 countries), together with Argentina, Mexico, and Taiwan (Kruckeberg & Tsetsura, 2003). Ukraine scored low on the perceived effectiveness of anti-corruption laws, professional education of journalists, well-established and enforceable journalism codes of ethics, and free press and free flow of information.

Other research and anecdotal evidence shows that current Ukrainian communications and media practitioners experience challenges while practicing media relations in Ukraine similar to those in other countries, such as limited freedom of speech, little room for advancement, heavy workloads, and inequality at work (Baysha & Hallahan, 2004; Willard, 2003; Willard, 2007).

Many media and communications professionals have argued that a lack of clear ethical guidelines in Ukrainian media practices together with the absence of accountability of professionals for their practices create a lack of transparency in the media (Chernov & Tsetsura, 2012; Sidorenko, O. & Sidorenko, N., 1998; Tsetsura & Grynko, 2009; UAPR, 2006). Among other problems that slow down the development of media transparency in Ukraine are the political dependence of the media, lack of specialization of journalists and specialists of public relations, and, most importantly, misunderstanding, and a lack of trust and knowledge.

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6 This section draws on previous research studies published by Tsetsura (2010) and Tsetsura & Grynko (2009).
among reporters and editors and those who provide information to the media (Baysha & Hallahan, 2004; Kulish, 2001; Ligachova & Ganzha, 2005; Pikhovshek, 1997; Willard, 2003).

In contemporary Ukraine, publishing news stories that mention names of organizations is often understood as placement of promotional materials in media on a paid or non-paid basis, and often the efficiency of any public relations agency’s work is evaluated by the number of publications in the media (Tsutsura & Grynko, 2009). An IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI) shows that non-transparent paid-for copy (jeansa), “overwhelmed the media for commercial as well as political reasons” (IREX, 2006/2007). MSI panelists reported that jeansa reflected “both the cynicism of media owners and journalists and the low professional level and poor education of most journalists” (IREX, 2006/2007: 177). Previous studies have also reported that the editorial interests and special issues of magazines and newspapers in Ukraine are often presented solely by the advertising department, and not by the editorial department (Ligachova & Ganzha, 2005).

Communication between Ukrainian public relations practitioners and media professionals may be corrupt because of the lack of understanding of how public relations practice contributes to information exchange (Kulich, 2001). One possible reason for media non-transparency is a weak journalism education system and no standardized system of public relations education in Ukraine. The problem of professional communication education in Ukraine is similar to problems that persist in other countries in which journalism is in a state of transition (Baysha & Hallahan, 2004; Tsutsura, 2004). Misunderstanding of media relations practices limits the ability to generate publicity in the Ukrainian media (Sukhenko, 2007).

However, the active development of communication practices and Ukraine’s continuous desire to integrate into the European Union create the necessity for honest and transparent coverage in the media, as part of business transparency practices that potential European investors seek when they consider Ukrainian companies. Currently, two professional public relations associations, the Ukrainian Association of Public Relations (UAPR) and Ukrainian Public Relations League (UPRL) put forward ethical codes and conduct activities to resist and minimize media non-transparency.

The Ukrainian Association of Public Relations monitors, develops, and reinforces professional standards of journalism, personal communication, November 17, 2010.

7 Eugeny Fedchenko, director of the Kiev Mohyla Academy School of Journalism, personal communication, November 17, 2010.

Despite these advances, media nontransparent practices, or jeansa, are still present in many media outlets, as local and regional media see this practice as a way to survive in an economically harsh environment, in which traditional advertising revenues no longer cover the budget. Some journalists in Ukraine go as far as saying that the media is a business and as such media practices of accepting payments for publishing stories that look like editorials are part of doing business. But of course, such a position is in direct conflict with journalistic integrity of media professionals.

Development Challenges for Ukraine

Today, one of the key development challenges for Ukraine is a lack of continuous political and financial support for the third sector and the civil society development initiatives that have been happening in the country during the last 20 years. Since the election of a
new president, Mr. Victor Yanukovich, Ukrainian NGOs have noticed a slow but steady change to a more centralized and controlled form of government, which had not been effectively eliminated after the Orange revolution in 2005. Many experts agreed that the rate with which the centralization of power is happening in Ukraine is alarming. For instance, the central government is increasingly involved in the everyday activities of the regional governments in Crimea and Lviv, as well as exercising more control over regional and local decision-making processes (Kudelia, 2011). Kudelia wrote, “The centralization of political power under President Yanukovych allowed the Ukrainian government to pass through the loyal parliament a number of critical legislative changes related to the improvement of product safety standards, procurement procedures and cutting excessive business regulations. This accelerated the talks on DCFTA, which were successfully completed in October 2011. Centralization of power under Yanukovych, however, also meant further weakening of institutional accountability, growing high-level corruption and a crackdown on the opposition” (Kudelia, 2011). Specifically, government pressures and threats to freedom of information and media have become very real since 2010, particularly in relation to central TV programming (such as pressures to control news coverage on Channel 5 and STB among others) and to major national newspapers (including Den ("Day"), Zerkalo Nedeli ("Mirror of the Week") and Gazeta po-Kievski, ("Newspaper, the Kiev Way").

The political and financial pressures on the media have become so pronounced in Ukraine in the last two years that, in the fall of 2010, the most notable journalists, media representatives and NGOs (numbering 135 media and civil society organizations and over 570 individuals) united to organize a civic movement with the aim of protecting freedom of speech and preventing any censorship that impedes the professional activities of journalists and interferes with the relationship between the media and those in power. Stop Censorship! [«Стоп цензурі!»] is an independent non-political movement which is not supported by any political party. The main activities of Stop Censorship! include: “movement activists’ professional and civil rights protection; prevention of censorship in the mass media, as well as prevention of pressure on journalists aimed to force self-censorship; launching a massive long-term anti-censorship campaign with NGOs and civic activists from Ukraine and other countries; professional standards in TV news of all leading Ukrainian TV channels monitoring; informing on facts of important social topics and facts concealment and manipulation; furthering of media branch self-regulation” (Stop Censorship! official website, 2011).

The movement is active in voicing real concerns about growing pressures and attempts to control the freedom of speech and information in Ukraine, which result from the current political discourse and initiatives of the President Yanukovich. Further important challenges for the development of media and civil society in Ukraine are identified in the next section.
Journalism Education in Ukraine

Many voice their concerns about a lack of qualified young media professionals and, more broadly, their concerns with the quality of journalistic higher education in Ukraine. Interviewees for this study identified the following challenges in professional education: the lack of qualified professors, researchers, and other academic staff at universities across the country; the lack of clear assessment of journalistic programs; and the so-called legacy journalism programs, which are a holdover from the Soviet Ukraine and today continue to operate despite limited teaching resources and lack of qualified staff. Most importantly, graduate professional education and continuous education programs for already working journalists are practically non-existent in Ukraine. The only notable graduate and continuous education program, the first professional program that was based on the Western model of journalism education that offers both an MA and a PhD in Journalism Studies, is the School of Journalism at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

Recently, however, the School has faced some threats and financial and political pressures from the new government (specifically from the Minister of Education in Ukraine, Mr. Dmitry Tabachnik) as the government terminated its support for the program by stopping government-subsidized scholarships for School of Journalism students at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Normally, all higher education institutions in Ukraine have these government scholarship programs, so-called “government student spots,” that allow students to study at the university after entering the programs on the competitive basis. This school has become the first journalism program in Ukraine to completely lose such government support for the first time since independence. This government move is widely seen as revenge against the most progressive and the most outspoken journalism program in the country. Despite the pressures and thanks to multiple Western and local donors (e.g., Akhmetov Foundation, Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada, and U.S. Embassy) and alumni, the School has been able to create an initial scholarship pool and has started a Foundation of UKMA Alumni with the goal of providing comparable scholarships for the best applicants according to their entrance exam ratings (Scholarship Program Fund UKMA Alumni, official website, 2011).

Active Donors in Ukraine

Several foreign organizations have been notable donors in Ukraine since the country claimed independence in 1991. The most important are the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (a nonprofit that receives funding from the U.S. Congress; the largest contributions to Ukraine were before the Orange revolution in 2005), U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (with programs that concentrate on promoting public policy, economic development, and education), Open Society Foundations, which has its own operation in Ukraine under the name of the Renaissance Foundation [Міжнародний фонд “Відродження"], the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine (which for many years, has had its own separate grant-giving program to support the development of independent media in Ukraine), the U.K. Embassy and the British Council, the Netherlands Embassy, the German Embassy, and the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (Germany).

Open Society Foundations (Renaissance Foundation), has spent more than U.S. $976 million on democratic development in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union over the last 30 years (OSF website, 2011). The Foundation is a large donor and is one of the most recognized donors among the Ukrainian associations. Please see the organizational profile in Appendix 2 for more detail.

Because Ukraine has long been one of the highly developed republics of the former Soviet Union and has had very solid infrastructure, high levels of education, and basic social services but lacked a strong system of NGOs free from the governmental pressures, the development priority for the country since its independence has been the development of political education and democratic initiatives, civil society, and the third sector. Freedom of expression became a priority early on for foreign donors who sought to help Ukraine become a newly independent state with a sustainable civil society. Past experiences and pressures from the Soviet government had created a situation in which Ukrainian citizens did not have a voice and were not able
to effectively resist and question government policies and actions. Thus, democratic initiatives, civil society education, and proper governance that recognizes a strong third sector (NGOs) have been a development priority from the very start.

In addition, there are a number of locally based foundations and donors that actively support the various civil initiatives in Ukraine. Among the most prominent ones are the foundations that are named after their founders, successful businesspeople in Ukraine who made their money in the 1990s in Ukraine, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, mostly in the metallurgy industry (Victor Pinchuk), coal mining, steel production, energy, telecommunications, media (Renat Akhmetov), and government-related finance (Arseniy Yatseniuk). These people are among the richest in Ukraine and in the world.

The Victor Pinchuk Foundation (Pinchuk is a businessman and son-in-law of the former president Leonid Kuchma) tops the league of Ukraine-based foundations with Hr 78.8 million (or U.S. $20.7 million) donated in 2008 to culture and health charities (Kiev Post, 2007). Other top donors include:

- “Ukraine’s man in Ukraine,” Rinat Akhmetov, who gave Hr 78.8 million ($15.76 million) in 2007
- Industrialist Serhiy Taruta with Hr 30 million ($6 million)
- Lawmaker and businessman Oleksandr Feldman with Hr 11 million ($2.2 million)
- Kuchma’s daughter Olena Franchuk with Hr 7.9 million ($1.58 million).\(^8\)

Other notable foundations include:

- Open Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk Foundation that supports international dialogue, cultural understanding and aims to raise the profile of Ukraine internationally
- Ukraine 3000 International Charitable foundation that was established by the former first lady of Ukraine, Kateryna Yushchenko (which focuses on historical, cultural, medical, and educational areas of development and support)
- Renat Akhmetov’s Foundation for the development of Ukraine [«Розвиток України»] (formerly known as the System Capital Management’s, Akhmetov’s industrial holdings, Development of Ukraine Fund).

These local foundations actively support health, social services, and education. However, very few of them have any programs specifically targeted toward the development of the independent media and journalism in Ukraine. One of the exceptions is the Renat Akhmetov Foundation for the Development of Ukraine, which has always been the single most influential local foundation to support the independent media development in Ukraine.

The Media Landscape of Ukraine

The so-called journalists’ revolution (which sparked the Orange Revolution in 2005) succeeded in eliminating centralized censorship and established a free and independent journalistic environment for the first time since 1991. However, this change did not automatically guarantee a rebirth of Ukrainian journalism. Problems have persisted with the ethics of Ukrainian journalists, poorly developed systems of professional journalistic education and practice, and with the interactions between journalists and editors and the media owners, who have become increasingly influential. Many of the Ukrainian media, particularly local and regional media as well as so-called “legacy” media (that existed before the Ukrainian independence, during the Soviet period), still do not have editorial agreements with owners that protect independence and freedom of speech. As a result, these media continue to serve the political or business interests of the owners (Pikhovshek, 1997; interviews with media representatives, 2011).

In the last two years, since the new president Yanukovich came to power, media in Ukraine have experienced problems, as political pressures and political prosecution of independent media journalists and editors have risen, according to Ukrainian journalists, editors, and NGO representatives interviewed for this study. These ongoing threats to freedom of the press and information in Ukraine have created a number of concerns among NGOs and the media, and have also been noticed by Western donors. The donors who are actively present in the country (e.g., USAID, U.S. Embassy, the Dutch Embassy, OSF-Renaissance Foundation, the British Council) have had a number of meetings in 2010-2011 to discuss new challenges that the media in Ukraine face and to try to find ways to help independent media to resist government pressures on freedom. As a result, a number of grants in 2011 were put forward by these organizations to support public forums, open dis-
Discussions, offer journalist and media training programs, and provide legal coaching and training for journalists so that they know and understand their media rights and can use their skills effectively.

**Traditional Media Outlets**

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Information TV and Radio (2011), a total of 2,067 different newspaper titles were published in 2011 (including 1028 in Ukrainian and 815 in Russian) although more than 27,000 media outlets are registered with the Ministry. Ukraine has 12 major daily newspapers (top three newspapers, all private, by circulation are Segodnya, Fakty i Kommentarii, Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine—all of these are Ukrainian versions of the major Russian publications), 524 radio stations (top stations, all private Russian entertainment/music radio stations, Hit FM, Radio Shanson, Russkoe radio), and 647 television stations, most of which are local (top TV channels, available nation-wide, all private, are Inter, Studio 1+1, TRK Ukraina, ICTV, STB, Novyi kanal) (Ministry of Information TV and Radio of Ukraine, 2011; Laba, 2012).

Among the major news agencies are Interfax (private), UNIAN (private), Ukrainski Novyny (private), Liga-biznesinform (private), RBC-Ukraine (private), UNIA Ukrinform (state-owned). The All-Ukrainian Coalition reported that the annual advertising revenue in media sector is divided as following: 1) television: U.S. $416 million; 2) print: U.S. $305 million; 3) radio: U.S. $34 million; and 4) Internet: U.S. $55 million (Laba, 2012).

Contemporary broadcasting media in Ukraine consists of more than 800 TV and radio companies with broadcasting licenses; more than 500 of them are private. Ninety percent of all profits from advertising in Ukraine are shared between two main TV channels Inter and 1+1. In addition, advertising profits are divided among such channels as Novyi Canal, STB, and ICTV. The other TV and radio companies share the remaining three percent of all advertising profits in the country.9

The state TV and radio system in Ukraine includes The National TV Company of Ukraine (NTCU), The National Radio Company of Ukraine (NRCU), The State TV Company of Crimea, The Kiev and Sebastopol State Regional TV Companies, and 26 oblast (regional) state TV and radio companies (Gabor, 2006). The state has a de facto monopoly in radio broadcasting which means that it covers more than 10 million radio receivers all around the country. Usually one radio receiver can transmit only three state radio programs. Financing is an important factor in shaping the national broadcasting environment: 84 percent of companies have a self-supporting running (so called “khозра-счет”) form of financing, 8 percent have a budget form (which means these media have partial or complete direct regional or local state government support of the media as these governments officially are the publishers of these media outlets; nonetheless, these media still generate revenue from advertising), and 8 percent have a mixed model (Gabor, 2006). If media are financed completely or partly by the state, then it is likely that they will broadcast information with a point of view of the state on certain problems that usually is not balanced. A similar dynamic is present in commercial

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9 Yevgeny Fedcheko, Dean of Journalism School, Kiev-Mogila Academy, October 5, 2007.
stations owned by someone with political interests; in many cases the influence is even more pronounced.

There are three national TV channels. Channel UT-1 has 98 percent national coverage, channel “1+1” has 95 percent coverage, but is received by just 88.5 percent of the Ukrainian population, while the third state channel “Inter” has 62 percent coverage in Ukraine. All programs from the state-owned National TV Company of Ukraine (NTCU) are transmitted on channel UT-1. This broadcasts 19 hours per day. NTCU shares a frequency with a TV company called ERA. According to the State Statistics committee of Ukraine the number of cable TV subscribers grew to 3 million in 2009, and more than 300 cable TV companies now operate in Ukraine. Cable television for the most part has entertainment-driven programming although popular entertainment TV channels, such as STB, have their own news programs. However, the news programs have little airtime since they are not sensationalist, and as a result are not profitable.

Figure 3 gives a sense of the relative popularity of TV, radio and newspapers as information sources in Ukraine in answer to the question “How often do you use the following type of media to get information about current events?” TV emerges as a very prominent news source (BBG, 2010).

Figure 4 confirms the popularity of TV when compared with other communications equipment typically owned by Ukrainians. It also shows the popularity of mobile phones, in answer to the question: “which of the following do you have working in your household?” (BBG, 2010).

Today, there are about 1,700 magazines in Ukraine. Most of them focus on special topics and have a small circulation. Only the so-called “women’s magazines” (tabloid-style magazines about fashion, entertainment, homemaking, and celebrity gossip) are quite widespread and have a good circulation all over the country. Most of them are monthly publications. Magazines such as Natalie, Academia, Eva, Lisa, and Otdohni (“Take a Break”) owned by the Burda Magazine Group are quite popular.

**Information Culture of Ukraine: The Rise of Digital and Online Media**

Ukrainians are active consumers of news, as Ukrainians read newspapers and magazines on a regular basis. For years, television has been the most popular medium, but recently internet media resources have become the most popular channel of information distribution, particularly in the capital, Kiev. As computing scholar Piskounova notes:

“The highest proportion of people used internet during the last year were in Kiev –(19.92%), then come the provinces of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Kharkov...
Ukrainian media are actively moving to the digital world, and social networking sites are becoming increasingly popular.

(10.32%) and then Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernovcy, Vinnitsa provinces (10.07%). The smallest proportion of people who used internet last year are in Chernigiv, a town in Sumy region – 5.93%, which is similar to the computer usage in this region” as a whole (Piskounova, 2007: 37-38).

Figure 5 gives a sense of how Ukrainians use the internet – for what purpose and how frequently. Sending e-mails, finding out the latest news and learning about a specific topic are the most frequent uses. (BBG, 2010)

The internet started to develop towards the end of 1990. The domain “.UA” was registered in December 1992. Over the past two years, Ukraine has been experiencing an internet boom. By the end of 2000 there were nearly 370,000 internet users in Ukraine; as of 2009, there were more than 15.3 million internet users in Ukraine, or about 33.7 percent of the population (World Bank World Development Indicators, 2009). However, the vast majority of internet users are effectively concentrated in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. Most Kiev residents now receive their news online (Piskounova, 2007).

There is no single market leader among the internet service providers in Ukraine. However, there are some strong companies like IP Telecom, Luckynet, Infocom, Global Ukraine, and Ukrsat. Over the last five years, there have been some attempts to create Ukrainian web-portals and search engines. Some survived for only one or two years, some still exist today, but they are not very popular among Ukrainian users who usually use Russian Rumbler or Yandex and U.S.-based sites like Yahoo or Google (which also enable searches in the Ukrainian language).

The number of web hosts based in Ukraine puts the country in 28th place in Europe and on the 45th place worldwide, according to the Ukrainian internet Association. There are more than 500 different news sites on the Ukrainian internet. They are mostly independent and do not belong to political parties or other interest groups. As a result, there is less pressure on the editorial teams and more openness. The first Ukrainian internet portal, Brama (“gate”), was developed and based in Canada. It still operates today although its quality remains low.
Internet: Online and Social Media Development in Ukraine

As the internet becomes increasingly popular, business opportunities for online media are growing. Although the internet usage and specifically online media remain popular in big cities, they are less widely used in small towns and in the regions. Digital technologies are actively entering Ukrainian journalism and reshaping and changing the work of professionals. Because traditional media depend on political and business forces, the internet is usually perceived as a territory of freedom and as a result generates a value as a credible resource. Thus advertisers are becoming increasingly interested in an online presence, although many pay only a fraction of traditional commercial costs for advertising online.

While advertising expenditure is still significantly higher for broadcast than for internet, Figure 6 shows how strong the growth in online advertising is, compared with the growth in television advertising (GroupM, 2010).

New technologies also provide new opportunities for media professionals in Ukraine: for instance, searching for information, access to audiences and new channels for information distribution. In fact, the ability to reach out to multiple audiences and to expand channels has led to the growth and professionalization of the media in Ukraine, according to professionals. The media challenge is how to monetize these opportunities in a transparent and credible manner.

In the first attempts to engage the internet, the media have started many online portals (the same information is distributed online as well as in print or on TV), added blogging platforms on these websites, and has provided opportunities for interactive communication with visitors. However, going online, Ukrainian media often a lack strategic vision of business development on the internet, they do not rely on any market or audience analysis and research, and they rarely recognize differences between printed and online content. The majority of online news projects still remain weak and unprofitable.

The growing number of media in Ukraine utilizes the social media platforms and social networks to share the news and to connect with the audiences. Every major national media outlet in Ukraine today has a social media presence in addition to its official website. The most popular social networking platforms among media in Ukraine are the blogging site platform Live Journal, followed by Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn.

Ukrainian media are actively moving to the digital world: many newspapers, magazines, and broadcast-
The Media Map Project: Ukraine 1990-2010

The Media Map Project: Ukraine 1990-2010

Today, television and radio in Ukraine are changing from analogue to digital. The digital switch is yet to happen, but digital television and radio are being test-
ed and the professional and industrial organizations, particularly ITK (Independent TV Committee) and IAB (Independent Association of Broadcasters), are actively involved in communication with the government officials regarding the transition to new digital standards. Since May 2009, digital TV has been tested in Kiev and in several other regions of the country (Myasnykova, March, 2011, personal communication). Radios with the broadcasting standards T-DAB (Terrestrial Digital Audio Broadcasting) and DRM (Digital Radio Mondiale) have already been tested in some regions of Ukraine, and today, nine channels in Ukraine work in digital format (Rozvadovskyy, 2010). A special national government program is in place to digitize the Ukrainian broadcasting system by 2015. Challenges to media freedom accompanying the impending switchover are discussed in a later section.

Online radio has developed in parallel with the increase in internet penetration (Rozvadosvkyy, 2010). Again, the vast majority of programming is entertainment and has limited news components (music radio channels usually have only a few minutes of news headlines every hour). Some of these online stations are one-person informal radio operations with very simple playlists; other newly emerging online radio stations are truly professional and compete as equals with FM stations (Rozvadovskyy, 2010).

The popular Ukrainian internet news resource is a virtual magazine called Korrespondent.net. It is also available in a print version and distributed mostly in Kiev. The creation of Media Company KievPost and Ukrainskaya Pravda was an initiative of journalist Georgiy Gongadze, who was murdered in September 2000. The majority of the Ukrainian print media can also be found on the internet, for example Dzerkalo Tyzhndnia, Stolichnye novosti, and Den. Some media watchdog publications have become online-only. Most noticeably, the leading media and freedom of speech watchdog Telekritika stopped publishing the print version of its magazine Telekritika in 2010.

News Culture of Agencies in Ukraine

The dominant agency in Ukraine today is the State Information Agency of Ukraine, or Ukrinform, which produces and distributes information throughout Ukraine and abroad, and is available in Ukrainian, Russian and English. The other two news agencies—Interfax-Ukraine and UNIAN—have no connection with the government. Interfax-Ukraine is a branch of the Russian news agency Interfax. Most subscribers to this

Donor interventions also reflect this evolution toward internet media. For example, the Ukraine Media Partnership Program (UMPP) launched in 2002 by implementer IREX and funded by the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, fostered print and broadcast media outlets throughout Ukraine, developing partnerships between U.S. and Ukrainian media companies. In 2012, UMPP came to a close. Most of the UMPP print alumni launched Web sites or web portals to cover daily news online. One of the most active newspapers participating in UMPP in 2009, Panorama in Sumy, used its web portal to cover the presidential campaign and elections. “The newspaper published an investigation into the falsification of ballots during 2010’s parliamentary elections. TV partners - TV Chernivtsi, Rivne-1, VTV Plus (Kherson) also developed video components to their sites to enhance their available content. (UMPP final report, 2012)

Changing from Analogue to Digital: Television Broadcasting Challenges in Ukraine

Today, television and radio in Ukraine are changing from analogue to digital. The digital switch is yet to happen, but digital television and radio are being test-

Social networking sites are becoming increasingly popular. According to Yandex, a Russian-based search index, in 2009 Ukraine had one of the highest rates of social networking in the world. An overall lack of trust in traditional news media providers “has accelerated the development of the blogosphere” (Rozvadovskyy, 2010). LiveJournal (LJ, or ЖЖ in Ukrainian) is the most popular platform among bloggers. Ukrainian LJ users are ranked fifth place in world rankings (Rozvadovskyy, 2010).

Podcasting is also becoming more popular, especially among media and public relations professionals (Rozvadovskyy, 2010). Podcasting has enjoyed a rapid development and is seen by professionals and by the audiences as an emerging medium in the Ukrainian market. Many podcasts however, are not journalistic or newsworthy; they are mainly focused on literature, culture and music and niche professional podcasts, such as the Ukrainian PR podcast that is produced by Oksana Hoshva, one of the leading public relations (PR) professionals in the country.

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agency are from local and regional Ukrainian media, and Interfax-Ukraine is popular among these media because it has an inexpensive subscription and provides quick, up-to-date information and announcements. The third news agency is the Ukrainian-based agency UNIAN. It covers the entire country, is one of the main sources of information for most Ukrainian-language media and also provides the best photo service.

News consumption often gives way to entertainment consumption, and sensationalism and tabloid news create a major challenge for quality media and journalists. Ukrainian audiences often prefer sensationalism and entertainment over hard news values.

**State of Journalism in Ukraine: Challenges and Opportunities**

Many media outlets that are owned by the top businesspeople in Ukraine are under pressure to deliver material in a certain way or to cover specific topics that may be dictated by the owners to represent their own political or economic interests. For the majority of the media owners in Ukraine, media are not their primary business: most of them own coal mines and metal production, processing, and distribution; they buy and own the media outlet to have a powerful instrument with which to communicate their ideas to the government. During the Orange revolution, many saw the real power of the media in shaping public opinion and pressuring the government; as a result, many business owners nowadays see a strong, influential media outlet, with a developed network and large number of viewers and readers as a potent communication instrument that can almost immediately be activated when their business interests need protecting.

In the last five years, the pressures from business owners have been especially intense; editors report that often they receive calls from business owners asking them to cover or not cover certain topics, government or business issues, or other stories that potentially can affect the wellbeing of their main profit-making industries. Such calls can also come from government agencies if the newspapers are founded or published by branches of government. This often happens despite the fact that such interference is forbidden under current Ukrainian media law.

Ukrainian media do not exercise press freedom; instead, they often exercise the freedom to sell their “freedom of press” ideas to whoever will pay the most. At the same time, journalists are often dependent on the publishers who determine the censorship or “editorial policy.” So, the overriding influence on Ukrainian journalism today can be best characterized not as state censorship but the influence of business interests of the owners and publishers (Commission on Journalism Ethics, 2006).

One of the central issues in the political economy of Ukraine is the issue of the language of the media. Russia has always been an influential neighbor, but especially after the Orange revolution in 2005, the degree of the country’s independence was tested by the large volume of relatively cheap media publications from Russia, on sale throughout the country. Some Ukrainian experts blame Russia for knowingly distributing cheap media to represent the interests of the Russian government in Ukraine and to influence the public.

To this day, the majority of media in Ukraine is published in the Russian language with the daily circulation of Russian-language newspapers at about 25 million copies per day, while the Ukrainian-language press accounts for only 16 million copies per day (Gabor, 2006). Media scholar Gabor notes that the circulation rate of Russian language newspapers is high all over the country, especially in the east and in the south, and says that the main problem for Ukrainian media is that some of the foreign print media, mostly Russian and Polish, are smuggled across the border or officially brought to Ukraine (about a million copies every day), including popular tabloid publications produced in Russia, such as Spid-Info, Cosmopolitan, Playboy, etc. It is difficult to put a stop to this practice, as the borders are only minimally policed. Plus, there is little control over illegal publications. There are also some English-language publications produced in Ukraine: Kiev Post, Kiev weekly, What’s up and Welcome to Ukraine but these are mainly distributed in Kiev through foreign-tourist-friendly locations, such as hotels, restaurants, and entertainment centers, but English-language publications are rare elsewhere in the country.10

In 2010, Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom...
The development of broadcast media in Ukraine is hindered by legal requirements that prohibit issuing new broadcasting licenses in analog.

Index ranked Ukraine as Not Free (Reporters without Borders, 2010). Recently, the ranking for Ukraine in this index fell sharply from 89th to 131st place amid growing concerns about the authoritarian regime of President Yanukovich. There have been multiple reports of abuses of journalists in the last two years, particularly when government officials have exercised their power to deny journalists access to information. Yet, physical pressures on journalists are not as pronounced as in the past. If in the 1990s, many journalists were victims of brutal physical pressures (most notably the killing of Gongadze, mentioned above), the situation has greatly improved. Even today, despite the growing concerns and some minor pressures from the national government, it is relatively safe to be a journalist in Ukraine. Between 2005 and 2010 there were fewer reports of actual physical abuse, although other types of intimidation, including the liberal use of tax inspection, have put other pressures on journalists. Many journalists experience financial pressures and often exercise self-censorship in the media (Grynko, 2010), which strongly reinforces media non-transparency.

Another factor that contributes to media non-transparency is the fact that many journalists are not well paid (with exception of national media editors and journalists); thus, they use any opportunity to earn money for their media outlet - and for themselves. Salaries of journalists in Ukraine vary greatly due to the discrepancies between national, regional and local media economic situations. As a rule, those journalists who work in Kiev for national TV companies as well as large national newspapers make several times (sometimes up to 10 times) more than the journalists with the same experience who work outside of Kiev for regional or local newspapers or radio or TV channels. This discrepancy is consistent with the salary discrepancy in other professions, with those working in Kiev earning on average twice as more a month (4,056 AUH, or U.S. $507) as those in the regions (average monthly salaries in the regions vary from 1,925 AUH, or U.S. $240 to 3,184 AUH, or U.S. $398, in Donetsk region, with a widely developed mining industry, with the most common average salaries are about 2,300 AUH, or U.S. $283) (Average Wage by Regions, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2010).

As a result, many publications appear in the media in exchange for direct or indirect payment or advertising (Tssetsura & Grynko, 2009). A recent survey of journalists and public relations practitioners revealed that both direct and indirect forms of media influence distort independent news coverage (Tssetsura & Grynko, 2009). Publishers, owners, editors, public relations practitioners, and advertisers often pressure the Ukrainian media to place paid materials as news pages or in news programming. According to Tssetsura and Grynko, media non-transparency occurs at three levels in Ukraine: interpersonal, intra-organizational, and inter-organizational. Their interviews and focus groups with journalists and public relations practitioners show that media professionals in Ukraine have yet to identify the modern roles and functions of media, public relations, and contemporary journalism and that they still struggle to find ways to reinforce their professional codes of ethics.

Media Laws and Regulations in Ukraine

The State Committee of Information Policy and Broadcasting of Ukraine is an official body that monitors moral and ethical issues in the media. Its other area of responsibility is advertising and broadcasting inspection. As the main government authority that oversees the state’s information policy, it is legally obliged to work together with the public National Parliamentary Committee of Press Freedom and Information, which unites representatives of prominent media, professional, and industrial associations, with media watchdog organizations. The Parliamentary Committee of Press Freedom and Information regulates the relationship...
between the state and the media and between the media and the citizens of Ukraine. It observes the legislative aspects of the media's activities and controls the state institutions' influence on the media. Together with the Parliament and the President this committee determines the country's information policy. Most of this study’s interviewees mentioned the importance of this committee for the continuous development of media freedom in Ukraine and for protecting the rights of the media and freedom of speech in the country. However, many media representatives noted that lately, the public committee has been largely absent from major discussions about the media and informational policy in the country, which is associated with growing concerns regarding the limited freedom of media in Ukraine.

The Department of Special Telecommunication Systems and Defense of Information is a branch of the Security Service of Ukraine. This department works on state policy for the defense of information sources on the internet and the cryptographic protection of this information. This organization has to observe and control the protection of information according to the legislation of Ukraine.

Established shortly after independence, the National Council for Radio and Television is a state committee that is accountable to the Parliament and the President of Ukraine. The Council's goal is to guarantee press and media freedom, to defend the rights and interests of the audience, journalists, producers, and broadcasters, to develop state policy in the licensing of broadcasters, and to monitor media legislation. Finally, the State Committee of Communication and Information regulates the technical side of the media, such as TV and radio frequency waves, standardization, etc. It gives licenses for mobile service providers and ensures the availability of internet services in Ukraine. Major broadcasting associations and industry organizations, including the ITK (Independent TV Committee) and IAB (Independent Association of Broadcasters), work closely with the aforementioned committees to protect and promote interests of broadcasters.

One of the pressing issues in the current Ukrainian media landscape is the question of the immanent switchover to digital broadcasting. As it is the most commonly used media and the main source of information for Ukrainian citizens, the future development of television in Ukraine is extremely important. Currently, the development of broadcast media in Ukraine is hindered by legal requirements that prohibit issuing new broadcasting licenses in analog. This is due to the Geneva Agreement of 2006, according to which 104 countries in the world, including Ukraine, should transition from analog frequencies to digital by June 2015. According to Ukrainian legislation, television companies will be forbidden to broadcast on analog frequencies starting January 2016.

The upcoming transition to digital includes a real threat to media freedom; the physical capabilities of the current infrastructure will only allow for 28 television stations to obtain a digital broadcasting license in the upcoming year. This may mean stiffer competition and also may create an environment in which local stations may be forced out of the market. Many discussions initiated by the IAB, the ITK, and by media NGOs representing the Ukrainian broadcasters focus on the best way Ukrainian television can transition to a digital format in the present era of increased government influence and control over content (IMS, 2011). IMS observed, “As Ukraine moves away from analogue signals, many popular regional TV and radio broadcasters are left without a digital license…. Although the final cut-off date for analogue signals is not until 2015 many private broadcasters have yet to receive broadcasting licenses. Without broadcasting licenses, some regions could be left with only state media coverage of the country’s presidential elections in 2015.” (IMS 2011) Observers at Internews and USAID have also noted that the process of receiving broadcasting licenses is happening in a non-transparent way. The media are regulated by Ukrainian laws, including

11 Under the plan for television and radio in Ukraine for 2011, the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting should give priority rights to obtain a license to broadcast on the digital network to the National Television Company, regional public broadcasters (broadcasting within the region), TV companies who have existing analog broadcasting networks covering 24-hour broadcasting for at least 50% of the population of Ukraine, as well as three leading regional television companies in each region. As of August 2011, a total of 59 applications had been submitted for broadcast licenses and 28 were able to receive them. Among those who received licenses were ICTV, Novy Kanal, Studio 1+1, STB, Inter, and National Television Company.

Newsboard in Telekritika office (credit: Katerina Tsetsura)
Today, the media business occupies a number of “parallel realities”: there are big media owners who control the major media corporations in the country, state and small local print media that cover the regions, and a growth of separate regional media projects founded by small local businessmen, who pursue high journalistic standards.
Business of the Media

In the 20-year history of free media in Ukraine, mass media has established itself as a strong and influential business. For the most part, mass media, both print and broadcast, has been a commercial and financial success. The following is an account of the business side of the media development in Ukraine, which highlights the major challenges associated with the running commercial media outlets in the country.

In the 1990s, business and political leaders in Ukraine started accumulating their initial capital. A few years later, these new businessmen started to realize their need to enter the field of politics to protect their business interests. This was the time when they turned their attention to the media, as they understood the ability of media to influence public opinion and ultimately, the government. Therefore, they started buying media outlets or creating new media to have control over content.

The middle of 1990s was the time when the first private newspapers and TV channels were founded, including Dzerkalo tyzhnya, Den, 1+1, and Inter. It was also a period of concentration of media resources and the beginning of the “oligarchization” process. Media started to become communication instruments to influence public opinion. Because of the close relations between media and political forces, the state authorities could easily pressure media organizations.

At the beginning of the 2000s, Russian media capital started impacting the Ukrainian media market, and the Ukrainian versions of national Russian newspapers, such as Komsomol'skaya Pravda and Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine were founded. New forms of media funding started to appear around the same time and grants from foreign donors established continuous support for such media projects as Ukrainska Pravda and Telekritika. The period from 2005-2010 (the presidency of Yuschenko) was a time of growing interest by western investors who started entering the Ukrainian media market. For instance, the well-known German publishing house Handelsblatt founded the newspaper Delo. However, non-transparent business practices in the country, difficulties in distribution, and political instability made it impossible for foreign investors to develop profitable media projects. The situation worsened after the economic crisis in 2008. Thus, many foreign owners had to quickly leave the market. Under the presidency of Yanukovych, which started in 2010, media ownership was redistributed among the main business groups in the country that control metallurgy, coal, pipelines, and oil industries.

Today, the media business occupies, as it were, a number of “parallel realities.” There are big media owners who control the major media corporations in the country. Besides these, there are state and small local print media that cover the regions. In the last two to three years, there has been a steady growth of separate media projects in regions, founded by small local businessmen in town and cities across Ukraine. These business people see the media as their main business venture and, as a result, pursue the journalistic standards by publishing editorials and news that are newsworthy and relevant to the local community. Recently, Western donors have been especially active in supporting these local and regional media outlets, particularly, in several geopolitical regions, including Crimea and Dnipropetrovsk.

According to Internews Ukraine reports, the advertising market registered a high growth rate of 250 percent between 2000 and 2008. While advertising revenue constitutes a large portion of media earnings, Ukrainian media also makes money on political campaigns, especially during election periods. The infusion of political money has become a common trend in the last five years during the democratic transformation of the country and mostly likely will fade away under the current government.

Although Ukrainian mass media have been a financial and commercial success, most of the money has not been spent in a transparent manner. Media owners and top managers have been the only people benefiting from such arrangements, while regular journalists remain heavily underpaid, especially at a regional level. Furthermore, centralization of capital and media resources, a process common in many ex-Soviet countries, altered the noble goal of democratic media in Ukraine as a watchdog. Instead, many media adopted ideologies of their corporate owners and served to secure and safeguard business interests of their owners. Several respondents emphasized that an owner does not invest money in the media to make money, but rather to protect themselves from the government or their competitors.

More than half of the founders and publishers of the print media are either citizens of Ukraine or members of commercial companies; government branches founded about 10 percent of the current print press. Political parties or politicians who place political and...
Legal and ethical codes are rarely applied to regulate the conduct of the media or of media owners.

economic pressure on the publications, own most of the newspapers in Ukraine.

**Challenges for Media Companies**

**Lack of Market and Audience Research**

There is a lack of publicly available reliable research studies and reports on media business in Ukraine. Information on audiences and advertising landscape is scattered and is often proprietary. Additionally, only few media companies engage in quality audience research due to the lack of funding and the lack of qualified professional staff. The vast majority of research companies and consultancies that offer research services are expensive and can be used by only a few major national media outlets. Anyone who wants to start his or her own media business in Ukraine will not only find fierce competition from existing media who say the advertising market is oversaturated, but also will face challenges in locating qualified yet reasonably priced advertising monitoring and research services.

There are only a few examples of market-oriented media studies in the country. Ukraine has been measuring TV audience preferences in Ukraine since 2003 (GfK, 2011). One of the largest marketing research groups in the world, GfK, has an office in Ukraine and offers sociological and marketing research services in the country on a commercial basis. The Industrial Television Committee orders the TV audience studies from GfK, but the study results are not publicly available. Periodically, some results or the market research are available for free, usually, when those who ordered the research decide to release some data. For instance, the website MediaBusiness presents the ratings of TV channels with reference to the GfK study (GfK, 2011). Media Business also publishes everyday TV ratings, and has a separate section “Analysis of the Market” in which it shares observations, trends, and recent publications on the subject of media business and media markets in Ukraine. However, media market research is almost non-existent in Ukraine, as the research results that are publicly available are rare and sporadic and in no way can be relied upon as up-to-date sources of information on the state of the media business in the country. Several other research agencies conduct internet audience research: KMIS, InMind and Gemius. But these studies are not systematic either and are often proprietary.

Other examples of media and market research are reports by the Worldwide Media and Marketing forecast, parts of which sometimes become publicly available. For instance, the Summer 2010 report on Ukrainian media advertising spending in 2009 showed advertising spending across several categories (such as communications (largest spend), media (second largest), cosmetics (third largest), pharmaceutical (fourth largest), etc.) as well as listing top ten advertisers in 2009 in Ukraine (top three were Procter & Gamble, L’Oreal, and Henkel). The report also included data on the advertising share of the media, with television consistently claiming about 43 percent of all advertising spending and internet advertising increasing its share of ad spending from 5.6 percent in 2003 to 21.4 percent in 2009 (GroupM, 2010). However, few Ukrainian business media managers know that such reports can be located online as few of them have time to conduct comprehensive media scanning and secondary research searches.

Non-governmental organizations sometimes analyze the media markets as well. The focus in these studies is usually around ethical issues in media, quality of the news, and objectivity of coverage of political events (often, during elections) in the country. Because these studies are donor-supported, NGOs are required to report information publicly. However, distribution of the results is often inadequate: even today one can rarely find such reports available online on the website of these NGOs. Many studies of political coverage and monitoring reports done with support from the Western donors in the early 2000s, particularly in 2002-2005, were mainly published in hard copies and are not available electronically today. After 2005, Telekritika has done the most regular studies on political media coverage and media monitoring, often with donor support. Although these studies are not methodologically strong, their results are usually available to the public online and are presented during public events.¹⁶

There is also a lack of quality systematic academic media research in the country. The culture of media research is almost non-existent, as there is no real relationship between academic resources and prac-

¹⁶ See Telekritika website: www.telekritika.ua.
tioners, and almost no data or research results are available for free. Besides, the studies conducted in universities at a postgraduate level (as a part of kandydat nauk dissertations),\(^{17}\) are usually far too theoretical for what the field really needs.

**Lack of Adequate Media Management Training**

Knowledge about successful business models for media development is severely lacking in Ukraine at the moment. That is not to say that such training has not been the focus of some donors; rather, that the training provided initially was largely content-centered and only very basic management training was offered. Donors perceived that they initially made a large investment in business capacity; however, interviewees universally complained that it was not enough to institutionalize business capacity in the media sector over the long term. The vast majority of media NGOs and media representatives, including journalists and editors, as well as representatives of Western donors, agree that the lack of business training of media managers and owners clearly puts Ukrainian media at a disadvantage. Business know-how is distorted by years of Soviet influence on the one hand, and by misinterpretation of the media business models on the other. Firstly, Soviet-style journalism covered topics that were only important for the government. Those who were in power used to identify what was newsworthy, and the information was communicated from the top, down to all media. Although many young journalists and editors in Ukraine broke free from the Soviet-style media, there are still many older journalists and editors in Ukraine who mostly work in local and regional media outlets and who were trained and educated to follow the orders from those in power.

Second, a common misunderstanding among many journalists is that media owners have now replaced the Soviet government and are clearly in control of the media agenda. Of course, in many cases, this belief is borne out by cases of owner and publisher pressures. What is different is that many Ukrainian journalists accept such control, as they are accustomed to the idea that “he who pays the piper calls the tune” as the saying goes. Thus the media business model is misinterpreted: the media is expected to either be a voice of the owner and should be solely concerned with representing the owner’s interests to the government or it is expected to make money first and foremost, and should publish or air information from any commercial or non-commercial source that is willing to pay for coverage. Although instances of the latter are rare, they can nonetheless be seen in the decisions of editors and journalists in many smaller local and regional media.

In other words, as outlined in Tsetsura & Grynko’s (2009), research, media transparency can be compromised in several ways, both direct and indirect, and at three different levels: interpersonal, intra-organizational (for instance, when transparency is undermined between an advertising and an editorial departments within the same media outlet), and inter-organizational. The inter-organizational level is the most troubling as this level of non-transparency happens when two organizations, for example, a media outlet and a corporation, enter a legally-binding agreement for promotional coverage within news pages without necessarily indicating the materials have been paid for; these are the materials written by journalists who may not even know that they are writing about a company that paid for its publicity. The editor may know that the material has been paid for but has little control over his/her newsroom freedom. Tsetsura and Grynko (2009) argue, “Often Ukrainian journalists justify this influence by citing personal or organizational financial struggles. More often, however, this practice is more than just a bribe: it is rather a calculated conscious decision to accept a direct or indirect payment from a news source because of a certain pressure from within the media company (such as an advertising department or publisher) or from the outside (such as an advertiser or a public relations practitioner).”

**Legal and Ethical Challenges**

Legal and ethical codes are rarely applied to regulate the conduct of the media or media owners. The legal guidelines for the media business have been at the center of many discussions in Ukraine in the last 20 years. For instance, immediately after the Orange revolution, a civic advisory committee, with representatives from the media and NGOs, was formed to help the new government to develop a scheme that would guarantee that Ukraine had a system of public broadcasting, which would be based on the well-developed national network of TV and radio studios that was present in the Soviet Union. These so-called “legacy” media continue to operate to this date, whether independently or under the patronage of, and with subsidies from, the local and municipal governments, often using the same staff (journalists and editors) and equipment. Despite very extensive work by the civic advisory committee and many Western donors, most notably the British Council, a draft of the law on public broadcasting in Ukraine has not been passed under president Yushchenko.

\(^{17}\) This is equal to a scientific postgraduate degree, and can be placed between a Masters and a PhD; although some argue that “kandydat nauk” is an equivalent of a Western PhD, this is not entirely correct.
In 2011, after several years of active work of media NGOs and public and national committees on freedom of speech and information with the government of Ukraine, a law on public access to information has finally been passed. The law guarantees protection to journalists who perform their professional duties while trying to gain access to government materials or information about public officials. Not surprisingly, the draft of this law has not been very popular among the Ukrainian government officials, but after several years the government gave in to pressures from Ukrainian media monitoring NGOs and media outlets to pass this law. The passing of the freedom of information law has been widely hailed as a major success by media scholars, professional associations, watchdog organizations, and other Ukrainian NGOs.
Much research on media development in Ukraine has been published in journals of media studies and mass communication as well as in journals dealing with political sciences and political communication. These studies have addressed the political dependence of the media, the lack of professionalization of journalists and specialists of public relations, and, most importantly, the misunderstanding and lack of trust and knowledge among reporters and editors about public relations, specifically media relations (Baysha & Hallahan, 2004; Dyczok & Gaman-Golutvina, 2009; Kulish, 2001; Ligachova & Ganzha, 2005; Pikhovshek, 1997).

In general, there is a lack of research publications about the media in Ukraine in English, which limits the availability of the literature resources on the media in Ukraine for the international community. Some works have been produced by western scholars interested in Ukraine and post-Soviet countries (for instance, Marta Dyczok at the University of Western Ontario, Canada).

Donors have conducted very little research on media development. In the rare cases when these studies have been done, the information has largely been inaccessible. For instance, in 2011, a local donor, the Akhmetov Foundation, commissioned a study on the contemporary landscape of social media in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the results of the study are not available to the public as the research was identified as proprietary. Thus, the motivations for conducting such a study and its findings remain unknown.

The most notable research studies have been conducted by Ukrainian NGOs, such as the Academy of Ukrainian Press. Its president, a well-known professor of journalism at Kiev State University’s School of Journalism, periodically secures research grants to conduct media-monitoring in Ukraine, as well as to examine media development trends, ethical challenges of journalists, and the overall development of the profession in the country. Those studies are published in Ukrainian in the form of textbooks and monographs, which are largely used as textbooks at the above School and some regional universities. Faculty members at the School of Journalism at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy also publish their research in books, textbooks, and monographs, largely in Ukrainian. They also have been active in publishing summaries of their research in English in Western journals and presenting the results of their research at international conferences.

Ukrainian media studies are examined within the PhD program in Mass Communication (School of Journalism, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2011). These research studies investigate contemporary media practices in Ukraine, online media, discourses in media, political communication in Ukraine and others. The researchers in the PhD program (Daria Orlova, Daria Tarada, Anastasia Grynko, Tetyana Lokot and others) conduct studies, produce work in English, and have the opportunity to publish study results in international journals.
Donor-Funded Media Development

It is hard to obtain accurate information about grant spending on media development in Ukraine as many projects combine many sectors and involve multiple Western donors. In addition, it is difficult to assess what funds were used for media development and what funds were used for civil society development, as the two sectors are often very connected. Many organizations report their total spending in the region for supporting democracy together with civil society and media development but they do not divide out their media spending.\(^{18}\)

However, the research was able to extract some figures to illustrate the scope of the investments in media development in Ukraine over the last 20 years. Additional information is also available in organizational profiles (see Appendix 2).

1. European Council Project “Promoting European Standards of Journalism in Ukraine” 2008-2012 has a budget of 2,488,918 euros.
2. International Media Support (IMS) funded by the governments of Denmark, Sweden and Finland reports its approximate budget of U.S. $99,3400 for 2008-2011.
3. Since 2008, the USAID U-Media program has awarded 99 grants totaling U.S. $3.46 million to 59 local media NGOs, research institutions, media outlets and civic organizations throughout Ukraine.

Efforts by Western donors to encourage capacity building among and cooperation between NGOs have failed, as many NGOs see themselves as unique and see other NGOs as direct competitors for grant funds.

\(^{18}\) See, for instance, reports from OSF-Renaissance Foundation.
Donor support has helped to found several media outlets that remain successful today, including STB TV, “Ukrainianska Pravda” and Telekritika.

4. In 2009-2010 alone, U-Media (USAID) awarded 27 grants to 18 organizations or media outlets in Crimea with an estimated overall budget of U.S. $513,000.

5. Over the last 20 years, OSF has granted $976 million on democratic development in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but it is unknown how much of this money was spent directly to media projects in Ukraine.

USAID has been the largest and most consistent donor for enhancing media development and supporting the independent media in Ukraine. Since 1992, USAID has provided $1.7 billion worth of technical and humanitarian assistance and supported numerous civil society, democratic initiatives, and media development projects in the country (USAID: Ukraine, 2011).

In the early 1990s, USAID focused its support on democratic initiatives and civil society development. At that time, the development of independent media channels (meaning, independent from the government) was crucial. Gradually, in the mid-to late-1990s and early 2000s, donor support extended to media development NGOs that united the media and were able to resist government pressures for media censorship and control. At the same time, USAID support has always been available for media monitoring and analysis of political coverage, especially coverage of political opposition candidates during elections at the local, regional, and national levels. The culmination of such support came in 2004 when USAID sponsored a number of projects that later contributed to the media protests during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, including the live TV coverage of the protests in Maidan square in Kiev by the independent TV channels which were established with support from USAID. Even after the Orange Revolution, it was clear that the support for new independent media in the country was still needed so, in 2008, USAID extended the U-Media program (which had begun in 2003) for another three years (see above). In 2011, USAID replaced U-Media with the Ukraine Media Project, which focuses on institutional capacity building and sustainability.

Over the years, USAID has worked closely with several international NGOs. IREX, an American NGO that has worked in Ukraine media development since 1996, implemented USAID’s ProMedia program from 1995-2006, and the U-Media program from 2002-2007. The ProMedia program worked “primarily with regional
newspapers – to improve journalistic quality of independent newspapers, improve the financial viability of those papers, promote and defend freedom of the press, and encourage development of professional associations.” (IREX 2003) Under U-Media, over 1,600 journalists were trained in professional standards, investigative journalism, new media tools and advocating for media sector legislation.

Another notable international partner of USAID is Internews Network, which since 2008 has implemented the U-Media program in Ukraine. In 2009-2010, USAID significantly expanded the U-Media program in Crimea in order to increase access to information for Crimean residents and their participation in local decision-making (see above). During 2010, U-Media grantees trained more than 70 young journalists in Crimea who produced more than 640 feature stories and news spots published in local newspapers and broadcasted on radio and TV.¹⁹

The National Endowment for Democracy, or NED, is also one of the largest and most consistent supporters of media development in Ukraine. According to the 2010 NED annual report, last year NED awarded 12 grants to support independent media and media development projects for the total sum of almost $528,000.²⁰

¹⁹ For details, see the USAID organizational profile in Appendix 2.
²⁰ For details on the projects and NGOs supported, see the NED organizational profile in Appendix 2.

The U.S. Embassy in Ukraine for many years has had its own separate grant-giving program to support the development of independent media in Ukraine.

**Evaluation of Donor Support**

Donor support was influential in the establishment and the development of the vast majority of independent media outlets in Ukraine. Donor support was also instrumental in establishing and supporting a number of media freedom watchdog NGOs and media monitoring NGOs that have functioned with various degrees of success. The biggest problem with media NGOs in Ukraine is their weak organizational structure and limited interest in investing time and resources in organizational development. Many established media NGOs in Ukraine, although widely popular and active, have evolved little because of the lack of clear organizational structure. Some still operate as one- or two-people organizations, much like they were in 1990s. Although some NGO representatives understand the importance of building capacity and developing a structure, many find it unnecessary, as they concentrate on getting grants from Western donors to complete specific projects and then have little time and energy left to work on the development of their organization. Multiple attempts by Western donors to encourage capacity building within these organizations and to push these NGOs to cooperate with one another on grant projects have failed as many NGOs see themselves as unique and see other NGOs as direct competitors for grant...
funds. In interviews, some donors suggested limiting or eliminating grants paid toward salaries of NGO implementers, to avoid the escalation of the fight for limited grant resources in the future, and to encourage organizations to think beyond just one source of income.

Most independent media and media NGOs in Ukraine have all enjoyed generous Western donor support in the years 1990 to 2005. Between 2005 and 2011, a lesser degree of this support continued, shifting focus to target multiple project-specific programs, such as media and journalism training programs, media education programs, and regional media development instead of organizational structure support.

Successful Donor-funded Media Development Interventions

Arguably, the most successful donor programs are those that have supported media watch organizations and freedom of speech movements. The following media watch organizations, which were established in the early to mid-1990s and which received continuous support from donors, and still exist today are the most recognized and widely respected:

- **Telekritika** [Наталія Лигачова «Телекритика»] (by far the most cited and most respected organization)
- **Bureau of investigative journalism Svidomo** [Бюро журналістських розслідувань «Свідомо»; leader: Єгор Соболєв]
- **Institute of Media Law, and Institute of Mass Information, or IMI** (also known as Kiev Mass Media Institute) [Вікторія Сюмар, Інститут масової інформації]

Among the media, the most notable and recognized outlets founded with the help of donors are:
- **Mirror of the Week** ("Дзеркало Тижня") magazine
- **Ukrainian Truth** newspaper («Українська правда»)
- The news studio of Channel 5
- **STB TV**
- Multiple regional newspapers and TV studios

In addition, the majority of interviewees also named the following local organizations as being consistently the most influential media organizations in Ukraine in the last decade:

- **Internews Ukraine**
- **Regional Press Development Institute (Institut Regionalnoj Pressy)**
- **Association of Ukrainian Press**

Donor support in the 1990s and early 2000s has helped to found several strong media outlets that are successful today. For example, the STB TV channel was founded with USAID funds. Even though STB came under fire later from USAID for the process of privatization of the equipment (now the channel belongs to Victor Pinchuk, one of the richest people in Ukraine), which was originally bought with grant money to support the establishment of this independent TV news channel, it is widely recognized as one of the most balanced and objective TV channels in the country. Specifically, the media monitoring conducted under the project of the non-governmental organization Telekritika (Mediasapiens, 2010) shows that the STB channel had the most objective and balanced news coverage during the 2009-2010 election campaign out of all TV channels in the country.

STB TV is a good example of projects founded by donors that have managed to build enough capacity to later become a separate business-owned project and yet have kept their high quality and independence. The reason that the STB channel succeeded is that from the very beginning the channel employed the best talent: well-qualified and professional editors and journalists. After working for the channel for several years and establishing their reputation as independent and objective journalists, they stood up against the new owner who, once he bought the channel, first tried to control the news. Editors and journalists protested and

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21 Two organizations in Ukraine have similar names: one is Internews Network, which is an international NGO headquartered in the U.S. with an office in Kiev, Ukraine. The other is a local NGO called Internews Ukraine (which was originally established by Internews Network). It is easy to confuse the two even for Ukrainian media and NGO representatives. Both organizations are located in the same building in Ukraine; both provide media support services in Ukraine. Internews Network implements the USAID-funded Ukraine Media grant program in Ukraine, whereas Internews Ukraine is a Ukrainian NGO that receives grants from Ukrainian Media and other donors to run training programs for journalists and other programs. Digital Media Project is one of the main training programs that Internews Ukraine is currently running, which aims to train regional and local journalists from across Ukraine on how to effectively use online portals and social media for journalistic purposes. Although both of these organizations (Internews Network and Internews Ukraine) have strong programs for media development, neither one of them was named as most influential or highest on the list of the best media supporting organizations. Perhaps, it can be partially explained by the fact that many media and NGO representatives fail to recognize the difference between the two organizations.
publicly announced that they would leave the channel if the owner pressured them and directed editorial policy. These editors and journalists were able to protect their independence and continued to produce quality output, even after the privatization of the channel. But it was only possible because of the early training and the established reputation that the media and the editors and journalists have enjoyed for the first years, as a grant-supported, non-governmental outlet.

“Ukrainianska Pravda” (“Ukrainian Truth”) is another positive example of a donor-funded project. It still works well and is perceived as a leading and independent online-medium in Ukraine. According to those who were interviewed for this study (representatives of Ukrainska Pravda declined to be interviewed), “Ukrainska Pravda” still receives donor support. However, it has also become successful in securing advertising dollars. Interviewees for this study agreed it is the most objective and high-quality source of news and investigation in the country.

Finally, Telekritika, the most respected news outlets for media professionals in the country, has been an exemplar of an organization that developed and grew from a small donor-supported organization into a strong independent venture that unites non-profit and for-profit elements. Telekritika, seen as a high-quality source of information, is widely recognized as a specialized medium for journalists and people interested in the media industry, and is also read by government officials at all levels, according to several media professionals and NGO representatives interviewed for this study.

### Donor-supported Media-related NGOs

Most donor activity before 2005 concentrated on providing opportunities to media NGOs to monitor freedoms of speech and information, particularly in light of elections in Ukraine. Another clear focus before 2005 was to support the establishment and creation of independent media outlets in Ukraine, by giving grants to establish the infrastructure of the independent media (e.g., buying equipment, paying for rent, and covering journalists’ salaries).

Donor interventions changed the landscape of media freedom in Ukraine, in particular, the independence, readiness, and articulate voices of Ukrainian media NGOs have greatly contributed to the development of independent media in Ukraine and have helped to support many independent journalists and editors providing them with a discursive platform and uniting them over a common cause of protecting freedom of speech and information. These results are the most vivid ones in terms of donor intervention in Ukraine.

After obtaining grants from Western donors to monitor and support freedom of speech in newly independent Ukraine, many media watch organizations (e.g., Tele-
kritika, IMI, Academy of Ukrainian Press, Institute of Media law, Regional press Development Institute, Souspilnist) conducted a series of studies on media monitoring, particularly in relation to political news and fair and balanced coverage of elections. At the time these monitoring reports were published, representatives of these NGOs presented the results of their research at regional, national, and international conferences. They were consistently able to attract the attention of the global community, particularly of the media and governing bodies in Europe, to the mismatch between the talk and actions of the government regarding the freedom of speech and the media in Ukraine in the mid-1990s and early 2000s.

Another notable NGO funded with donor support is Internews Ukraine. The organization was established in 1996 as an offshoot of Internews Network whose head office is in the U.S. It is one of the leading Ukrainian NGOs in the area of media development, whose focus is mostly on “promoting free media and establishing European values through development of successful media” (Internews, n.d.). Today, Internews Ukraine is a completely local NGO that has no direct ties with Internews Network, the USAID project implementer, although the two share the same building (originally purchased by Internews Network but now is owned by two organizations).

The vast majority of Internews Ukraine’s programs are media and journalist training, for which it is well known and popular. Often, because of the similar names and the connected past, many local media and NGOs confuse Internews Ukraine with Internews Network. Many Ukrainian NGOs may receive support from U-Media project but cite this support as given by Internews Ukraine. At the same time, they can also attend workshops and training sessions put together by Internews Ukraine as part of a grant that may or may not be U-Media grant, and still consider the workshop as the one “organized and conducted by Internews.” This confusion brings both opportunities and challenges to Internews Network presence in Ukraine. Internews Ukraine is the central media training hub and one of the most successful media centers in Ukraine. It is widely known beyond Kiev, and it has a strong network of journalists and editors who often travel to Kiev to attend training seminars offered as part of its grant-sponsored activities to enhance journalists’ professionalism in Ukraine.

All media NGOs listed in this study were able to engage in a variety of freedom of speech and information monitoring activities and were able to fulfill watchdog roles for two reasons: the continuous financial support for their organization from a variety of Western donors, and the somewhat relaxed political environment of

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23 The vast majority of these studies, conducted between 1991 and 2004, were available only in print versions, with a limited number of published copies. After extensive search and multiple visits to these organizations, we were able to locate only a few prints of these media monitoring studies. There is no one central location or organization that has and/or provides access to the variety of media monitoring materials, largely produced under the Western donor grants in the last 20 years. According to the NGO members of these organizations, the electronic files of the documents have been lost and were never available online.
There is a clear connection between Western donors’ support of the media and the media’s ability to initiate political and social change in Ukraine.

Ukraine. For years, these NGOs have enjoyed financial independence from the government thanks to the Western donor grants, which aimed to support the development of the independent media environment and, largely, the development of the civil society in Ukraine through the development of the third sector (NGOs).

Other, less prominent non-government media organizations included Kiev Independent Media Professional Union with leader Yuriy Lukanov (Юрій Луканов, Київська незалежна медіа-профспілка) and the Foundationa Suspilnist (or Souspilnist) with its leader Taras Petriv (Тарас Петрив, фундація «Суспільність») (descriptions of their activities can be found in the organizational profiles in Appendix 2).

Most importantly, the overall donor support of the civil society development, including support of multiple organizations that strived for political and economical change in Ukraine, allowed the media to be in the front of the action and to some extent unite the activists via extensive independent coverage of the events during the Orange revolution.

Current State of Donor-funded Media Development in Ukraine

During the last few years, donor support for media development in Ukraine has significantly decreased. The respondents outline several major changes in donor-funded media development. First, the format of donor support has drastically changed, moving from grant support to contracts. The goals and tasks of donors in Ukraine have changed and donors sponsor only those programs and projects that help them achieve their goals. Furthermore, such format for media support is much cheaper as it eliminates any organizational infrastructural support and allows certain tasks, such as organization of training seminars and professional conferences, to be outsourced to local NGOs. Many donor organizations now have open calls for submissions and Ukrainian NGOs must compete and show they can implement the task for the smallest amount of money.

This situation creates financial hardship for many civil society actors and media NGOs in Ukraine. The problem with such donor-driven media development or civil society development is that NGOs in Ukraine are not simply non-profit: they are also non-income. That means that they cannot be self-sustained as according to the law they cannot sell their seminars, trainings, expertise or their books. Therefore, donor support is the main source of income for these organizations.

Furthermore, during the last few years, donors have been significantly reducing institutional support for projects, including staff salaries and money for office supplies. Because donors mostly sponsor specific projects rather than organizations, problems tend to arise, especially for those staff who need to feed their families.

In the 2000s, the widely discussed proposal to create public broadcasting in Ukraine was supported actively by the British Council and British Embassy donors for more than six years, but nothing has happened. A new wave of discussions came around early 2011, in light of the latest media freedom concerns, and the British Council once again awarded several project-specific grants to media NGOs that were instrumental in moving the conversation forward.

There are two main reasons why sustainability is impossible for local NGOs in Ukraine at the moment. First, the law does not allow NGOs to earn money in any other way. There is an effort to change the law, and if this happens there will be a transition period for NGOs during which they will need training in how to be sustainable. Second, Ukrainian society is not ready yet. It requires time to make people believe that the right to freedom of speech and free media is as important a civil liberty as the right to health care and education.

The Role of Foreign Donors in Media Development in Ukraine

The role of donors in media development in Ukraine can be assessed on two levels: from a historical perspective starting from support begun in the early 1990s and from a contemporary perspective—analyzing how donors can contribute to Ukrainian media development under the current political and economic conditions of the country. When viewed in retrospect, many respondents emphasize the historical role of foreign donors in the development of a democratic media in Ukraine. “Ukraine significantly differs from other former Soviet states because it has a pretty strong civil society,” said a representative of International Media Support
in Ukraine. “Thanks to donors’ support we now have a strong pool of professional media organizations that help media development.”

After obtaining its independence, Ukraine started building a new country. During this time donors brought innovations, technology and knowledge to the freshly established free media. Contributions of money, education and training, and Western expertise allowed for establishing new standards of journalism, openness and legal initiatives. It has also allowed for building a strong foundation for democratic development and has sown the seeds of Western democratic ideals in the minds of a new generation for years to come. Openness to new knowledge (sponsored by foreign donors) and democratic transformations of the country made its development significantly different from other ex-Soviet countries like Belarus, Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan.

From a contemporary perspective, donors and non-governmental organizations play an important role as international advocates for the development of civil society and media in Ukraine. According to respondents, there is an international pressure to support media development in Ukraine and it is partially influenced by donors. For example, The Law on Access to Public Information has been under consideration in the parliament for many years. When donors and NGOs, including IMS, Internews, Article 19, and Council of Europe, joined their forces on the issue, creating a consolidation of opinions and power, the Ukrainian parliament decided that it would be easier and more beneficial to pass the law rather than create an international stir. This illustrates that donors play an important role in advocacy in Ukraine.

Another important role for donors is helping media development in ethnically unstable regions of Ukraine. Their role is especially visible in Crimea, where ethnic tensions run high and the strong political pressure and involvement from the Russian Federation is notable. By allowing and supporting ethnic media (Tatar and others) through Internews Ukraine and other NGOs and creating alternative sources of information, donors help ease some of the tensions.

A clear connection can be made between Western donors’ support of the media and the media’s ability to initiate political and social change in Ukraine. The reason why so many media outlets, including Svidomo, Ukrainska Pravda and STB and nonprofit media freedom watch organizations, such as Telekritika, and IMI, have been able consistently to resist and protest against growing government pressures on the media over the last few years (particularly after President Yanukovich’s return to power) is that these media outlets and media watch NGOs have been consistently active in media freedom in Ukraine, in many instances for over ten to fifteen years.

How Donor Support Has Helped or Hurt Media Development in Ukraine

Participants in this study, as well as various actors and organizations involved in media development in the last 20 years, agreed overall that interventions by Western donors in media development and journalism training in Ukraine have largely had a positive, significant impact. There was a clear difference, however, in responses regarding the current challenges and strategies different media and NGOs propose to donors in terms of grant projects. The difference was between those media and NGOs that have invested in structural development and those who have not. Interviews and limited participant observation revealed that those organizations that donors identified as having strong or relatively strong organizational structures still pinpointed the lack of well-prepared business media managers and business personnel as their main challenge. Representatives of these organizations emphasized the importance of training in the area of media business and fundraising as well as in the area of organizational management. They viewed training of journalists as important but not as critical, as there have been plenty of quality training programs offered to journalists in the last 20 years. Instead, they recommended that donors concentrate on journalism training on writing on specific issues (such as economics).

On the other hand, the lack of funding for organizations themselves, and the need for grants that support organizational structures, leaders and a small number of personnel were the major themes and needs identified by the organizations that were defined as having weak organizational structures. Clearly, these organizations still rely on donors to support their organizational structure and as a result have limited or non-existent sustainability strategies.

However, all organizations interviewed were quite supportive of one another, and were very protective of their organizational structure and sustainability efforts. In fact, every organization interviewed defined itself as having a strong organizational structure. Only Western (particularly, U.S.-based) donors made a distinction between weak and strong media organizations, as follows: from very weak (e.g., IMI, Suspilnist, Investi-
Donors emphasized their increasingly strong interest in supporting those organizations that have demonstrated the desire and ability to support and develop their own organizational structures. Donors acknowledged that organizational growth and development might not deliver immediate results. They also recognized that most of these media NGOs are central to media development and to monitoring of freedom of speech in today’s Ukraine as concerns over censorship have risen dramatically in the last two years, after the new president of Ukraine came to power as his administration seems to be warming up to the idea of selective censoring. At the same time, donors emphasized that their decision to sponsor specific projects instead of organizations at large was in part due to encourage infrastructural development and sustainability. Donors pointed out that infrastructural development, including, but not limited to, financial sustainability of an organization (its ability to pay salaries, rent, and utilities with its own money and not money that come from grants) and its infrastructural growth (or instance, strategic planning, addition of new employee lines, such as Director of Fundraising and/or Development, etc.) At the same time, media representatives and NGOs have said that these topic-specific projects, such as training journalists to effectively use online distribution and social media or sponsoring research and evaluation studies on media monitoring of opposition coverage, have forced them to abandon some of their interests and adjust their organizational missions to be able to successfully compete for grant money. In short, the project-specific grants have been successful in the short-term, but it remains to be seen whether there could be a successful long-term model to motivate Ukrainian NGOs to move toward sustainability.

The donors interviewed characterized most of the successful organizations that consistently get grants and deliver results as having “weak structures,” as they question whether some of these organizations are sustainable beyond grant-specific projects. Some donors recalled a conversation they had with one leader of a very active media NGO that consistently receives grants—yet fails to develop its structure—about the importance of sustainability and organizational development. When the donor representative asked a leader of this NGO what would happen to the organization if its leader were to meet with an accident and could no longer perform the duties, the leader answered, “Well, then the organization will die with me.” This passionate response from the leader who, while he deeply cares about the NGO, fails to see the benefits of sustainable growth is a typical example of the problems many successful Ukrainian NGOs face.

There might be several reasons for this: first, all NGOs, despite the number of active donors and multiple projects, still see each other as competitors and rarely share information or try to organize in clusters to achieve the goals. They often unite for a cause to protect freedom of speech (as it is the case with the recent movement Stop Censorship! which aims to attract national and global attention to the latest censorship-like developments in Ukraine; see the organizational profile of Stop Censorship! for more information). At the same time, the same organizations rarely, if ever, unite to bid on grants or to implement the projects together. Each claims to have the wide, strong network of supporters and followers along with the large database of journalists. None of these databases or media contacts that NGOs have developed through the years are publicly available (online or otherwise). Despite multiple attempts by the donors, including USAID, U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, and Internews Network to offer incentives to these NGOs to unite and create interest and topic clusters (some even offered grants that could only be given to organizations that have multiple partners), forced collaboration was never a success. Ukrainian NGO leaders failed to find a way to unite, as each NGO was concerned that a different NGO would ultimately become a grant-distributor and thus would not assign project implementation (and would not give enough money) to representatives of another NGO.

Small or regional NGOs that have not had a long history of getting media development grants are now in a tough position, as the number of grants and caps get smaller. Donors do not have an established, trusted relationship with them and thus feel reluctant to sponsor their projects, even if they are presented as important and relevant. That is why the strategy of unification of NGOs works much better at the regional level than it does at the national level or with Kiev-based NGOs. According to representatives of small and regional media development NGOs, the staff members of the few Kiev offices are closely connected with managers of the grant-giving organizations and with the leaders.
of major media NGOs in Ukraine. They often speak in support of each other’s projects. In addition, some interviewees expressed concerns, believing that leaders of these major NGOs located in Kiev often have an unfair advantage in grant competitions because they know the donor representatives (or managers of grant-giving organizations) personally and over the years have developed strong ties and personal and professional connections with them. By contrast, representatives of major donor organizations felt strongly that the competition is fair and accurate, emphasizing that they pay particular attention to regional NGOs to make sure that there is an equal opportunity for all to apply for grants.

Assessing the Impact of Donor Support

The interviewees for this study report that donors support first and foremost those projects that they see as well written and articulate. According to those interviewed, donors pay a lot of attention to reports that highlight measurable outcomes and results. However, not all donor-supported NGOs are funded on the basis of measurable results. There are NGOs that have existed for more than 20 years, yet most of them are visible and well represented because of strong leadership, and because one or two of the NGOs’ leaders are skilled at getting grants. Donors reward these NGOs for work they perceive to be effective, despite a lack of measurable results, organizational structure, or organizational sustainability.

NGOs judge success by observing changes in the media landscape. They consider it a major victory if the government reacts or responds to media accusations on limiting freedom of speech. They see independent media development as a process of continuous media monitoring and attracting attention to problems with freedom of information and speech in the society at large. Most importantly, NGOs cite the fact that journalists and editors can freely criticize the government without being jailed or killed (as was the case ten years ago when Gongadze was murdered) as evidence of success of their projects. Although violations of freedom of speech are still quite widespread, as one media NGO representative puts it, “the Ukrainian media have enjoyed breathing the era of freedom for about six years, and now it is practically impossible to take this freedom away from us.”

However, concerns over growing government control have become more vocal recently. “Today we are being robbed of our country. We are doing everything we can to explain to people what is happening these days and why,” said one of the representatives of Internews Ukraine. Currently, there is very little media development in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian media is now deteriorating and has stagnated. “The only reason why free democratic media in Ukraine still exists is that Ukraine has a very active NGO sector and journalists who fight for it. These are the organizations and people who were educated and trained with help of donors. These are value-driven organizations: Institute for Mass Information, Telekritika, Stop Censorship, Suspilnist, Ukrainyskaya Pravda,” concluded this representative.

After 2005, the Western donors started paying particular attention to the sustainability and organizational structure of NGOs and found that many NGOs that received funding did not deliver tangible, measurable results. As a result, the decision among donors was to push for sponsoring concrete specific projects aimed at media development. Donors offered topics in their RFPs and asked organizations to apply for implementing specific tasks, mostly journalist training and media monitoring. This change in grant-giving strategy was a welcome change at first, as many local NGOs also wanted to separate themselves from those who live “from grant to grant.” However, many organizations found themselves in the position of chasing grants and switching their priorities and focus constantly, rather than serving and supporting their original mission. In 2010-2011, Western donors, particularly the ones from the U.S., started to note this game-switching strategy. In early 2011, donors have engaged in multiple conversations about the importance of keeping the organizational mission clear and finding the new ways to sustainability of media NGOs in Ukraine.

Almost all participants also referred to the newly organized movement “Stop Censorship!” («Стоп цензурі!»), created in May 2010. The impetus for the unification of journalists into a civil grass roots movement “Stop Censorship!” was the statements of TV journalists from leading TV channels in Ukraine “1+1” and the STB (CT5) on the introduction of censorship of their news editions. In response to accusations of harassment of media representatives’ freedom of speech, President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych instructed the security Service and the Interior Ministry to deal with facts of censorship. Media representatives met with a member of the Ministry to discuss their concerns; however, the violations of journalists’ rights continued, but the president ignored these violations.

26 Note: although the interviewee refers Stop Censorship as an organization, it is actually a movement that unites many different media NGOs and media outlets across the country.
Key Issues in Sustainability of Donor-developed Media and Media NGOs

In the 1990s and early 2000, the vast majority of grants were issued to media NGOs that monitored the media freedom, political, particularly opposition, coverage and to the independent media for structural support and development. These grants were largely the reason why many of the leading independent media exist in Ukraine today. Among the respected independent media outlets and NGOs that were established with help of Western donor money are Telekritika, Channel 5, STB (CTB), and Ukrainian Pravda. Most of these media have become privatized, not without a scandal and harsh feelings on part of donors. For instance, the TV equipment originally bought with Internews Network funds for the newly independent TV studio CTB, has been soon privatized and became commercial; and Telekritika joined the commercial media publishing house in 2006. However, the media themselves, media monitoring NGOs, and many Western donors agree that integrity and independence of the news media has been protected.

In the last few years, large Western donors, particularly the ones from the United States, have started to carefully consider the sustainability factor and the level of organizational development when awarding grants for implementation of specific projects. Today, the big question Ukrainian NGOs try to answer is how to build or develop a solid structure without initial grant investments and, at the same time continue, work with donors on specific projects delivering the measured results.

Many donors mentioned NGO Telekritika as an exemplar model for organizational structure development and sustainability. Not only does the NGO have a strong and forward-looking leader, Natalia Ligachova, but it has also consistently invested into its structural development, recently hiring a Director of Development. Telekritika was the only organization that was unanimously characterized as a Ukrainian NGO with a strong leader and a strong structure. Among the NGOs with relative strong leaders and relatively weak structures (some progress has been made in recent years) are Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI), Association of Independent Regional Publishers in Ukraine, Industrial Television Committee (ITK), The Independent Association of Television and Radio Broadcasters. Among the most active and most popular among donors NGOs that, according to donors, have strong leaders but weak structures, are Institute for Media Information, Academy of Ukrainian Press, and Suspilnist Foundation.

All these NGOs consistently get grants from the donors and deliver measured results. However, in the last few years, donors have started to pay particular attention to steps these NGOs take to develop its sustainability and structure. These NGOs have seen indirect pressures from donors to find ways to sustainability and independence, albeit with limited success to date.

Some interviewees claimed that the era of the so-called “grant-eaters” has passed: unlike the 1990s and early 2000s, donors do not award grants for the organizational structure support and development (e.g., to cover costs of office rent, office equipment, etc.). The vast majority of the grants are awarded to implement specific projects aimed at the media development. Usually, the topics of these projects are designed and offered by the donors as part of the RFPs. Lack of the organizational structure grants minimized, if not eliminated those NGOs in Ukraine who existed solely for the purpose of getting such structure grants.

Identifying Future Donor Interventions

Today, most Western donors are re-evaluating their grant-giving strategy; they are particularly interested in identifying the organizations that have a solid, strong structure (including multiple leaders, a director of development, etc.) and a clear strategy as to how to continue serving their mission even when grant money is no longer available. While some organizations are perceived as having “weak” or “very weak” structures, they continue to receive grants today as they have a well-developed network and proven successful mechanism for implementing specific projects. In other words, despite the fact that some of those organizations have one or two people doing all the work and have no clear tangible plans to grow and look for sustainability outside of grant money, they are nonetheless able to deliver specific results and clear measurable outcomes. This is a challenge for all donors and NGOs in Ukraine: on the one hand, a few central, powerful media NGOs consistently get media development grants from Western donors and consistently deliver results and outcomes (including well-prepared reports). On the other hand, many of the smaller start-up NGOs, especially in the regions, are unable to fully develop and to implement the projects that are new, unique, and noteworthy because they do not have a record of receiving grants in the past and they have not been around long enough to establish connections with the donors and to receive organizational development grants that were available to NGOs in the early 2000s.
In short, today, Western donors continue to be quite active in Ukraine, supporting specific projects rather than organizations as a whole, particularly concentrating their efforts on providing quality online media training to independent media and journalists, especially in the regions outside of Kiev. Additionally, donors have a number of grants to support the development of small media business in strategic regions of Ukraine, most notably Crimea. While the increasingly centralized government and governmental push to silence the media hinders the development of democratic media, the freedom in Ukraine since 2005 has created an atmosphere in which free media can still prosper. When asked what must be done to ensure further development of the democratic media in Ukraine, many respondents stated that it is more important to focus on maintaining and preserving at least the current level of freedom rather than thinking about future of media development.

In this study, many media organizations pointed out that in 2011 and early 2012, journalists and independent media outlets have experienced multiple, although not always direct, governmental pressures in Ukraine. Freedom of speech has been challenged through multiple legal cases brought against the media at an alarming rate. The latest developments in the political arena demonstrate that donors can create great independent media organizations, but their sustainability and ability to protect freedom of speech in Ukraine ultimately depends not only on professionalism of the journalists and editors, but also on the political environment and legal and societal mechanisms that need to be in place.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

Future research on the media landscape should investigate the role of the local donors, media publishers, and media owners. The results of this study indicate that, since 2005, several local Ukrainian donors have offered multiple grants to support the development of the civil society in Ukraine. Some have also supported Ukrainian journalism programs and contributed to the development of the independent media in Ukraine in the last 20 years either by giving multiple grants directly to media NGOs through its own foundations (Akhmetov) or by investing in the media business (Pinchuk). Most importantly, the government of Ukraine has not obstructed local donors for their grant-giving activities, and these donors have been able to enjoy seeing the results of their efforts in practice. Since some local donors in Ukraine have influenced the development of independent media, it is imperative to learn more about their activities and impact.

Additionally, future studies should concentrate on investigating the impact of regional NGOs and the media. This study was limited to collecting the data in the capital of Kiev and, as a result, missed the opportunity to interview media and NGO representatives in other Ukrainian cities (e.g., Lviv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk) who have contributed to the development of the independent media system in Ukraine and continue to be active in the regions. These future studies could also investigate to what extent the ability and desire of the regional and municipal governments to support the development of civil society in different regions of Ukraine influences the development of the independent media in these regions, as politics and media development have always been closely connected (Dyczok & Gaman-Golutvina, 2009).

Finally, future research should take a close look at the quality of journalism training programs in Ukraine and investigate which programs have truly revised their curricula to address changes that have happened over the last 20 years and which programs are simply legacy programs that have been left by the Soviet-style journalism education system. Several interviewees pointed out that these legacy programs create challenges for the newly independent media, as they teach using outdated methods and follow outdated standards. Some even went so far as to say that these programs still teach that journalism is an instrument for sharing the opinions of those in power. However, no additional support to these statements was found in the course of this study.

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27 The situation in Ukraine contrasts strongly with neighboring Russia, where oligarchs currently prefer not to stand up and show their support for civil society development after Khodorkovsky (a former CEO of the oil company YUKOS), who had taken the lead in grant-giving activities and was a vocal supporter of the civil society NGOs in Russia, was arrested and sent to jail on tax invasion charges in a case which many see as political because Khodorkovsky repeatedly voiced support for civil society initiatives and free and fair elections.
Conclusion

This study has drawn a picture of media development in Ukraine based on in-depth interviews with representatives of Western donor organizations, civil society NGOs, media NGOs, journalists and editors, and journalism and media educators and researchers. The results show that the achievements in the area of freedom of speech and media, as well as active media development of independent media in Ukraine in the last 20 years were possible because of the following factors. Firstly, continuous generous donations from multiple Western donors helped to support the development of civil society in Ukraine and the development of the independent media system. Secondly, the political landscape, specifically, the fact that between 2005 and 2010 Ukrainian government did not interfere with the independent media development and the fact that journalists and editors enjoyed relative freedom encouraged the further development of the media. Most importantly, because of the pro-democratic leadership and indirect political pressures from the European Union on Ukraine, Ukrainian media and NGOs were able to develop, strengthen, and flourish over the last six years, having a clear, visible impact as government watchdogs and fulfilling their function as a barometer for civil society development in Ukraine. In turn, outcome-driven donor-supported NGOs in Ukraine were able to enjoy new freedom of information and financial freedom and thus were able to play a central role in engaging citizens and media in building civil society in Ukraine. Yet, today, civil society of Ukraine remains fragile.

Donor support has been influential in establishing and developing the vast majority of media freedom watchdog NGOs, media monitoring NGOs, and the independent media because the most influential of these all enjoyed generous Western donor support between 1990 and 2005. Between 2005 and 2011 this support has continued targeting multiple project-specific programs, such as media and journalism training programs, media education programs, and regional media development rather than capacity building in organizational structure. Although some NGO and media representatives said that they would like to see the donor money invested “in NGO structure,” the vast majority agreed that, at this stage in Ukraine, the money should be invested “in people.”

Much needs to be done to continue supporting the development of independent journalism in Ukraine as it still severely hampered by political and business interests, and many media and NGO remain fragile organizations. To this end, media NGOs and donors must continue providing grants for media business training, media business management as well as professional journalism training for current and future journalists and editors, particularly in the regions of Ukraine outside Kiev. Donors also should support professional journalism programs, particularly at Masters level, and refresher training for working journalists. Finally, to stimulate the development of civil society in Ukraine and to encourage further infrastructure development among NGOs, Ukrainian NGOs must consider the possibility of lobbying for changes in the tax system for nonprofit organizations, simplifying the tax codes for NGOs and allowing NGOs to earn tax-free revenue as long as it gets reinvested in the organization. Independent media in Ukraine can function successfully only if there is a functioning civil society, with is supported both structurally and politically.
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Appendix 1: Methodology

The following template and sampling frame guided the field research:

Case Study Report Template

For the research consultant: This document provides the overall structure for your report. Your role is to focus primarily on the following:

1. Pulling together the evidence needed to describe how donors have contributed (or not) to media development in the country: who were the major players, what were the major trends, over the last 20 years.

2. Incorporating the perspectives of donors, local NGOs, international implementers, and aid recipients to describe these interventions: what worked, what didn’t work, and why. When possible, collecting the reports, data and other evidence on which these conclusions are based.

3. Diagnosing the state of media as a business in the country. What are the business models? What are the major challenges? What data do people base business decisions on?

PART ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1-3 pages)
I. Summary (bullet points are fine) of the major findings of the study, focusing on the areas in the box above

PART TWO: MEDIA OVERVIEW
II. (suggested length: 2-3 pages) Brief historical and development background – tie into information / media culture
   a. What are the key political, social, and economic events and trends that have shaped the last 20 years of the country’s history?
   b. What are the country’s key development challenges (general development, media development)?
   c. What donors are most active in the country (economic development, not just media development)? What are their development priorities for the country overall (e.g. poverty, health, governance)?

III. (suggested length: 5 pages) What does the media landscape of the country look like?
   a. Brief overview: What are its major features? Developments and trends over the last 20 years? Is it able to hold government and business accountable? How well does it provide essential information to the population? Who does information reach and not reach? What forms of media are most prominent?
   b. What is the state of journalism in the country? Is the media relatively free from corruption? What are average salaries for journalists? How good is the overall quality of reporting? How safe is it to be a journalist?
   c. In what ways is the political economy / enabling environment of each country supporting or detracting from the development of the media sector?
   d. Brief overview of related laws, regulations and major developments over the last 20 years
   e. To what extent are laws and regulations that are in place put into practice
   f. Describe the information culture of the country. How do different groups of people get information? What are the major challenges? Do they feel that they have a say in decision-making? How important is news vs. entertainment?
III. (suggested length: 2-3 pages) What is the state of the business of media?
   a. What are the business models? What are the major challenges?
   b. What are the trends in media ownership, major issues there?
   c. What do people base business decisions on? What is the state of data on media?
   d. What kind of data on media is there in the media system (audience / market research)? What data
do different stakeholders use? How do they use it? How did its use develop?
   e. If possible, please try to get copies or access to any of this data that media enterprises are using
(audience/reach for various types of media, advertising numbers, etc.)?

PART THREE: DONOR-FUNDED MEDIA DEVELOPMENT (suggested length: 20 pages)

IV. Given the media landscape, why have donors intervened in the media space? What was perceived as
missing / needed?

V. What have been the donor-funded media development interventions with the most impact over the last 20
years?
   a. What were the major activities? What were these activities meant to achieve, in both the short
and long term? What local media or media-related organizations were created / supported (brief
description – profiles of key orgs can go in the appendix)?
   b. What have foreign donors' roles been? What have foreign NGOs' roles been?
   c. How have donor investments supported or impeded media development? To what extent have
these activities addressed the major challenges outlined in Part One? What approaches did they
take? What worked? What didn't work?
   d. Why? How do various actors opinions' converge or diverge about the success or failure of different
MD interventions?
   e. By what criteria are stakeholders judging the success or failure of interventions? How do they
assess impact?
   f. Any sense of interactions / conflicts in goals or direction with other forces, such as private investors,
public diplomacy, strategic communication, etc.
   g. What are the key issues around sustainability in donor-developed media? Differences in business
model or approach between donor-developed media and the rest of the media?
   h. How have the actors, activities, and impacts evolved over the last 20 years?
   i. Where do donor-funded interventions seem to be going in the future?

VI. (suggested length: 1 page) Gaps, further questions that should be asked, issues to investigate

VII. (suggested length: 1 page) Conclusions: What role did donor-funded media development interventions
play in shaping the overall media landscape? How do these interventions fit into the overall development
of the country?

APPENDIX

VIII. Literature review: Brief overview of previous research on media development in this country
   a. What research has been done? What conclusions has it reached? What questions has it asked?
How has it framed and assessed the question of impact of MD interventions? What are the gaps in
the research?
   b. Who has conducted the research (academics, implementers, donors, etc.) and how has this shaped
the perspectives?

IX. Methodology: overview of approaches used
   a. List of stakeholders interviewed

X. Profiles of key media organizations and NGOs (suggested length: one paragraph)

XI. Chart – overview of major donors, implementers, local partners, and activities
### Sampling guide - Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Informants</th>
<th>Ideal interview quota</th>
<th>Actual total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>High level programmatic decision makers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In-country (e.g. embassy or donor office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Advocacy, legal, watchdog organization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umbrella organization / network</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Media monitoring</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Implementer of media development projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media organization (NGO or for-profit)</td>
<td>Journalists, producers, editors, managers from media that receive donor funding: o Radio o TV o internet o Mobile o Newspapers or magazines</td>
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<td>Media Industry</td>
<td>Conduct research and data collection used by the media</td>
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<td>Ministry of Communications / Information Donor coordinating organization</td>
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<td><strong>10-15</strong></td>
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This study utilized in-depth semi-structured interviewing, partial participant observation, and Social Network Analysis (the results of the latter will be published in a separate report). Thirty-eight interviews with representatives of major media outlets, media development NGOs, civil society NGOs, and Western and local donors in Ukraine were collected in the spring 2011 to describe and understand the changes and challenges in the media development in the country. Each interview lasted between 40 and 120 minutes and was audio-recorded. The interviews were conducted in English, Russian, or Ukrainian, according to each interviewee’s preference.

Interview data were partially transcribed, partially translated in English, and later back-translated for accuracy. The data were analyzed using a thematic analysis technique to identify recurring themes within the data and scrutinize them against the participants’ explanations. A selective approach to partial translations allowed a researcher to listen to and read interviews several times to identify statements and/or phrases that seemed to be relevant, essential, and illustrative or which discussed experiences and emerged as definitive and helpful to answer research questions. Interviews were scrutinized several times to identify the overarching themes. All relevant statements were identified, underlined, translated, and used for analysis. A three-step qualitative data analysis of finding reduction, identifying explanation, and approaching grounded theory, was applied (Lindlof, 1995). Finally, after the first round of interpretation and analysis, the member check was conducted with two volunteers from the group of interviewees who agreed to look at the first partial results. The input from the cultural liaison person who was present during interviews was also incorporated into the second round of analysis.
today continues with production of informational, publicist and documentary television projects for Ukrainian television; though totally unprofitable in Ukraine (and thus not interesting for local producers of commercial TV products), these projects when aired always attract large audiences and quickly become notable events in the Ukrainian television world.

U.S. Embassy in Ukraine
The Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv administers the Media Development Fund grant program. The fund supports the development of free and independent media in Ukraine and provides financial grant support to Ukrainian journalists, media organizations and other non-governmental organizations for media-related projects. The most recent competition topic was “Strengthening Online Media in Ukraine” (with a deadline for submitting proposal on April 8, 2011).

National Endowment for Democracy (United States)
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was established in the early 1980s as a result of the recommendation by the Democracy Program, a research study sponsored by the American Political Foundation (AID). The Democracy program’s executive board consisted of a broad cross-section of participants in American politics and foreign policy making. It recommended the establishment of a bipartisan, private, non-profit corporation, as part of the U.S. strategic public diplomacy efforts. NED is premised on the idea that American assistance on behalf of democracy efforts abroad would be good both for the U.S.A. and for those who struggle “around the world for freedom and self-government” (NED website, 2011). NED is primarily funded through annual appropriations and subject to congressional oversight. It acts as a grant-making foundation, distributing funds to private organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. Below are the media development projects in Ukraine NED sponsored in 2010:

Western Donors

MATRA Ukraine & Moldova
The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs started the MATRA program of social transformation in 1994. The main goals of the programs were to support the process of transition in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, and the building of a pluralistic, democratic and constitutional society. MATRA is open to all civic organizations, institutes and local authorities whose activities support the process of transition from totalitarianism to pluralism, democracy and the rule of law.

The projects of the MATRA program encompass such aspects of civil society as legislation and the rule of law, democratic government, human rights and minority rights, public health, ecology, education, culture, provision of information and freedom of speech, social security and so on. The MATRA consists of two subprojects: MATRA (MPP) for large-scale initiatives and MATRA KAP for small-scale initiatives funded by the Netherlands Embassy in Ukraine. The Ukrainian MATRA office oversees projects in both Ukraine and Moldova.

In terms of media development, currently MATRA has a limited involvement. In retrospective, MATRA has funded a number of media projects, including the establishment of the Nova Mova (New Language) TV Company, which was done in cooperation with the Netherlands’ Veronica TV. As a part of this projects, Ukrainian journalists were acquainted with modern journalistic practices and practices of media production. The Nova Mova TV became popular with their information-analytical program “Pislyamova” ( Afterwards), which received wide recognition by critics and politicians inside and outside Ukraine. The most famous among other Nova Mova projects have concerned establishment of a TV news service with 1+1 Studio Channel (started in early 1997) and the annual TV program cycle Faces of the World (Inter Channel, 1998).

The Nova Studiya (New Studio) Company which is the legal successor of the Nova Mova TV Company today continues with production of informational, publicist and documentary television projects for Ukrainian television; though totally unprofitable in Ukraine (and thus not interesting for local producers of commercial TV products), these projects when aired always attract large audiences and quickly become notable events in the Ukrainian television world.

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Freedom House – Ukraine  
$50,400  
To produce the 2010 edition of its annual report on human rights in Ukraine. Several press conferences and roundtables will be organized in order to promote the findings and raise awareness of human rights in Ukraine; the results will also be made available on the organization’s website.

Independent Center of Political Researchers and Journalists  
$28,880  
To research and analyze the impact of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet on the development of democracy in Crimea. The Center will also carry out research into the integration of the Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian society and the impact of recent Russian outreach efforts to the Tatars. The Center will hold roundtables and publish a series of articles on these issues on its web site.

Information and Analytical Center “Civic Space”  
$32,700  
To improve the information and communication strategies of Ukrainian NGOs. Civic Space will analyze the present communication strategies of NGOs, develop a set of best practices for NGO project implementation, assist NGOs in crafting new reporting strategies, and identify issues affecting third sector activities.

Institute of Mass Information  
$35,000  
To foster freedom of information in Ukraine. The Institute will monitor conflicts over journalists’ access to official information, render assistance to journalists, develop proposals for reforming media law, and track the progress of efforts to reform media law and freedom of information law through the national legislature.

Integration and Development Center for Information and Research (IDCIR)  
$36,796  
To increase the professionalism of the regional press in its coverage of inter-ethnic relations and to develop independent journalism in Crimea. The IDCIR will monitor the regional press for hate speech, publish the results of its monitoring, and work with local NGOs and community activists to foster the development of independent media in Crimea.

Kherson City Association of Journalists “South”  
$42,100  
To support a traveling festival of human rights documentary films, docudays.ua, which will be shown in 22 regions throughout Ukraine, including Vinnitsya, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Krivyi Rih, Luhansk, Lviv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Simferopol, Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, and 79 villages and regional centers.

Open Society Foundation – Ukraine (OSF)  
$55,000  
To monitor and publicize the activities of the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament. OSF will produce three publications and an electronic bulletin detailing the work of members of parliament from each party or faction. It will also conduct a series of ten roundtables to increase the accountability of elected officials to their constituents, and will continue to modernize and update its website.

Public Organization “Donetsk Press Club” (DPC)  
$37,380  
To continue educating journalists in eastern Ukraine. The DPC will organize 12 press club meetings throughout the Donetsk region. In addition, the DPC will continue its monthly meetings at its main office. Press releases from each of the meetings will be published on the DPC’s web site.

Public Organization “Our Town”  
$37,565  
To continue its regional reporting and press monitoring programs. Our Town will organize a journalists’ association with ten journalists and five experts. In addition, Our Town will conduct weekly meetings for 25 independent journalists in western Ukraine, monitor reporting by the regional mass media, and track reporting on important regional issues.

Public Organization Telekritika  
$60,880  
To raise standards of journalistic professionalism. Telekritika will continue to operate its web site, which promotes professionalism in journalism, and publish several issues of the Telekritika magazine.

Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI)  
$55,241  
To improve the quality of government-run websites and e-governance initiatives in Ukraine. Building on the highly successful model of NED grantee Informa-
tion Freedom Development Institute (IFDI, based in St. Petersburg, Russia), RPDI will monitor 56 government websites, develop a transparency rating system, and disseminate the findings of its monitoring activities.

**Ukrainian Catholic University**

**$56,000**

To support the Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU), an online news agency that covers the issues of church-state relations, freedom of conscience, and conflicts between Ukraine’s various faith communities.

**USAID in Ukraine**

USAID promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and nurturing democracy in developing countries. USAID’s work in transformational countries enables these nations to build the capacity to sustain their own progress.

Since 1992, the USAID Regional Mission to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus has worked with government, non-governmental organizations and civil society to further the processes of democratic development, economic growth and social sector reform in the region.

Today the regional mission is also providing assistance to fight HIV/AIDS and to combat trafficking in humans. We have become involved in the effort to control the spread of Avian Influenza in Ukraine and Moldova as well. Energy efficiency is receiving renewed interest in Ukraine today, and we are looking at activities in this area too. USAID is also supporting the United States Millennium Challenge Corporation in developing additional assistance for Ukraine and Moldova.

**International Renaissance Foundation (The Open Society Foundations in Ukraine)**

The International Renaissance Foundation is dedicated to building and maintaining the infrastructure and institutions necessary for an open society in Ukraine. Foundation programs foster the development of and cooperation among nongovernmental organizations in an effort to create a strong civil society sector. The foundation also prioritizes initiatives that protect civil liberties, prevent corruption, support the rights of vulnerable populations, advance education, increase access to information, and improve public health.

Over the last 30 years, the Open Society Foundations had expenditures of more than $8 billion. Much of this spending has been directed at specific priority issues and regions for the Open Society Foundations such as:

- $976 million on democratic development in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union;
- $527 million for public health issues such as HIV and AIDS, TB, palliative care, harm reduction, and patients’ rights;
- $163 million to fight discrimination and advance the rights of Roma communities in Europe;
- $1.9 billion to defend human rights, particularly the rights of women, ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, and often marginalized groups such as drug users, sex workers, and LGBTQ communities;
- $1.7 billion for education projects ranging from pre-
school to higher education reform, and:
• $1 billion to promote reform in the United States on issues such as criminal justice, drugs, palliative care, education, immigration, equal rights, and democratic governance.

(From the website http://www.soros.org/about/expenditures)

In 2009, the Open Society Foundations had expenditures of $683 million in support of justice, human rights, public health, media, governance, and education.

Website: http://www.irf.ua/
The following is a list of media development activities that were supported by the OSF-Renaissance Foundation in the last ten years, from 2001 to 2011 (in reverse chronological order):

Activities 2011
• Promotion of public media literacy [1 grant]
• Increasing professional level of Ukrainian journalists [4 grants]
• Support to convergence of traditional and new media in Ukraine [10 grants]
• Development of investigative journalism [7 grants]
• Promotion of journalists’ rights [4 grants]

Activities 2010
• Promotion of public media literacy [1 grant]
• Increasing professional level of Ukrainian journalists [3 grants]
• Support to convergence of traditional and new media in Ukraine [28 grants]
• Development of investigative journalism [4 grants]
• Promotion of journalists’ rights [4 grants]

Activities 2009
• Promotion of professional growth of journalists [22 grants]
• Promotion of journalistic investigations to increase transparency of Ukrainian authorities [9 grants]
• Monitoring of implementation and support of the development of media legislation [4 grants]
• Non-Competitive and Innovative Projects [2 grants]

Activities 2008
• Reforming State and Communal Media [2 grants]
• Monitoring Adherence to and Supporting the Development of Media Legislation [8 grants]
• Promoting Professional Journalism [8 grants]
• Public Monitoring and Lobbying Ukraine’s Switch to Digital Broadcasting [1 grant]
• Developing the Genre of Journalist Investigations to Increase Government Transparency [1 grant]
• Non-Competitive and Innovative Projects [3 grants]

Activities 2007
• Promotion of the Establishment of Public Broadcasting [0 grants]
• Support for Denationalization of State and Municipal Media [0 grants]
• Development of Media Law and Supporting Public Control over the Activities of Government Bodies in the Media Field [0 grants]
• Fostering the Growth of Social Responsibility of Journalism [1 grant]
• Supporting Reform, Adherence to and Executive of Legislation in the Information Sector [0 grants]
• Preparing and Disseminating Informational Products in order to Raise Governmental Responsibility and Accountability [0 grants]
• Information Exchanges between Ukrainian Regions [0 grants]
• Independent Coverage of Snap Elections to the Verkhovna Rada [0 grants]
• Miscellaneous [5 grants]

Activities 2006
• Promotion of the Establishment of Public Broadcasting [3 grants]
• Support for Denationalization of State and Municipal Mass Media [6 grants]
• Development of the Legislation on Mass Media [4 grants]
• Media Rights Advocacy and Legislative Reform [10 grants]
• Preparing and Disseminating Informational Products in order to Raise Governmental Responsibility and Accountability [7 grants]
• Information Exchanges between Ukrainian Regions [3 grants]
• Miscellaneous [7 grants]

Activities 2005
• Facilitating Creation of Public Broadcasting and Privatization of State and Municipal Mass Media [9 grants]
• Monitoring Adherence to Media Legislation and Freedom of Speech Standards [4 grants]
Activities 2004

- Mass Media [3 grants]
- Information Broadcasting Development and Support for internet Media in Ukraine [2 grants]
- Support for Establishment and Development of Media Trade Unions and Professional Associations, Professional Skill Enhancement for Journalists [10 grants]
- Reform of Media Legislation, Ensuring Legal Guarantees of Freedom of Speech and Right to Information [12 grants]
- Support for Internships, Participation in International Conferences, Media Coverage of Crucial Foreign Events [9 grants]
- Public Monitoring of Abidance by Freedom of Speech and Right to Information, Protection of Rights of Journalists and Media [8 grants]
- Other [3 grants]

Activities 2003

- Information Broadcasting Development and Support for internet Media in Ukraine [10 grants]
- Support for Establishment and Development of Media Trade Unions and Professional Associations, Professional Skill Enhancement for Journalists [12 grants]
- Reform of Media Legislation, Ensuring Legal Guarantees of Freedom of Speech and Right to Information [2 grants]
- Support for Internships, Participation in International Conferences, Media Coverage of Crucial Foreign Events [9 grants]
- Public Monitoring of Abidance by Freedom of Speech and Right to Information, Protection of Rights of Journalists and Media [7 grants]
- Other [4 grants]

Activities 2002

- Grant Projects [61 grants]

Activities 2001

- Grant Projects [32 grants]
- Open Elections Program [12 grants]

Ukrainian NGOs

According to the Western donors, much of the success of any Ukrainian NGO directly linked to the leadership skills of its director. Up until very recently, the poor organizational structure and weak organizational capacity of a Ukrainian NGO has been overlooked by the western donors as the leaders of organizations were able to deliver the tangible results on grant-sponsored projects. Several media NGOs in Ukraine are clear leaders in the area of media monitoring and media freedom protection. Representatives of all these NGOs, clearly identified as leaders, were interviewed for this case study. Because individual leadership is perceived as important by the Western donors, names of leaders of these NGOs are listed in each organizational profile.

Telekritika

Project Telekritika opened its new portal in 2001 with support from Internews Ukraine and a generous grant from the U.S. Embassy. The Project Telekritika was first located in Internews Ukraine. The main goal of the project was to conduct continuous public monitoring of situation in media environment in Ukraine. Other notable donors of Telekritika were NED (The National Endowment for Democracy) and the Renaissance foundation (Soros OSI-Ukraine). Later, TADS “Media reforms” (UK) and the Embassy of the Netherlands supported Telekritika at various stages. Telekritika has actively developed particularly thanks to specific grants supporting political elections in Ukraine (parliamentary elections in 2002 and presidential elections in 2004). Until 2004, the project was a part of Internews Ukraine. In 2003, Internews Network offered Telekritika to consider becoming an independent organization, and the NGO “Telekritika” was established in 2004 by the leader Natalia Ligachova. The goal of NGO was to support the news portal Telekritika financially and logistically and develop a sustainable NGO structure to expand Telekritika. Between 2004 and 2010, with support of the multiple Western donors, including USAID, Internews, and U.S. Embassy, Telekritika also published the magazine that featured the main stories from the portal. In 2006, as part of the sustainability strategy, Telekritika joined the media holding “Glavred-Media”
The Institute of Mass Information (IMI) is a Ukrainian non-governmental organization that researches mass information in modern society (available in Ukrainian, English, and French). Established in 1995 by a group of Ukrainian journalists, the objectives of the Institute of Mass Information include: Defending freedom of speech; Supporting Ukrainian mass media; and Training Ukrainian journalists. Most notably, the IMI was the first organization which started to continuously monitor the case of Gongadze, a Ukrainian journalist who was killed after writing a series of investigative reports about the former president of Ukraine Mr. Kuchma and was able to put together arguments to demonstrate the connection between killing of Gongadze and the suppression of freedom of speech in Ukraine at the time. In August of 2011, the suspect in this case identified Mr. Kuchma. Monitoring the rights of journalists and media; attempts or pressure inflicted upon them; ongoing criminal trials involving mass media and authorities are among the top issues for the organization.

In 2001 the IMI became a partner of the international watchdog organization Reporters Without Borders. Since IMI has become an exclusive correspondent to the international organization Reporters Without Borders. In co-operation with Reporters Without Borders and other influential international organizations as well as with leading experts in the defense of freedom of speech, the Institute of Mass Information carries out a number of projects aimed at defending freedom of speech in Ukraine. The latest news on mass media development is available on the IMI web site. Currently, the IMI is also a member of multiple international associations, including the IFEX (International freedom of Expression Exchange). The IMI is consistently identified as one of the leading, most active media NGOs in Ukraine. However, some donors are concerned there is little evidence of the ability of this organization to develop and build its organizational sustainability to improve the organizational capacity.

Executive Director: Victoria Syumar
Website: http://imi.org.ua/en

Internews Ukraine

International Public Organization “Internews Ukraine” (IUA) was established in 1996 as an offspring of Internews Network. It is one of the leading Ukrainian NGOs in the area of media development, whose focus is mostly on promoting free media and establishing European values through development of successful media. Today, Internews Ukraine is a completely local NGO that has no direct ties with Internews Network U-Media project implementer although the two share the same building (which was originally purchased by Internews Network but now is owned by two organizations).

Internews Ukraine is both an implementer and a small grant administrator funded by USAID, Embassy of the United States, Embassy of Netherlands (MATRA project), International Renaissance Foundation, Delegation of the European Commission in Ukraine, British Embassy, Eurasia Foundation, Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation), Council of Europe, World Health Organization and UNDP among others. The vast majority of the programs are media and journalist training, for which Internews Ukraine is very famous and popular in the country. Often, because of the similar names and the connected past, many local media and NGOs confuse Internews Ukraine with Internews Network-U-Media project.

Today’s landmark program of Internews Ukraine is the The MediaNext, a New Media Initiative for Ukraine, which NGO calls “a project with soul”: 
Not only are we teaching journalists about new technologies and standards in media and internet, we are creating a community of media innovators. We have managed to bring together excellent journalists and media activists to create a network of people who communicate informally in and outside of our classes. These professionals help each other with contacts, activities, and consultations.

In addition, Internews Ukraine is active supporter of digital media development and innovation in Ukraine. With their help, many journalists and editors are trained to effectively create and distribute online content and successfully utilize new media platforms and technologies.

Website: [http://www.internews.ua/index_en.html](http://www.internews.ua/index_en.html)

**Academy of Ukrainian Press**

The Academy of Ukrainian Press is a non-profit, non-governmental and independent organization based in Kyiv with branch offices throughout Ukraine. Founded in 2001, the Academy is supported by European and American institutions. The aim of the Academy of Ukrainian Press is to offer training opportunities and further education to Ukrainian journalists and press secretaries, regardless of their political views, and to coordinate existing activities along these lines. The Academy of Ukrainian Press is dedicated to the principles of impartial journalistic practice, freedom of the press, and development of democracy in Ukraine. Its program seeks to achieve Western standards of media quality as well as to promote independent media in Ukraine.

Academy claims to have the largest, most comprehensive electronic database of regional and local media journalists and editors. This database, however, is not publicly available.

President: Valeriy Ivanov

**The Crimean Information and Press Center**

The Crimean Information and Press Center was created by IREX as part of the ProMedia program IN 1997. In October 2002, the Crimean IPC was spun off from IREX and has been operating as a Ukrainian NGO since then. It has received funding from the U.S. Embassy’s Media Development Fund, the Eurasia Foundation, International Renaissance Foundation, and IREX ProMedia. It is currently supported by U-Media through a sub-grant from IREX.

**Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI)**

The Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI) is a Ukrainian nonprofit organization, founded in 2006. The RPDI was created with a purpose of promoting democratic civil society through the development of professional, sustainable, and pluralistic media. The areas of expertise include: 1) training and education of media professionals; 2) partnership and exchange of information and experience among Ukrainian and foreign media outlets; and 3) legal support to journalists and media primarily in areas of access to information, prepublication screening, defamation cases, defense of the sources.

RPDI is a leading non-government organization in Ukraine that supports projects related to investigative journalism. Work in this area includes journalistic training, funding of investigative reporting and connecting Ukrainian journalists with international investigative network, practitioners and relevant events.

In 5 years of existence RPDI has implemented 25 projects funded by various donors such as 1) Danish SCOOP project (Danish government), 2) USAID (Promoting Active Citizen Engagement in Combating Corruption in Ukraine/Gidna Ukraina; U-Media Project of Internews Network; Universal Newsroom in a Digital Era funded by U-Media and IREX), 3) National Endowment for Democracy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland (RPDI jointly with the Eastern European Democratic Centre (EEDC, Poland) conducted a series of training workshops for municipal and small private newspapers).

In addition, RPDI had received funding from Open Media Fund, a nongovernmental funding source, managed by Internews. The main contributors to the fund are George Soros’s Open Society Institute, the AOL-Time Warner Foundation, the Markle Foundation, and Dow Jones and Co. Overall, in 5 years RPDI has received more than USD $ 1,050,000 in funding and support.

Leader: Katya Laba
Website: [http://irrp.org.ua/](http://irrp.org.ua/)

**Media Law Institute (MLI)**

Media Law Institute (MLI), founded in 2005, supports media law development, freedom of speech, and access to information in Ukraine. The work of the MLI includes monitoring and commenting on draft laws brought forth at parliamentary hearings, developing new media and information law curricula for law and journalism schools, and cooperating with Ukrainian
and international organizations to protect freedom of speech and journalists’ rights. The focus of MLI expertise mirrors IMS and includes creation of public broadcasting in Ukraine, privatization of the print sector, concentration and transparency of media ownership, and development of a new state information policy and regulations on the media.

The Institute operates mainly through the support of the USAID-funded non-governmental organization (NGO) Internews Network and U-Media Program. The Institute’s Media Law Summer School (professional training program for Ukrainian and CIS lawyers and law students) is supported by IMS.

Director: Taras Shevchenko
Website: http://www.medialaw.kiev.ua/en/

Suspilnist (or Souspilnist) Foundation

Foundation Suspilnist, founded in 1995, originally united journalists and other civil activists through an email forum and e-list. From there, the foundation grew into an NGO that focuses on conducting applied research that addresses the political and civil society development in Ukraine. It implements research projects and assists in decision-making “in the areas of government politics, development of civil society, and international relations and challenges of the millennium.” In the mid-1990 and early 2000, the foundation has held a number of media monitoring and political election monitoring grants, particularly parliamentary elections in 2002 and presidential elections in 2004. Today, the foundation has a low profile but works closely with the Academy of Ukrainian Press as a sub-contractor on several projects.

Leader: Taras Petriv
Website: www. souspilnist.org

Western NGOs/ Grant Implementers in Ukraine

IREX

IREX is an international nonprofit organization providing thought leadership and innovative programs to promote positive lasting change globally. Founded in 1968, IREX has an annual portfolio of over $70 million and a staff of over 400 professionals worldwide. IREX has offices and partners in more than 100 countries. IREX was instrumental in implementing media development programs in Ukraine since 1996 as part of U-Media, with a focus on training for print media. The Ukraine Media Partnership Program is one of its main projects in the country. Originally launched in 2002 by IREX, the Ukraine Media Partnership Program (UMPP) fostered print and broadcast media outlets throughout Ukraine to promote the development of a free and independent media sector by developing partnerships between U.S. and Ukrainian media companies. UMPP emphasized the business and journalism skills of independent Ukrainian media outlets in their programs to improve sustainability and professionalism as well as to ensure these media can inform citizens about important political, economic, and social issues in their communities. Under UMPP, IREX paired Ukrainian media organizations with U.S. counterparts for mutual staff exchanges to enhance the skills of the Ukrainian partners. UMPP program came to a close in 2012.

For more information about UMPP, visit http://irex.ua/en/media/umpp

For more information about IREX U-Media, visit: http://irex.ua/en/media/umedia

Internews Network

Internews is an international media development organization based in California. Internews has worked in over 70 countries and trained over 80,000 people in media skills. Together with local partners, our activities include establishing and supporting media outlets, journalist associations, and broadcast networks. We also have special programs to improve reporting on the environment, humanitarian crises, public health and women’s issues.

During its existence Internews Network has implemented over 115 projects, held over 365 trainings and seminars, produced over 270 TV and 1308 radio programs covering political, economic and social topics, provided technical and legal support to 322 TV companies, 177 radio stations and 74 newspapers in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

In Ukraine, Internews implements the U-Media project. The various grant projects that are implemented under the umbrella of U-Media usually include civil society partners and media organizations, range from monitoring the quality and quantity of televised and printed news to establishing a nationwide investigative reporting network. U-Media staff works closely with partners to develop projects that will be funded.

Project Director of U-Media project Ukraine: Christopher Wild

Website: http://www.internews.org/ukraine/eng/default.shtm
International Media Support (Denmark)

International Media Support (IMS) is a non-profit organization working to support local media in countries affected by armed conflict, human insecurity and political transition. In more than 40 countries worldwide, IMS helps to strengthen professional journalism and ensure that media can operate in challenging circumstances. Established in 2001, today, IMS covers three thematic areas of engagement: media and conflict, media and democracy activities in countries in transition in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and in media and dialogue activities mainly covering the Arab world and Iran.

IMS is committed to Freedom of Expression, and the work of IMS adheres to recognized international human rights and Freedom of Expression standards endorsed by the international community including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, various UN Security Council Resolutions as well as the UNESCO Windhoek Declaration which defines the international principles for independent and pluralistic media.

Website: www.i-m-s.dk

Eastern European Institute of Media Problems

Eastern European Institute of Media Problem is a non-governmental organization created by members of Ukrainian NGOs, working with media issues. The purpose of the Institute is to support research on media environment and media development in Ukraine. The focus of the Institute is rather broad and includes problems of radio and TV broadcasters, law on elections, publication of analytical literature, and long-term law initiatives.

The Institute was created with a goal of addressing issues that require time investment, long-term orientation and implementation. Because many media NGOs in Ukraine were established by industry and market actors to defend their interests (these interests are mostly business-oriented and are short-term), members of media NGOs established the Institute to address issues that are not dictated by the industry. Members of the Institute work part-time and in their free time.

Freedom House

Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization that supports the expansion of freedom around the world, opened an office in Ukraine in 1993 to work for free and fair elections and to strengthen civil society.

From its inception, most of the Freedom House’s projects in Ukraine were directed toward democratization. As a catalyst for development of civil society several Think Tanks were created to monitor and develop policies and encourage citizen participation in election processes. Currently, Freedom House is one of the few organizations in Ukraine that reports on the conditions and violations of human rights.

Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms UNITER

Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) is a five-year project funded by USAID and implemented by Pact (www.pactworld.org/). The primary goal of the UNITER is to strengthen and assist leading pro-reform Ukrainian civil society organizations to sustain and consolidate democratic gains. The project addresses systemic sector-wide challenges to civil society as well as support NGOs monitoring and advocacy initiatives from various spheres of public life which are essential in advancing Ukraine’s reform process.

Around 300 civil society representatives have participated in capacity building trainings as a part of the UNITER program. Under the UNITER project, 75 grants have been issued at the local and national levels throughout Ukraine totaling over $3.3 million. Among these, 34 grants were awarded in Crimea totaling about $470,000. Thirty young Crimea civic activists studied at the Civic Innovation Fellowship trainings.

Chief of Party: Roland Kovats
Website: http://uniter.org.ua/en/index.html

International Media Support (IMS)

IMS is an international organization created in 2001 with headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark. Primarily Danish, Swedish and Finish governments fund the organization. The mail goal of IMS in Ukraine, which has opened an office in Ukraine in 2005, is the reformation of media law and capacity building of media lawyers. All media support from IMS in Ukraine is focused around five main issues pertaining to media development: 1) access to information, 2) transparency of media ownership, 3) public service broadcasting, 4) privatization of state media, and 5) pluralism and editorial standards. The main partner of IMS in Ukraine is Media Law Institute and Article 19.

IMS is actively involved in Ukrainian media landscape, assisting media actors in ensuring protection and regulative measures in accordance with international standards. Particularly, the organization works with
such issues as an inadequate legislative framework, which does not guarantee press freedom and the ownership structure of national broadcast and print media, which remains widely controlled by oligarchs and politicians.

**Media Industry-Connected NGOs in Ukraine**

**Association of Independent Regional Publishers in Ukraine [AHPBY]**

The goal of the Association is to represent the rights of the independent publishers in Ukraine and to support the media development in the country. With the support from the U-Media grant, the association conducts research among regional journalists and editors on questions on the media freedom and influences on the media and puts together a monthly regional media freedom monitoring (in a form of an electronic newsletter) and sends it out to its members and other media NGOs. The newsletters and other materials are available from the association upon request. The Association united more 20 regional publishing companies that publish about 100 periodical titles in Ukraine. The Association is a member of the International Newspaper Association (WAN-IFRA) and works closely with the International Forum of Editors (WEF).

CEO: Oksana Brovko
Website: www.airp.ua

**The Independent Association of Television and Radio Broadcasters**

The Independent Association of Broadcasters (IAB) has been a strong leader in Ukraine and the region on digital transition and making space for local broadcasters on the airwaves. As an industry association, it unites broadcasters from all over Ukraine to address and protect their interests. The association is also active in the freedom of the media activities in Ukraine and has a strong presence of its leader on major issues, particularly of women in the media and independent TV news coverage.

Executive Director: Kateryna Myasnykova
Website: www.iab.ua

**Industrial Television Committee (ITC) [ИТК]**

Television Industry Committee was established in 2002 to present and protect the interests of the television industry. The founders have eight players television market, namely channels: 1 +1, Inter, ICTV, Novy, STB, Tonis, media agency DMB & B / Starcom MediaVest Group (now Publicis Groupe Media), Provid / BBDO (now “Media Management”) and “Effect Intehreyted Media” (Initiative media). ITC brings together 19 participants as of September 2011.

Executive Director: Katerina Kotenko
Website: http://itk.ua/

**Community Board to the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine**

Community Board to the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting was established in 2003. It is comprised of professional organizations that represent interests of mass media owners in Ukraine, whose goal is to lobby for industry interests. In 2011, the National Council was restructured and new community board was re-elected. It is an open community board, where any non-profit organization and public figures representing media interests can apply for membership. Currently, 14 organizations and public figures serve on Community Board, including Internews Ukraine and Independent Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters.

**Ukrainian Internet Association**

The Ukrainian internet Association (UIA) was founded in the year 2000. This organization coordinates the co-operation among the participants of the Ukrainian internet segment. It also develops and introduces projects aimed at improving the conditions and functions of the internet market. More than 50 companies are represented in the UIA. The members are internet providers, the owners of portals and internet media (Ukrainian internet Association, 2011).

Website: www.inau.org.ua
Other Notable Media Projects and Civic Movements

Stop Censorship!

Stop Censorship! is a civic movement created by Ukrainian journalists and NGO’s aimed to protect freedom of speech and prevent censorship, impeding professional activity of journalists and professional standards violation. Stop Censorship! is an independent non-political movement which is not supported but any of political parties. The main activities of Stop Censorship! include: movement activists’ professional and civil rights protection; prevention of censorship in Ukrainian mass media, as well as prevention of pressure on journalists aimed to force self-censorship; launching a massive long-dated anti-censorship campaign with NGO’s and civic activists from Ukraine and other countries mobilization; professional standards in TV news of all leading Ukrainian TV channels monitoring; informing on facts of important social topics and facts concealment and manipulation; furthering of media branch self-regulation.

Ukraine: Rule of Law Project

Ukraine: Rule of Law Project is implemented in Ukraine by Chemonics International Inc. and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Chemonics is an international development consulting company that helps governments, businesses, civil society groups, and communities promote meaningful change so people can live healthier, more productive, and more independent lives.

The project aims at improving judicial system by establishing effective and transparent disciplinary procedures. The goal of the project is to support the Government of Ukraine and Ukrainian civil society in eliminating opportunities for corruption under existing law. The media part of the project focuses on education of judges and other officers of law about media regulations, international copyright law and media law of Ukraine.

Council of Europe project “Promotion of European Standards in the Ukrainian Media Environment”

Council of Europe and European Union jointly created project “Promotion of European Standards in the Ukrainian Media Environment” in 2008. 90% of its funding comes from the European Union and 10% come from Council of Europe, but the project is fully implemented by Council of Europe. The total budget of the project for five years is 2.2 million Euros. The main goal of the project is to raise standards of journalism with a view to ensuring that the Ukrainian public is better informed about political and social processes in Ukraine and provide continuing support to the process of enhancing the media legislative framework. Through trainings and exchanges the anticipated results of the project include developing professional working methods on the basis of best practices in Europe by journalists and editorial staff; enhancing understanding of ethics among media professionals and information available about corruption in the sector; and developing media legislation in line with European norms and standards.
## Appendix 3: Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>High level programmatic decision makers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vitaly Zamnius</td>
<td>Fund Renaissance (OSI-Soros Foundation in Ukraine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Marchenko</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne-Marie Dohm</td>
<td>International Media Support (Denmark) in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olga Zhyrachenkova</td>
<td>Grant Officer, Grant Office, U.S. Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anna Rozhniantovska</td>
<td>Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ukraine Office</td>
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<th>NGO</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tanya Kotyuzhinskaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ludmila Gumenyuk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taras Petriv</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valery Ivanov</td>
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<td>Viktoria Sumar</td>
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<td>Oleg Khomenok</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christopher Wild</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oksana Maydan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irina Negreyeva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kostyantyn Kvurt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roland Kovats</td>
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<th>Media Organizations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Print</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svetlana Panushkina, editor, former representative of Fund Axmetov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diana Dutsyk</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TV</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Aleksey Mustafin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natalia Ligacheva</td>
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<th><strong>Associations</strong></th>
<th><strong>Professional association</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>We interviewed the executive director; he chose not to provide us his name</td>
<td>National Union of Journalists in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Sкрипін</td>
<td>Head, Kyiv Independent Media Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerina Kotenko</td>
<td>Independent TV Committee, Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanya Kotuzhinskaya</td>
<td>President, Media Lawyers Association; secretary of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, Kyiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oksana Brovko</td>
<td>Association of Independent Regional Publishers of Ukraine (AIRPU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerina Myasnikova</td>
<td>Independent Association of Broadcasters (IAB)</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Academia</strong></th>
<th><strong>Experts on the media and media development</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Serhiy Kvit</td>
<td>National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy President and U-Media board member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruslan Denichenko</td>
<td>KMA School of Journalism, Associate Dean</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Media Industry Research</strong></th>
<th><strong>Conduct research and data collection used by the media</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taras Tymchuk</td>
<td>GURT, resource portal center CSO web portal #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marina Starodubska</td>
<td>General Director, Partner Michailov and Partners Agency-Ukraine</td>
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<th><strong>Government</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ministry of Communications / Information Donor coordinating organization</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Andriy Shevcheko</td>
<td>Former TV journalist (Channel 5 anchor), U-Media board member, and current member of parliament</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Other</strong></th>
<th><strong>Outreach Specialist; adjunct professor; former journalist in Western Ukraine</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vitaliy Zhuhaj</td>
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The Media Map Project is a multi-faceted two-year pilot research collaboration between Internews and The World Bank Institute, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. This report is a product of that research. The findings and conclusions contained within this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the World Bank or Internews.

The Media Map Project draws together what we know and precisely defines what we do not know about the relationships between the media sector and economic development and governance. The research also examines donors’ roles in supporting the media sector over time and provides an evidence base for their future decision-making about media support. Through research, public events, and the data made available on the project website for public use and extended research, the project aims to engage the development sector in greater understanding and exploration of the role of media and information in development.