About the Author

Marie-Soleil Frère is senior researcher at the National Fund for Scientific Research (Belgium) and teaches journalism at the University of Brussels. Her research focuses on the role of the media in political evolutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. She has worked as an associate expert with several International NGOs and donors, including the Panos Paris Institute, exploring different aspects of the media landscapes and of media support strategies and programs in West and Central Africa. Her recent work includes *Elections and the Media in Post-Conflict Africa* (London, Zed Books, 2011), *The Media and Conflicts in Central Africa* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2007), *Presse et Démocratie en Afrique Francophone* (Paris, Karthala, 2000). She has also published country-centered studies such as *Le paysage médiatique congolais. Etat des lieux, enjeux et défis* (Kinshasa, FEI, 2008) and *Communications sociales au Burkina Faso* (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2003).

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Tara Susman-Peña is director of research, The Media Map Project.

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IFASIC, the national school of Journalism in Kinshasa (credit: Yves Kalikat, 2009)
DRC Map (credit: iStockphoto)
The studio of Radio Neno la Uzima (Bukavu) (credit: Pierre Martinot, 2008)

The Media Map Case studies were completed in November 2011.
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The field of media development assistance – support provided by foreign donors to promote independent, professional news media in developing and transitioning countries – dates back at least to the 1950s. Almost never recognized as a sector in its own right, media development is a relatively tiny portion of overall development assistance.\(^1\) Despite this marginal status, media development veterans passionately believe that their work plays a critical role in improving the governance and development of the countries where they work. Successful support to local media should facilitate its independence from government and other outside influences, promote freedom of information, represent the public’s needs to decision-makers, and improve the quality of the news that is produced. In turn, by maintaining a free-flow of information, improved news media should keep government transparent and hold it to account, give life to the market economy, and provide citizens with the information they need to make all kinds of critical decisions that impact them as individuals, and their families, communities, and countries.

In theory then, media development supports all other development, both directly and indirectly. However, media development stakeholders have not always been able to make a compelling, evidence-based case to the greater development community that what they do matters critically for both governance and development. Former World Bank president James Wolfensohn, Nobel prize-winning economists Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz, and many other policymakers have made a strong case for the media’s importance, but this has yet to be translated widely into systematic incorporation of media development support into aid policy and budgets. The Media Map Project was created to interrogate the evidence on the connections between media and development, as well as to make global data on the media sector more accessible to researchers, policymakers, and practitioners.

This series of case studies addresses more specific questions regarding the impact of donor interventions that support the media in developing countries.\(^2\) The following key questions focus on the last two decades of donor support to independent media in seven countries. Who are the major actors? What are the major activities? Which activities have a positive impact? Which activities fail? Why? Finally, we go beyond the reflective exercise of “best practices and lessons learned” to offer evidence for donors interested in improving the effectiveness and relevance of their media support. These studies are intended for donors, policymakers, and media development practitioners alike.

In a perfect world, we would have been able to identify all of the donors supporting media from 1990-2010, precisely outline their activities, goals, partners, and budgets, collect monitoring and evaluation reports, and, armed with nationally representative data measuring the many facets of the health of the media sector,\(^3\) we would have been able to determine precisely which projects had impact, the return on investment, and perhaps even the collective impact of all projects. Given the constraints of a pilot project, and the limits of the donors’ own documentation, we were not able to perform exhaustive research. Instead, our methodology was designed to build a solid foundation for understanding each country’s media development history, illuminated by rich, revealing detail. Further, we have carefully out-

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1 Estimates of current spending on media development are extremely difficult to make with precision, due to poor donor documentation, and range from 0.3% of all U.S. aid (the United States is the largest bilateral donor to media development) (Mottaz, 2010) to 0.6% of all aid (as estimated by D. Kaufmann in a presentation entitled “On Media Development & Freedoms in a Governance Context: An Outsider’s Reflections, with Some Empirics,” presented at OECD DAC GOVNET meeting on June 7, 2011.)

2 The vexing question of how to define impact of a particular media development intervention, and further, how to measure that impact, is addressed in another report for the Media Map Project (Alcorn et al., 2011).

3 The Media Map Project defines the health of the media sector: “The health of the media sector refers to the extent of its development. A healthy media sector is independent from both government and business, generates quality outputs that reach citizens, and engages them to make informed decisions that impact their own lives and the lives of their community” (Roy, 2011a: 3).
lined any remaining gaps in the research. Building upon this work, we have proposed a design for quantifying the impact of donor support to the media that could be undertaken in a subsequent phase of the research.4

The original design of the project included four or five countries as case studies. We selected the countries to represent a range of development challenges, political situations, media development history, and geography (with a slight emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa). In consultation with the Media Map International Advisory Board, we selected Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Peru, Ukraine, and Indonesia. As the project progressed, we formed partnerships that enabled us to add Kenya (Center for Governance and Human Rights, Cambridge), and Cambodia (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). The basic research design includes:

1) Qualitative desk research providing context on each country’s development, political, historical, and media landscapes

2) Quantitative desk research creating a portrait of each country’s media sector progress over the last 20 years, to the extent that data is available, also some comparison between the country and its region

3) Primary data collected from in-country fieldwork, which includes interviews, focus groups, and observation

Pilot projects come with constraints, but they also come with great opportunities for exploration and creativity, and we have pursued the case study research very much in this spirit. However, while each of the countries contains all of the above components, and thus a consistent line of inquiry, there is some variation across the studies. First, as to format, the lead researcher for each country was provided with a template meant to structure the report. All of the reports cover the key areas in the template, but they do not share a perfectly uniform structure. Both the template and sampling guide are provided at the end of this report. Model discussion guides for interviews were provided, adapted for language and context, and used to guide semi-structured interviews and focus groups during the field work.

Mali and Peru were chosen to coincide with two of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) Governance Network’s (GOvNET) case studies that lay the groundwork for improving donor support to domestic accountability. We provided GOvNET with summary reports on these two countries focusing on the media’s role in domestic accountability in support of GOvNET’s preparation for the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 in Busan, Korea.

To the Peru and Ukraine case studies, we added Network Analysis, a social science methodology that investigates connections among organizations to probe relationship patterns in areas such as information sharing, prestige, and trust. In Peru, we also piloted a methodology called Participatory Photographic Mapping, a technique that has been used principally in the U.S. and Canada to investigate community health and safety issues. This produced visual, oral, and textual data showing where people get their information and what sources they trust. The experiment yielded some insights about information sources, but was even more useful as a process to refine the methodology appropriately for future research.

In recent years, news media have been evolving and significantly overlapping with the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. An overview of the Internet and mobile phones is included in the media landscape portraits. The question of new media and social media was included in the primary research to the extent that donors support these areas. We excluded any donor assistance consisting of pure infrastructure provision. In recognition of the rapidly shifting information landscape, we chose to focus the Kenya case study more pointedly on the convergence of old and new media, and on what donors are focusing on today, rather than conducting an extensive review of the past.

Finally, each of the individual case studies is meant to illuminate the specificity of each country context, but also feed into a broader evidence base of why and how better to support the media sector around the world. Out of this research, our aim is to identify clear guidelines for donors about the best approaches to media support across a variety of contexts. The final Media Map Project report will assimilate findings from all of these components, including the seven case studies, an econometric study that demonstrates that a healthy media sector has a positive impact on political stability in the sub-Saharan Africa region (Roy, 2011b), and a study of donors’ approaches to assessing the impact of their media development projects. All of these reports, the quantitative data used in the reports, and a wealth of other data that can be used to further investigate the role of information and media in governance and development is freely available on our project website, www.MediaMapResource.org.

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4 See Roy and Susman-Peña, 2011.
## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Congolese Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEJIK</td>
<td>Association of Independent Publishers in Katanga</td>
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<td>AFEMEK</td>
<td>Association of Women of the Media in Katanga</td>
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<td>ANEAP</td>
<td>National Association of Private Broadcasters</td>
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<td>ANR</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>ANECO</td>
<td>National Association of Congolese Publishers</td>
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<td>APAC</td>
<td>Association of Women African Communications professionals</td>
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<td>APEFE</td>
<td>Association for the Promotion of Education and Training Abroad</td>
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<td>ARCO</td>
<td>Association of Community Radios in the Congo</td>
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<td>ARPTC</td>
<td>Regulatory Agency for Post, Telephone and Communications</td>
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<td>AZAP</td>
<td>Zaïrean Press Agency</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Canal Congo Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEAC/ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>CEI</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>CEMPC</td>
<td>Center for Listening and Monitoring the Congolese Press</td>
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<td>CIAT</td>
<td>International Comity to Accompany the Transition</td>
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<td>CKTV</td>
<td>Canal Kin Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMMC</td>
<td>Monitoring Center of the Congolese Media</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNONGD</td>
<td>National Council of Non-Governmental Organizations for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAC</td>
<td>High Council for Broadcasting and Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>Swiss Direction for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Documentation and Information for Africa</td>
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<td>DIC</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>DW</td>
<td>Deutsch Welle</td>
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<tr>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCK</td>
<td>Catholic Faculties of Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEI</td>
<td>France Expertise Internationale (formerly FCI – France Coopération Internationale)</td>
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<td>FH</td>
<td>Fondation Hirondelle</td>
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<td>IFJ</td>
<td>International Federation of Journalists</td>
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<td>GRET</td>
<td>Technological Research and Exchange Group</td>
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<td>HAM</td>
<td>High Authority for the Media</td>
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<td>ICA</td>
<td>Congolese Institute for Broadcasting</td>
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<td>ICM</td>
<td>InterCongo Media</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFASIC</td>
<td>Institute of Information and Communication Sciences</td>
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<td>INSS</td>
<td>National Institute for Public Welfare</td>
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<td>IPP</td>
<td>Institut Panos Paris</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDC</td>
<td>Journal du Citoyen (Citizen’s Paper)</td>
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<td>JED</td>
<td>Journalist in Danger</td>
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<td>AFEM-SK</td>
<td>Association of Media Women in South Kivu</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement of Liberation of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Mission of the United Nations in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)</td>
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<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIZA</td>
<td>Nederland Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>International Organization of Francophonie</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMEC</td>
<td>Congolese Media Observatory</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNMLS</td>
<td>Multi-sectorial National Program of Struggle against Aids</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPRD</td>
<td>People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTT</td>
<td>Post, Telephones et Telecommunications</td>
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<tr>
<td>RATECO</td>
<td>Networks of Community Radios and Televisions in Eastern Congo</td>
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<td>RATEPROKA</td>
<td>Networks of Radios and Televisions in the Province of Kasaï</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCK</td>
<td>Community Radio of Katanga</td>
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<td>RCN</td>
<td>Rape Crisis Network</td>
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<td>REMACK</td>
<td>Network of Community Media in Katanga</td>
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<td>REMACOB</td>
<td>Network of Community Media in Bas-Congo</td>
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<td>REMACPO</td>
<td>Network of Community Media in Province Orientale</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Radio France Internationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTBF</td>
<td>Belgian Francophone Radio Television</td>
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<td>RTGA</td>
<td>Radio Television of the Group L’Avenir</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTNC</td>
<td>National Radio Television of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNEL</td>
<td>National Company for Electricity</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNPP</td>
<td>National Union for Media Professionals</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunications Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPC</td>
<td>National Union of the Congolese Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPZa</td>
<td>Union of the Zairian Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WBI</td>
<td>Wallonia-Brussels International</td>
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Over the last 20 years, the dynamics of democratization have been a main focus for donors and international NGOs (INGOs) in sub-Saharan Africa, involving, on occasion, a particular interest in the growth of independent media. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, was not, however, a priority until the launch of the peace process, at the beginning of the 2000s, following the brutal war which tore the country apart from 1997 to 2002.

Today, the DRC tops the African charts in the number of registered media outlets, be they print media, radio or television. In 2008, 638 publications were registered country-wide; there were 341 radio stations and 82 television stations, although TV is still an essentially urban phenomenon, given the lack of access to electricity. Despite this hugely diverse media landscape, citizens in the provinces are often deprived of access to information, as the media are most concentrated in the capital city, Kinshasa.

Congolese media outlets are characterized by poor content, a severe shortage of material and technical capacity, and significant sustainability problems. Journalists work in an unsafe environment, lack regular salaries and protection, and regularly struggle with threats to press freedom. The legal and regulatory framework does not provide sufficient guarantees and basic regulations to ensure that media outlets abandon their “informal” practices. The advertising market is still undeveloped and disorganized, providing little financial backing to media companies. The supposedly “public” broadcaster is the mouthpiece of the government, and the only “public service broadcaster” is Radio Okapi, a UN-based station.

In such an unfavorable context, the involvement of donors has become increasingly important over the last 20 years. The reasons why donors have intervened and continue to support the media sector are tied to the country’s political situation. The media have thus been supported for a variety of reasons:

- From 1990 to 1997: to encourage new democratic media freedoms;
• From 2000 to 2004: to promote a return to peace and reconstruction during negotiations to solve the conflict;

• From 2004 to 2007: to enable the media to play their part during the electoral process, as the first democratic elections during the last 40 years took place in 2006;

• From 2007 to 2011: to establish a solid and responsible press likely to take part in the consolidation of democracy.

Reaching $80 million over the past ten years, media support by donors and operators has varied, essentially covering five types of activities:

• The creation of “neutral” and “apolitical” media and content (a recurring strategy in post-conflict countries);

• Direct support (funds or equipment) for a number of outlets;

• Media staff training;

• Strengthening of the sector’s professional organizations and associations;

• Consolidation of public institutions to organize the sector (including regulation and legal reform).

Each of these types of interventions has generated both positive impacts and negative effects on individual journalists, newsrooms, media outlets and local organizations in the media sector. Beneficiaries, donors, and INGOs have all advanced their own critiques regarding the ways in which media support initiatives have been designed, implemented and assessed so far. They also make suggestions about how to improve media support in the future, to make it more consistent with the needs of the local Congolese media.
Part 2: Media Overview

Historical and development background

Key political, social, and economic events and trends (1990-2010)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the third largest country in Africa in terms of population and land area, with 2,345,409 square kilometers and 71.7 million inhabitants. The urban population is estimated at 35 percent, and 44.4 percent of the Congolese population is estimated to be younger than 15 years old (CIA, 2011). The capital of the country, Kinshasa, is a megalopolis of more than eight million inhabitants; Lubumbashi (1.54 million inhabitants) and Mbuji Mayi (1.49 million inhabitants) are the next two most populous cities.

During its transition to independence from Belgium in 1960 the country suffered major political unrest, which peaked with the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1961. General Mobutu seized power in 1965 and managed the country with an iron hand until 1990, when swelling demands for reform by his opposition led to the initiation of a new constitution and a political transition. Political freedoms were granted and a Conference Nationale Souveraine [Sovereign National Conference] (CNS) was organized, supposedly in order to bring together all political stakeholders to discuss the future of the country. However, this turned into endless debates, likely fed by a head of state determined to stay in power. The regime was weakened and destabilized, but succeeded in blocking the democratization process.

In 1996, an armed rebellion, supported by Rwandan and Ugandan armies, started in the east of the country. It ended with the seizure of power in Kinshasa by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in May 1997. Just one year later, a second war erupted in the east, supported by the former Rwandan and Ugandan allies, which soon became a major regional conflict involving several armed movements and nine other countries in the region. In January 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph succeeded him; the latter proved to be more open to dialogue with Western countries and ready to initiate peace negotiations, including the brokering of a temporary peace deal that called for the withdrawal of the Ugandan and Rwandan troops. In 2003, the Dialogue Inter-Congolais gathered all the Congolese warring parties together and produced a more significant peace agreement signed in Pretoria.

This agreement provided for the implementation of a ‘transitional’ government, based on a system called “1+4” (the President being flanked by four vice-presidents from various armed groups and from the political opposition). The transition lasted three years and ended with the organization of general elections in 2006 when Joseph Kabila was elected President. A National Assembly as well as provincial assemblies and governments were also elected and established in 2007.

But the war, which ravaged the eastern part of the country between 1998 and 2003, left deep scars in the country. More than three million Congolese were killed (as victims of violence, malnutrition or disease) and two million people were internally displaced. Half a million people are still refugees abroad, while the DRC is currently thought to host an estimated 185,000 refugees from neighboring countries (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, etc.).

Economically, the country is on its knees, after thirty years of Mobutu’s dictatorship and five years of deadly conflict. It is recovering slowly, amid widespread corruption (the country currently ranks 164 out of 178 and is thus among the most corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International in 2010). Estimates of
per capita GDP per capita in 2010 range from $181 to $300, one of the lowest in the world, and 71 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (CIA, 2011). The literacy rate in French (the official language) or in one of the four national languages (Kikongo, Lingala, Kiswahili, and Tshiluba) is 67 percent. Life expectancy is only 55 years old, and 85 percent of the population has no access to electricity. The DRC ranked last in the 2011 UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2011).

Although the country is immensely rich in natural resources and minerals (diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, coltan, zinc, iron, etc.) and contains the second largest rainforest in the world, years of conflict and mismanagement have led to the collapse of infrastructure and production.

The current government faces multiple challenges: the consolidation of recent macroeconomic stability, implementation of structural reforms, consolidation of justice, peace, and security country-wide. The provinces in the east remain unstable, marked by sporadic conflicts, especially due to the activity of the FDLR (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda), and the Ugandan LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army). In this fragile context, the country held elections in November 2011. These polls are a real political, financial, and technical challenge in a country deprived of basic infrastructure and confronted with huge economic and security problems.

Donor priorities in the DRC

From 1999 to 2011, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the country received almost $15 billion ($14,447,546,388) in overseas aid, mainly from the United Nations (UN) ($3 billion), the European Union (EU) and the World Bank ($2 billion each), Belgium, the United Kingdom and the United States (around $1.2 billion each) (PGAI, 2011). This support has been centered mainly on humanitarian assistance ($3.5 billion), and the DRC was the sixth largest recipient of humanitarian aid in the world between 1995 and 2008. The second most-supported sector is governance and civil society (with roughly $3 billion), for which the EU is the biggest donor (with $684 million). Health comes third with $1.26 billion (Belgium is the biggest donor in the health sector with more than $250 million). Banking and financial services is the fourth largest sector (reaching $1.2 billion in aid).

The Congolese media background

Democratization was one of the main focuses for donors and international NGOs (INGOs) in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2000, involving, on occasion, a particular interest in the independent media. Zaire/DRC was excluded, however, from most support mechanisms. Indeed, in April 1990, Mobutu announced a set of political and media freedoms, but less than a month later students were massacred at the University of Lubumbashi and foreign assistance to Mobutu’s Zaire was suspended.

Despite the suspension of foreign aid, the new movement toward political pluralism led to the rapid development of the country’s media sector; hundreds of new private publications were registered during the early 1990s. The press was quickly divided into the “blue” and “green” press, supporting the Mobutu regime, and the “red” press, aligned with the political opposition. Even though freedom of the press was granted, Mobutu did not show tolerance toward the opposition newspapers, and several papers encountered major problems (e.g. a printing office was bombed, and journalists received threats).

Many independent radio stations were also created and private television channels started broadcasting as early as 1991. At the time, this was a rare phenomenon in Africa; most African countries had liberalized their written press but were still reluctant to allow private broadcasting. The first private Zairian broadcasters were financially supported by businessmen, politicians, various religious groups, or NGOs funded by foreign donors (given the suspension of governmental aid, NGOs and civil society were the only remaining channels for development assistance).

Donor support for the media sector did not develop on a large scale during this first decade of pluralism, and just a few isolated initiatives were implemented:

- Some bilateral development aid agencies and embassies offered limited support by supplying technical and material resources to some targeted newspapers, essentially those close to the political opposition (for example, donations of a generator and stocks of paper, etc.);

6 Complete data by sector, year and donor can be found at Platforme de Gestion de l’Aide et les Investissements n.d..

7 The massacres were later contested and the subsequent events remain unclear.


9 A private local radio station had been created years before (Radio Candip, in Bunia), but it was forced to close down after foreign assistance was suspended.
• The CNONGD (National Council of Non-Governmental Organizations for Development) received a $65,000 subsidy from the Canadian Catholic organization Développement et Paix [Development and Peace], which was redistributed to various newspapers;

• UNESCO organized a few training sessions for media professionals in Kinshasa;

• In 1995 the French-speaking Community of Belgium and the EU implemented some activities to support the media beyond the capital. The provinces had hardly any contact with Kinshasa in those days, given the decaying telecommunication network, but local media were nevertheless trying to survive and to circulate local information (Frère, 1996).

As Baudouin Hamuli, then General Secretary of the CNONGD, put it: “There was real freedom of expression [for the first time] but the sector was totally disorganized and every media outlet had to survive day-to-day as best it could.”

Besides the suspension of bilateral assistance the absence of support to the media sector was linked to two other factors:

• None of the donors established in the country had specific concerns about media support and none of the INGOs with media expertise had yet settled in the country;

• There was no real collective representation of Zairian journalists: the UPZa (Union of the Zairian Press), the only professional association, had been paralyzed for years.

In 1995, a National Press Congress (Etats Généraux de la Presse) was held and led to the adoption of a new media law that enshrined freedom of the press in law in 1996. The media sector showed some signs of moving towards more self-organization.

However, few months later, when an armed rebellion emerged in eastern Zaire, peaking with the seizure of power by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and the downfall of Mobutu in May 1997, a more difficult period began. The new regime had little regard for media freedom. The eruption of a second war in 1998 then pushed the country into even greater instability and all foreign aid was suspended. For the media, it was a very tense period, marked by with widespread violence and constant financial problems.

In 1999, the first ceasefire agreement was signed in Lusaka and a peace-keeping mission was established by the United Nations: the MONUC. Its staff and its mandate quickly widened and, in 2002, MONUC was equipped with a broadcaster: Radio Okapi. Radio Okapi was jointly established by the UN and Fondation Hirondelle, a Swiss NGO specializing in the creation of independent media in countries that have experienced conflict. From 2001, three other international NGOs (INGOs) started media-support activities: Institut Pa-

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11 Baudouin Hamuli Kabarhuza, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs also launched a project to restructure the public broadcaster’s training center, the ICA (*Institut Congolais de l’Audiovisuel*). It was the beginning of a decade of increasing media support with growing numbers of stakeholders and implementers, as well as growing budgets.

This media support developed in parallel with the peace process. In 2003, while peace was negotiated in South Africa, another French NGO, the GRET (*Groupe de Recherche et d’Échanges Technologiques* [Research and Technology Exchange Group]), received funding from the EU to implement a program to support the Congolese press. Meanwhile, the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) and the Belgian government were also turning their attention to the DRC’s media sector.

In March 2004, with the support of the IPP, GRET and NIZA, a new National Press Congress was organized, which convened more than 200 journalists from across the country. This Congress provided an opportunity to identify the new dynamics and challenges facing the media sector, as well as to restructure professional organizations. It fostered a wide debate among media professionals and donors about how media should prepare for the crucial electoral process, which was meant to be the culmination of the ‘post-conflict’ transition.

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13 A Dutch NGO created in the context of the fight against apartheid, NIZA supported the Congolese media until 2007 but, following the restructuring of Dutch foreign assistance, it lost its main donor, and eventually abandoned its work with the Congolese media sector.
The media sector in the DRC lacks quality journalistic content, and the credibility of information disseminated by the Congolese media is regularly called into question.

The Congolese media landscape

The DRC tops the African charts in terms of the number of registered media – be they print media, radio or television broadcasters.

In August 2008, there were 638 print publications registered in the country, but only 228 of them were to be found on the market, mostly irregularly. Nearly all newspapers and periodicals are published in Kinshasa, where only about 20 (out of the 125 papers registered in 2008) appeared regularly. The circulation is generally low: daily papers with the highest circulation in Kinshasa reach only 1,500 copies maximum; most newspapers rarely print even 150 copies.

No daily newspapers appear outside the capital and the Kinshasa press is very poorly distributed beyond the capital. In 2008, 65 weekly or monthly newspapers were registered in Katanga province, 19 in Oriental province, 17 in Kasai Oriental province, 4 in Kasai Occidental province, 12 in North Kivu province, 8 in South Kivu province, 7 in Bas-Congo province, 5 in Equateur province and 1 in Bandundu province; there were none registered in Maniema province.

The radio landscape has expanded quickly over the past ten years. In Kinshasa alone, there were about 40 radio stations broadcasting on FM in 2008. At the national level, an inventory carried out in 2008 reported that 341 radio stations were operational and more recent estimates (2011) report as many as 450 radio stations country-wide. Twelve years earlier (1996) there had been only 20 stations operating in the country.

These radio stations include:

- One “public” broadcaster, the RTNC Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise [Congolese National Radio Television], which has two channels in Kinshasa and theoretically a production and broadcast center in each province;
- 133 community, associative, academic and school radios (supposedly ‘not for profit’);
- 104 denominational radios, most of which are connected to Pentecostal and other charismatic churches;
- 91 commercial private radios;
- One UN station (Radio Okapi) headed by MONUSCO and Fondation Hirondelle
- Four international radios established on FM: RFI (Radio France Internationale), with six transmitters in different cities; Africa n°1: BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation); and International RTBF (French-speaking Belgian Radio Television) in Kinshasa only. The VOA (Voice of America) also broadcasts in the DRC, but does not have a transmitter: it operates through local radio stations that broadcast its news programs.

Commercial, private radio stations are concentrated in urban areas (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi), while community and religious radios are scattered throughout the country’s rural towns and villages.

Television is an essentially urban phenomenon given the lack of electricity. In 2008, 51 of the country’s 82 television channels were in Kinshasa.

These television stations included:

- One public broadcaster (RTNC), managing three channels (RTNC1, RTNC2 and RTNC3), and local

14 Most of the general data included in this section comes form Marie-Soleil Frère 2008. For fuller listings of the main print media in the DRC, see Appendix 1.
15 Figures vary from one study to another because, on the one hand, it’s difficult to obtain up-to-date data on the situation in the provinces, and, on the other hand, given the different types of classification (some radios have a frequency but have never started operating; others have started but then stopped temporarily; some have transmitters in several different cities but only one license; etc.).
16 For fuller listings of the radio stations in the DRC, see below, section 2.3.2. Media consumption in the DRC, and Appendix 3.
17 For fuller listings of the TV stations in the DRC, see below, section 2.3.2. Media consumption in the DRC and Appendix 4.
production and broadcasting centers in 10 provinces (with rates of local production that are extremely variable);

• 52 commercial private channels (among which two – Digital Congo and RTGA – are available in almost the whole country);

• 24 private religious channels;

• Four community television channels;

• Two international television channels that broadcast free to air in Kinshasa (TV5 Monde and Euronews);

• International television channels available by satellite.

Finally, a handful of news agencies exist in the DRC but few of them actually sell their output.

• ACP (Congolese Press Agency) is a public agency, created in 1960. It publishes a daily bulletin, with a circulation of about a hundred copies and a website.

• DIA (Documentation and Information for Africa) is a religious agency created in 1957 and belonging to the national Episcopal Conference of Congo.

• APA (Associated News Agency) is a private agency set-up in 1996 publishing a daily bulletin (paper only)

• InterCongo Media (ICM) is a nonprofit agency that is the Congolese branch of the France-based NGO, Syfia International.

• Two INGOs provide radio and TV programs to broadcasters: Search for Common Ground and La Benevolencija. Their programs are broadcast by more than 100 local radio stations across the country.

Major features of the media landscape

The Congolese media landscape is unusual and very different from any of its neighbors in central Africa.

The large number of media

The large number of media outlets is impressive and new ones are born in the DRC every week. There are several reasons for this profusion of media.

Firstly, the 1996 Press Law, which defined the criteria for establishing a media company, is very flexible and very incomplete in regards to broadcasting. Furthermore, there is constant disorder and overlap between the various decision-making structures that should be responsible for licensing and regulating the media. Many media outlets receive authorization from a number of different statutory bodies, including the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Post, Telephones and Telecommunications (PTT), the ARPTC (Authority of Regulation of the Post Office and Telecoms of Congo), and the ANR (Autorité Nationale des Renseignements) [National Intelligence Agency].

There is no systematic mapping of frequency allocation for radio or for television. Some stations broadcast on a frequency that was officially allocated to another company and few of them respect the rules about the power of transmitting equipment. According to the former director of cabinet for the Ministry of Communications and Media, “Many pieces of equipment have been purchased randomly and do not fit regular standards. So there are too many conflicting signals as stations are broadcasting on frequencies that are too close.”

Poor content

The media sector in the DRC lacks quality journalistic content (IREx, 2008). Moreover, the credibility of information that is disseminated by the Congolese media is regularly called into question.

Recurrent problems regarding the news are as follows:

• The publication or broadcasting of unchecked, deceitful, inaccurate, incomplete information;

• Advertorials (or “infomercials”), which tend to take precedence over investigative journalism;

• The dissemination of information paid for by the source (a well-known practice of rewarded journalism called “coupage,” or taking a cut);

18 http://www.acpcongo.cd
20 http://syfia-grands-lacs.info
21 Faustin Fouassa, Chief of staff, Ministry of Communication, personal communication, Kinshasa, August 15, 2008.
• Invasions of privacy, slander and defamation;

• Blatant sensationalism, particularly on some TV stations or in some tabloids, dominated by sex, scandals and horror stories.

As far as entertainment is concerned, programs are mainly produced outside the country and are aired in violation of all international rules on copyright and broadcasting. Paradoxically, despite there being a high degree of media choice in the DRC, there is little pluralism of content: alternative content and voices are limited, entire segments of the Congolese population are not represented in the media, and their daily concerns seem to merit no attention.

The weaknesses of media content are also the result of several other factors:

• **Weak DRC economy exacerbates financial sustainability challenges.** Apart from Radio Okapi, which is supported by the UN, the Congolese media have low budgets and must survive in very difficult economic conditions.

• **Weak professional media skills,** be it in journalism, management and accounting, or technical matters

• **Unstable working conditions.** Salaries are low, irregular and often non-existent. This does not encourage quality work and often pushes journalists into finding other resources to survive.

• **Distortion of the media in general.** Many private media outlets are the property of politicians who use them as instruments of personal promotion or to back their political allies. Also, many media outlets claiming to be “community”-based belong in fact to politicians and are devoted to serving their interests.

**Poor business structures**

Most Congolese media can hardly be labeled “businesses” or “companies,” as they generally do not conform to accepted standards of administration, taxation requirements, or corporate organization.

**Low administrative requirements**

The legal and regulatory frameworks are rudimentary so media outlets have no clear legal status. The broadcast media, for instance, are not subject to specific regulations and requirements defining their focus and area of operation. Many radio stations registered as “community” or “church” actually belong to a single individual and they broadcast/accept commercial advertising. Government regulations do not require any kind of transparency about the shareholders of media outlets or their profits. As the vice-president of the UNPC (National Union of the Congolese Press) underlines: “Media outlets are neither required to have a number in the business registry, nor to give the names of shareholders, nor even to have a main office anywhere.”

In print media, the multiplicity of newspapers reflects the expansion of the political scene. According to a Kinshasa publisher, “The proliferation of newspapers is due more to politicians than to journalists…there is always a conviction that money is to be found in politics and that the closer one gets to politics, the richer one can get. And the media is one way that can help you on that path.” The print media is strongly politicized in the DRC: “one minister, one newspaper,” as the saying goes in Kinshasa. And indeed, newspapers appear each time a new government is appointed, only to disappear when that minister/promoter loses his post.

**Lack of internal organization**

Few media outlets have an organized accounting department and many do not even have a bank account. The majority of the Congolese media work in an informal way, just like the economy in which they exist.

With low circulations and a limited advertising market, many newspapers survive thanks to “obscure” financing, which impacts seriously on their credibility. Very often, newspapers in the provinces publish an issue only when they have found a “sponsor” to support it. Many newspapers are in the hands of a single person, who seeks freelance journalists when the necessary resources for an issue have been collected. In Kinshasa, only about 15 newspapers have a head office; others are put together in their owner’s private home or in the office where the owner has his regular job. In Lubumbashi, even though more than 40 papers are registered, only two (Mukuba and Quiproquo) have a head office.

In the broadcast sector, community media outlets are especially fragile financially and frequently lack internal
organization. Most of them do not have a real management department and survive day-to-day without budget plans.

**Random taxation**

As corporations, media outlets are supposed to pay a number of taxes. However, without organized accounting departments or clear declarations of their profits and staff, the media are taxed in a random and arbitrary way. Taxes are imposed on them depending on the whim of the tax authorities. Some media outlets that are politically close to President Kabila are never visited by tax officials, while others outlets are harassed to pay various taxes that can amount to half their budget. As one observer of the media sector remarks, “If you are a television station close to the opposition, you will have to pay taxes, otherwise the authorities will consider that your non-payment is a good enough reason to shut you down, while other radio and television stations close to those in power can flout the rules and are never threatened.” 25

The tax laws do not recognize the specificity of community radios, and these stations are required to pay the same taxes as commercial outlets. This means that they pay taxes that are often inversely proportional to the extent to which they please the local political authorities. 26 For example, the community radio station of Likasi was closed down by the local authorities, who said the station had not paid its taxes when, in fact, the mayor was simply not happy with its news coverage. 27

**Lack of sustainability and independence**

Not surprisingly, given the weak economic context, the Congolese media fail to generate sufficient financial resources. The high numbers of media outlets contribute to the precariousness of the sector, given the narrowness of the advertising market pressured by a plethora of competing companies. The advertising sector is completely disorganized (as will be detailed below), and is characterized by unregulated competition and an opaque contracting system. Advertising revenue is very often seized by the owner of the media or by the staff members who negotiated the contract.

This financial fragility makes many media outlets dependent upon external support, either from political or religious circles, or from international organizations; this movement raises further concerns that economic pressures are forcing stations to compromise their independence.

For instance, the Governor of Katanga, Moïse Katumbi, grants $5,000 a month to every private television station broadcasting in Lubumbashi and a $120,000 annual subsidy to the RTNC Katanga, which has a team directly connected to the Governor’s office. Therefore, the unbiased credibility of local news coverage is certainly damaged.

“In such a context, what does the freedom of the media mean?” wonders Tshivis Tshivuadi, executive secretary of Journalist in Danger (JED), a local NGO defending the freedom of the press. “It is the freedom for the managers and owners of media outlets to publish what will bring them some money or what suits them and their friends? There cannot be any press freedom in the DRC if we do not solve the problem of the economic sustainability of media companies.” 28

**No public broadcaster apart from Radio Okapi**

The national media does not fulfill its “public service” mission to provide information to all citizens. The RTNC is used for promoting the government’s politics and does not concern itself with broadcasting information relevant and useful for local communities and citizens. With a large central newsroom in a huge building in Kinshasa and ten provincial production and broadcasting centers, the RTNC employs around 2,300 agents, including more than a thousand in Kinshasa. It broadcasts in five languages: French, Kikongo, Swahili, Tshiluba and Lingala.

25 Serge Mumbu, Experts SPRL, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
26 Franck Mbumba, IPP Program Officer, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
28 Tshivis Tshivuadi, JED executive secretary, personal communication, March 2011.
But the national broadcaster is going through a profound crisis: its technical equipment and its buildings have deteriorated severely over the past 20 years. According to Isidore Kabongo, Director of Programs in the radio section of the RTNC, “the State doesn’t care at all about the RTNC, except when it comes to its own propaganda. There is no public broadcasting policy, no plan to develop the RTNC, not even a vision.” An audit report produced by Mr. Kabongo shows that no more than 20 percent of the budget allocated yearly to the RTNC actually goes into the public broadcaster’s bank account. Its signal is supposed to be transmitted by satellite and to be relayed by the provincial centers, but in Lubumbashi, for instance, RTNC/Katanga only broadcasts within a 120km radius around the city. The rest of the province simply has no access to the national public broadcaster.

Therefore, it falls upon Radio Okapi, an international media outlet established by the United Nations, to fulfill this public service broadcasting role at the national level. Created in 2002, within the framework of a partnership between the UN and a Swiss NGO called Fondation Hirondelle (FH), Radio Okapi is currently the only radio that covers almost the whole of the DRC. The radio employs more than 160 journalists and presenters, and has 25 FM transmitters throughout the country. It has established eight regional production centers inside the country. Its programs are in French and in the four national languages. Each of the regional stations employs between five and nine journalists who produce a one-hour local newscast every day.

To widen its coverage area, Radio Okapi has established partnerships with a network of 51 partner radios in the provinces, which rebroadcast Radio Okapi’s programs (the news and some popular magazines) in the isolated areas that are out of the reach of Okapi’s own transmitters. Radio Okapi broadcasts 24 hours a day, and also has a website. Its schedule includes news, information, entertainment and magazine programs. Radio Okapi is well respected among its listeners, especially because of its political neutrality and its balance, as well as its national dimension. Its wide capacity to collect and disseminate information is unique, and its professionalism has made Radio Okapi a model for other stations. Some of its most popular debate programs (for instance, the popular “Dialogue between Congolese”) have reached large audiences for years. But Radio Okapi also faces a major sustainability challenge. Originating from the outside and being an initiative of the international community, Radio Okapi is not officially registered as a Congolese media outlet. Its substantial budget (from $13 million per year in 2008 decreased to about $8.5 million in 2011) is dispropor-

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30 In Mbandaka, Kisangani, Bunia, Goma, Bukavu, Lubumbashi, Mbuji Mayi and Kindu. Radio Okapi has also set up offices with one or two correspondents in Matadi, Bandundu, Kilkwit, Kalémie, Butembo and Kananga.

31 www.radiookapi.net

32 The budget of Radio Okapi has always been difficult to
tionate in relation to the local economy. It is also more than ten times higher than the annual budget of the best performing private media outlets. Moreover, tensions have repeatedly arisen between the UN and FH about the editorial line of Radio Okapi. The UN mission staff often does not understand why “its own” radio can criticize the UN mission. FH believes that Radio Okapi, as a news outlet, should not be a tool for the UN to publicize itself, but a space for neutral, independent and pluralistic journalism.

Other than Radio Okapi, it is necessary to underline the important role played by some community radios, at the local level, in supplying valuable local information to communities. Even though they are very fragile financially and have low levels of professional skills, to some extent they fulfill a public service remit.

Unequal access to information
Despite the large numbers of media outlets in the DRC, access to news that is complete, rigorous, and professional remains problematic in many areas because the media are unevenly distributed across a large geographical territory. While there is an overload of media outlets in Kinshasa, many villages and towns in the provinces receive no newspapers and no television signal at all.

Radio Okapi claims to cover approximately 85 percent of the population, but the signal cannot easily be received in many places. The partnerships that Radio Okapi has arranged with local radio stations for re-broadcasting are not always operational, for technical reasons or lack of access to electricity. Low technical capacity and lack of fuel, at the community radio stations, mean that broadcast footprints are often limited. Foreign radio stations transmitting on short wave (RFI, BBC, etc.) can be listened to almost anywhere, but the quality of the signal is generally low, and the cost of batteries and short-wave receivers is not always affordable for rural people.

The state of journalism and journalists
The UNPC (National Union of the Congolese Press) estimates that 4,500 professionals work in the Congolese media. The vast majority of these journalists work in very fragile conditions. As JED has observed, journalists “either are afraid, corrupted, or manipulated.”

Wages and social position of the journalists
In a context where most media outlets operate in a largely informal environment, wages and contracts are quite problematic, except for Radio Okapi whose journalists earn from $800 to $1,500 a month with signed contracts that conform to labor regulations.

In the private media, most journalists have no contract and make little money. In the print outlets in Kinshasa, journalists earn between $30 and $80 a month; in the broadcasting sector between $50 and $100. There are large disparities from one media outlet to another, as well as within the same media group. At one daily paper in Kinshasa, the director apparently welcomes new recruits by saying: “we cannot guarantee you a salary, but you can have space in the newspaper: it’s up to you to make a profit out of it.”

In such a situation, it is difficult for the journalists to be motivated, and to work with discipline and rigor.

In the provinces, the SNPP (National Union of Media Workers) has observed that journalists face even more difficulties. In Bas-Congo and Kasai, only very few media succeed in paying their staff regularly; the community radios cannot afford any salaries at all.

Thus, many journalists devote time to other money-making ventures besides their editorial work. That is why young journalists often regard their jobs as only temporary, while waiting to find a better position elsewhere.

This is also why the practice of “coupage” is so widespread, where journalists become little more than mercenaries, and give coverage to those who pay. As a journalist from the press agency ICM, Didier Kébongo, writes, “the journalists from the Congolese media pay themselves by producing information financed by their sources.” He quotes a colleague who exclaimed: “Can you name a single journalist in this city, except for those from Radio Okapi, who got married or built a house on [just] his salary?” (GRET and InterCongo Media, 2006: 18).

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33 Tshivis Tshivuadi, JED Executive Secretary, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
34 Anonymous journalist from the press, personal communication, Kinshasa, August 2008.
The practice of “coupage” is widespread; most journalists have become little more than mercenaries, giving coverage to those who are willing to pay for it. In fact, there are standard rates: $10 to $20 for a newspaper reporter, $20 to $30 for a radio journalist, and $50 to $200 for coverage by a TV team.

An important aspect of the professionalization of any activity is the social prestige that journalists can expect to derive from doing their job well. Prestige does exist for some leading journalists with Radio Okapi or the RTNC. But most Congolese journalists now belong to a category of people viewed with disdain and who appear to be continuous scroungers. According to Pierre Nsana, “Professional advancement is not based on professional qualities but on the prestige of the people the journalist is familiar with. In such a context, it is difficult to mobilize journalists around professional standards and challenges, such as the struggle for the freedom of the media.”

Security

The struggle for press freedom is still necessary, since Congolese journalists have been the targets of many press freedom violations over the past 20 years. The local press freedom organization, Journaliste en Danger [Journalist in Danger](JED), (created in 1998), lists all attacks on press freedom on a daily basis, including:

- Murders of journalists and other media personnel;
- Detentions (interrogations, arrests and detention without trial);
- Attacks, violent threats and physical violence (including seizure and destruction of equipment);
- Closure or interference with broadcast transmitters;
- Direct threats (by telephone, text messages, e-mail, or even broadcast by some radio or TV stations);
- Administrative, economic or legal pressures;
- Barriers to the free circulation of information (censorship, suspensions, etc.).

38 Pierre Nsana, IPP program officer, personal communication, March 2011.
JED gives the following figures for the recent past:

- 2007: 163 attacks on media freedom (including 2 murders and 10 detentions),
- 2008: 110 attacks on media freedom (including 1 murder and 6 detentions),
- 2009: 75 attacks on media freedom (including 1 murder and 3 detentions),
- 2010: 87 attacks on media freedom (including 1 murder and 17 detentions).

These attacks on journalists are perpetrated by a wide range of actors: police, intelligence services (ANR), any holder of public office (local representatives, political personalities); armed groups and militias (still very active in the east); businessmen; and even media managers who have been known to manhandle their own staff.

According to JED, these attacks are systematic every time journalists “denounce facts of corruption, misuse of public money or abuse of power by any holder of public authority” but also, simply, when some element in authority feels unhappy with a piece of news (JED, 2008: 12). For instance, in October 2007, a secretary of state ordered two policemen serving as his bodyguards to beat two journalists in his office because he felt embarrassed by some of their questions. These reporters walked out wounded and with their clothes in tatters, which aroused a significant degree of emotion and a public debate in parliament.

Besides overt pressure, there are various forms of covert pressure. Journalists fear “orchestrated” road accidents, poisonings, and criminal acts (there is widespread insecurity that makes it possible to disguise an attack targeting a specific journalist). Several media outlets have also experienced infiltrations by “journalists” who turn out to be agents of the intelligence services (both civilian or military).

JED has also criticized the judicial system that is “accommodating, corrupt and applying orders from above,” which during press trials tends to apply severe interpretations of the law in order to send journalists to jail (JED, 2008: 14). Three professionals imprisoned in 2008 were prosecuted for “insulting the Head of State,” a formula that allows very wide interpretation by a judge.

Finally, there is economic pressure. Advertising contracts have been cancelled in some cases where media outlets have not been sufficiently accommodating towards the advertiser’s political friends. At the individual level, journalists can be threatened with non-payment for a piece, as those who pay know full well that this payment is a question of survival. Public authorities usually select the media that are authorized to cover their activities, and they can limit that coverage to the RTNC and to the “allied” media, close to their political camp.

The chart in figure 1 shows Freedom House’s scores for press freedom in the DRC as compared to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a whole, from 1994 to 2011. The higher the mark, the worse press freedom is, according to the Freedom House scoring system. The DRC consistently shows media as “Not Free” compared to the “Partly Free” average for SSA.

The consequence of all these practices is simply self-censorship. A study carried out by the opinion poll company Experts SPRL concluded: “The great majority of the journalists interviewed admitted to not feeling free to disseminate any information about the government. They prefer not to talk about information which either criticizes the government or higher public authorities in the country, or which relates to the private life of the Head of State, or to secret mining operations or to the execution of political detainees…” (Experts Sprl, 2008a: 11).

In this very delicate situation, the activity of JED deserves special mention. JED is not a professional association (even if its driving forces, Donat M’Baya Tshimanga and Tshivis Tshivuadi, are journalists), but a civil society organization, which dedicates itself to defending freedom of expression, hence defending journalists that are threatened, prosecuted or jailed. JED publishes communiqués protesting each time an attack on the media happens, and orchestrates campaigns to raise awareness about media freedom. It operates a network monitoring press attacks on a daily basis and issuing alerts. It also publishes an annual freedom of the press index.

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40 Ben-Clet Kakonde reports the incident of a journalist who was punched by his editor in the middle of the newsroom because he had criticized one of the advertisers that was supporting the newspapers where he worked (IREX, 2008, p. 81).

41 During the celebration of Independence Day, on June 30, 2007, many journalists were threatened because they were covering the parade without belonging to the “limited circle” of media officially invited to provide coverage (IREX, 2008, p. 82).

42 Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index 2011. Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) on the basis of a set of 23 methodology questions divided into three subcategories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having “Free” media; 31 to 60, “Partly Free” media; and 61 to 100, “Not Free” media. For detailed methodology see http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=350&ana_page=376&year=2011
The report, analyzing the obstacles impeding the work of journalists. JED is recognized at home and abroad. It is a member of the IFEX (International Freedom of Expression Exchanges) and has close ties with the French organization Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Borders). Because of their commitment to and activities around press freedom issues, JED’s staff has been threatened on a regular basis and they have had to go into hiding several times over the past ten years, depending upon donors for their protection.

Professional organizations

Media professionals face huge problems in the DRC and several organizations have been set up to try to tackle some of these issues. As problems persist, associations have also multiplied in recent years.

For years, the Congolese Press Union (UPC, formerly UPZa—Union of the Zairean Press) was supposed to be the main organization representing the media. In March 2004, when the National Congress of the Congolese Press was held, such a meeting had not been organized since 1988, a time when almost all journalists were state employees, and the private press was still almost nonexistent. The 2004 Congress made it possible to set up a new key structure, the UNPC (National Union of the Congolese Press), intended to unite all the associations of the media sector. Since then, new organizations have been created regularly, be they sector-based organizations (community radios, publishers, editors), category-specific (women journalists), thematic (cultural reporters, sports reporters, etc.) or locally-based (provincial, local, etc.).

While many of these professional organizations contribute effectively to the consolidation and professionalization of the Congolese media, most are confronted with numerous problems, such as:

- **The absence of voluntary commitment.** Professional associations are normally based on the active, voluntary involvement of individuals who enjoy a salary that comes from their professional employment elsewhere in the media sector. In the DRC, it is practically impossible to count on the voluntary commitment of professionals whose low salaries do not provide for their daily survival.

- **The strong personalization of these associations,** which are often tied to the dynamism of a single individual. Often, the departure of this key personality can lead to the end of the association.

- **A lack of professional consensus.** A feeling of belonging to the same specialist group is normally the foundation of any professional association. But, in the DRC context, it can be difficult to generate this esprit de corps. Indeed, the weight of political affiliation is strong in the media: journalists are permanently pulled between their professional identity and their political membership. This situation is particularly
larly sensitive in associations composed of media managers (ANEAP [National Association of Private Broadcasters] and ANECO [National Association of Congolese Publishers]). As for OMEC, when the observatory issues a communiqué, following a complaint, about an abuse in the media, the organization is usually accused of taking “politically oriented” sanctions.

- **Internal democracy** is difficult to establish for these fragile and precarious associations. Most do not abide by their own statutes. They do not hold general assemblies and do not renew their board as often as they should. It is often difficult for organizations with limited resources to cover the travel expenses of their members.

**Legal and regulatory framework**

The legal and regulatory framework of the media sector is incomplete. The public institutions devoted to media regulation lack both a legal base and sufficient human, material and technical resources to implement any significant regulation. As a result, there are many abuses: on the one hand, as stated above, there are countless violations of the freedom of the press in a context of impunity, with no reaction from the Congolese public institutions. On the other hand, legal, regulatory, and ethical violations by media professionals are also continuous, common, and rarely punished.

**The existing framework**

The Congolese Constitution, approved by referendum in December 2005, states (in article 24) that: “Every person has the right to be informed. The freedom of the press, the freedom of information and of broadcasting by radio and television, the print media or any other tools of communication are guaranteed, as long as public order is respected, as well as good morals and the rights of others. The law fixes the modalities of the exercise of these freedoms.”

However, the legislation in force in the DRC, providing for the application of this constitutional principle, is as yet incomplete and insufficient.

The current legal framework is based on the following texts:

- **Law no. 96-002 dated June 22, 1996** fixing the conditions for the exercise of the freedom of the

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44 For an in-depth analysis of these two pieces of legislation, see Chiragarhula, 2004: 45.
press. It is relatively liberal, even if it was heavily criticized during its adoption process for not providing for the full confidentiality of sources. It also almost completely ignores the broadcasting sector, and provides no specific status for community radios.

- **Prescription-law no. 81-012 dated April 2, 1981** outlining the status of journalists working in Republic of Zaire: it is obsolete because it was drawn up at a time when the private media were almost non-existent.

- **Organic law no. 11/001 dated January 11th, 2011** providing for the composition, responsibilities and operating rules of the High Council for Broadcasting and Communications (CSAC). This law, establishing the regulatory authority, is the only piece of legislation on the media sector adopted by the newly elected regime during the past five years.

Other pieces of legislation provide rules for specific issues in the sector, such as a 1981 prescription providing for the creation of the Zairean Office of Broadcasting and Television (OZRT) and a 1996 ministerial decree fixing the administrative expenses for the establishment of new publications, radio and/or television stations, news agencies, as well as advertising agencies, and for authorizing photo or film reporting. There are also Collective Agreements for the staff of the RTNC and the staff of the ACP.

The common Penal Code and the code of Military Justice also provide for prosecuting and punishing abuses committed by the media. They are punishable by imprisonment of up to 20 years or by capital punishment in cases of treason in wartime. Numerous press trials have marked the recent history of the Congolese media and were essentially held for violations of the penal code (defamation, insult, offence against national security). Regarding libel, the Congolese law provides that the violation is tied to the proof that the honor of the plaintiff has been harmed, independently of the truthfulness or falseness of the reported facts. There were countless trials in the 1990s, but their numbers have been diminishing in recent years. According to JED, trials are decreasing not because rules and regulations are better known, but because journalists have learned how to practice self-censorship.

**A new regulatory body**

The new regulatory authority, the CSAC, established in January 2011, after long negotiations, is a constitutional authority, provided for by the Constitution of 2005, which stipulates that the High Council for Broadcast-
the airwaves, allocation of air time during television debates, neutrality of the public broadcaster, and publication of opinion polls). During this tense period, the HAM received major financial and diplomatic support from the international community. It tried to monitor the campaign and took regular decisions to suspend and sanction various media outlets during the 2006 elections.

Weaknesses in the legal framework
There are significant gaps in the regulatory framework; for example, a specific law on the broadcasting sector, awaited since 1996, has never been adopted, so the procedure and requirements necessary to operate a television channel or a radio station remain vague. This is highly problematic since politically-oriented stations with the sole purpose of electoral propaganda have been growing unchecked.

The existing, though rudimentary, legal and regulatory framework is totally unknown to most of the media industry. As underlined in a study by UNESCO, “the majority of the media professionals have no idea about the legislation in their field of activity. Even if they refer to the law of 1996, no one has ever read it” (UNESCO, 2008: 15).

Furthermore, the legislation and regulations are simply not applied. Offenders are seldom policed and rarely punished; when they are reprimanded it tends to be only in cases where the administration or the judiciary is motivated by political interests. (For further details on current legal initiatives concerning the media, see Appendix 6).

The media audience
Sources of data
Audience data in the DRC are sparse and the way this information is collected is often questionable. There are three types of institutions collecting data on media consumption:

- Local polling organizations. The best-known organizations are Experts SPRL, Azimuts and the BERC. Local polling organizations enjoy limited credibility and are suspected of being bribed by media managers worried about the ranking of their company and willing to pay for a better ranking in order to better negotiate advertising contracts with advertisers. Serge Mbumbu, director of Experts SPRL, explains that many media directors visit him to find out how “to come to an agreement so that they can rise in the ranking.”46

- International polling institutions. The French company IMMAR and SOFRES (French National Institute for Market Research and Opinion Polls) are the main companies that have conducted studies in the DRC. They have done so at the request of the only media concerned about proving their wide audience to their donors: Radio Okapi and RFI (Radio France Internationale). These media are also the ones that have sufficient financial resources to commission this type of poll.

- Large companies (mainly breweries and telecommunications) have developed their own specialized services, in order to have data about the media market before choosing where to place their advertisements.

Audience surveys commissioned and sponsored by Congolese media outlets are nonexistent. The reasons why the media do not invest in data that will allow them to better understand their audience include:

- Lack of budgets to dedicate to this type of expenditure;

- Little interest in the audience from some media owners who use the media as a personal megaphone for self-promotion and are not interested in providing information or responding to the needs or expectations of the public.

However, media outlets certainly have an intuitive knowledge of which programs “work.” The proof is a tendency to copy and to duplicate some formats. The same Nigerian serials, the same Congolese soap operas, the same popular programs such as the news in “easy Lingala”47 are to be found on almost all channels. Sometimes, it is during negotiations with big companies over advertising contracts (who have audience data) that media managers realize the popularity of their own programs.

47 On the « journal en français facile » and other popular TV programs in Kinshasa, see Frère 2010.
Media consumption in the DRC

Audiences are very fragmented in this huge country, with a wide variety of languages, cultures, environments and wide disparities in standards of living and education.

Access to equipment

Access to media equipment is generally quite high, especially for the broadcast media in urban areas.

Radio remains the most common medium in the DRC with access rates that vary from 97 percent (Kinshasa) to 92 percent (Goma) in the cities (2009 figures). In rural areas, radio access is sharply lower (for instance, it reaches only 64 percent in Bundu), but radio is still far ahead of the other media.

Television is catching up with radio in the big cities: with 97 percent having access in Kinshasa, 90 percent in Lubumbashi, 92 percent in Matadi, 82 percent in Mbuji Mayi, 69 percent in Bukavu, 65 percent in Goma and 61 percent in Kisangani. It is less used in secondary cities or rural areas (reaching between 27 percent and 60 percent of people in localities surveyed in 2009).

Access to mobile phones is expanding rapidly: 72 percent of those surveyed in Lubumbashi in 2009 say they have one, 68 percent in Kinshasa, 70 percent in Mbuji Mayi, 68 percent in Matadi, 53 percent in Bukavu, 54 percent in Goma and 45 percent in Kisangani. It is also used in rural villages (between 10 percent and 45 percent).

Frequency and duration of media consumption

Consumption of print media is limited to the most educated people, essentially men over 40. The best-known newspapers are L’Avenir, Le Palmarès, Le Potentiel and La Référence Plus, as well as local newspapers in some provincial towns. Most people surveyed say they read a newspaper “once a month” or “once a week.”

The percentage of Kinshasa inhabitants who read the paper every day is very small (from 2.6 to 5.2 percent of the people surveyed, for the five most popular papers).

Daily consumption of radio and television is high. In Kinshasa, television is the most popular medium (196 minutes a day for women and 158 minutes for men), far ahead of radio (86 minutes of daily consumption for women and 105 for men). In Lubumbashi and Matadi, television has a very slight advantage, and in four other cities radio comes first. In the seven cities surveyed, women dedicate more time than men to television and less time to radio. The peak audience for radios is in the mornings at 7:00 am, while television is especially watched in the evenings, particularly from 8:00 pm onwards. In the rural areas, television and mobile phones are more used by men than by women, while both genders use the radio.

Popularity of local media

The most popular radio stations vary across the country because radio stations mainly broadcast locally. Radio Okapi is the leader everywhere, except for in Matadi. It is trailed:

- In Kinshasa by RFI, Mirador FM, Raga FM, Radio Sango Malamu, RTGA and RTNC1;
- In Lubumbashi by RFI, Radio Mwangaza, Nyota FM, Wantanshi FM and Radio Tam Tam Africa;
- In Bukavu by the RTNC, Radio Maendeleo, Radio Maria, Radio Star, then RFI;
- In Mbuji Mayi by RTDK FM, Radio Pacific Ocean FM, Kasai Horizon RT FM, Radio Mount Carmel and Radio Fraternité;
- In Kisangani by the RTNC, RTGA FM, Digital Congo and Radio Amani;
- In Goma by RTGA, Digital Congo, RTNC, Sauti ya Inzili FM and Radio Colombe.

In Matadi, the RTNC comes first, followed by RTGA FM, Radio Okapi and RTDM FM.

In the rural areas, Radio Okapi is often number two, behind a local radio station and ahead of the international stations such as RFI, Africa n°1, Radio Vatican, VOA and the BBC. The radios from Kinshasa that broadcast throughout the country, such as Digital Congo, are very seldom cited among the favorites.

Radio Okapi is especially popular for its morning newscasts, while the other radios are listened to for their musical and entertainment programs, later in the morning.
In television, the leading quartets are the following:

- For Kinshasa: TV Mirador, followed by RTNC1, Antenne A and TV Numérica;
- For Lubumbashi: TV Mwangaza, followed by TV Nyota, TV Wantanshi and RTNC1;
- For Bukavu: TV Shala, followed by Digital Congo TV, RTNC1 and RTV Grands Lacs;
- For Mbuji Mayi: TV RTDK, followed by TV RTOP, TV KHRT and Mount Carmel TV;
- For Kisangani: Digital Congo TV, followed by RTNC1, TV Amani;
- For Matadi: TV RTGA, followed by RTNC2, RTNC1 and Digital Congo TV;
- For Goma: Digital Congo TV, RTNC2, RTNC1 and Raga TV.

In Lubumbashi, Bukavu and Mbuji Mayi, the audience turns to local television stations, whereas in Kisangani, Matadi and Goma, they watch televisions broadcasting from Kinshasa. Television is especially consumed in the evenings for entertainment.

In the rural areas, RTNC1 and some private channels from Kinshasa (RTGA, Digital Congo TV and CCTV) are preferred, and local TV channels are almost unknown.

Obstacles to media consumption

In regards to the print media, the obstacles include:

- Low literacy, which means only a small French-speaking elite reads newspapers.
- High price of newspapers: in Kinshasa, a daily costs about $2, which is beyond the reach of a huge part of the local population (living on less than $1.25 a day);
- Limited circulation of newspapers: newspapers are distributed only (and with great difficulty) in the city where they are produced. There is no press delivery service and publishers avoid distributing copies in the provinces, as they know they will not be able to realize a profit;
- Poor internet connections: although several dailies from Kinshasa have websites, figures indicate that they are visited mainly by the diaspora. Very few Congolese from inside of the country have access to the internet, and if they do, they spend insufficient time online to surf the papers’ websites.

As far as television is concerned, the obstacles include:

- Unavailability of signal: only two channels are available throughout the whole country;
- The cost of a TV set: even though inhabitants of Kinshasa are very well-equipped, the cost of a television set (let alone the cost of a satellite dish allowing access to international stations) remains prohibitive for many homes in the provinces;
- Lack of electricity: in most cities, there are constant power cuts. In Goma, Bukavu, or even Lubumbashi, watching television is possible in many neighborhoods only if someone is equipped with a generator, allowing the whole district to watch TV together.

The impact of the media

The impact of the media on the public has become an important issue. Media supported by international donors has to increasingly demonstrate both quantitative success (number of readers, coverage area) and qualitative impact (the influence they have over their audience), but qualitative impact is notoriously difficult to measure.

A few media outlets have set up methods by which to measure the impact of their programs:

- Center Lokolé (SFCG), which produces radio and television programs to promote reconciliation, has set up assessment tools to capture the views of its audience;
- Radio Maendeleo has a network of 125 radio clubs, which contribute to the evaluation of its programs. The follow-up of these radio clubs occupies three employees on a full-time basis at Radio Maendeleo.
- Institut Panos Paris (IPP) has grass-roots listening panels (or cellules d’écoute) to assess the quality of their radio content for a project called “Rendez-Vous du Citoyen” [Citizen’s Hour] (IPP Rapport Semestriel, 2011).

Most media outlets can supply numerous anecdotes showing their impact on their public but have no real strategy to understand their audience’s needs, tastes and behavior.

Donors and media are usually interested in two categories of impact:
• Impact on the public authorities (the “watchdog” role of the press);

• Impact on the citizens (increasing their capacity to have a voice and play a part in the democratic control of the management of the state).

**Impact on political authorities**

There are many examples of the media drawing attention to a major problem and forcing the authorities to find a solution.

For example, at the beginning of the 2011 war in Libya, some newspapers raised the problem of Congolese migrants stuck in Libya. “The subject was ignored by our leaders,” explains Polydor Muboyayi, director of the newspaper Le Phare, “but other countries had already taken measures with regard to their citizens. Finally, having been called by the media, the Congolese authorities couldn’t avoid reacting to the Libya issue. That shows that the media’s voice can be heard.”

Another example comes from Mbuji Mayi, in 2007, when a public debate about water supply in the city was organized and broadcast live by local community radios and civil society. One member of the audience reminded the local authority representative that the Congolese people had now gained the right to vote and that they probably would not re-elect a governor who did not guarantee them access to water. A project implemented by Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) eventually solved part of the problem, providing water fountains in some neighborhoods. The community radio and the civil society believe it to be their victory.

According to Freddy Mulumba (General manager of Le Potentiel, Radio 7 and TV 7), the impact of the media and their criticisms of the authorities are very often indirect: “The print media has an influence on the behavior of political leaders because they know that it is read by diplomats, at a time when the country is heavily dependent on international aid. If the press exposes misappropriation of public money, or other scandals, such as the issue of the submarine cables that we raised, diplomats and donors can put the authorities under pressure, urging them to react. Radio and television have a big impact on the population, but are not listened to either by the politicians or in diplomatic circles. And as for internet, this medium is essentially consumed by the diaspora.”

Nevertheless, the impact of the media is limited by the fact that basic systems do not function and there is still no proper rule of law in the DRC. The lack of an independent judiciary and its general state of decay prevents judges from taking cases forward. For example, during the trial of the killers of a Serge Mteshe, the Radio Okapi reporter who was shot in 2007 in Bukavu, many media denounced the trial as a masquerade. Yet this did not bring any change either to the procedure or to the verdict.

**Impact on citizens**

There are many clear examples of the media contributing effectively to the consolidation of citizenship. The director of the Journal du Citoyen (meaning the “Citizen’s Newspaper,” a weekly supplement of electoral information published during the 2006 elections) remembers that many voters entered the polling stations holding copies of the JDC, which explained and illustrated with very drawings the voting procedure and presented portraits of the 33 presidential candidates. And a large-scale poll done for Radio Okapi by the independent company IMMAR in 2006 showed that almost 36 percent of those polled claimed to have been influenced by the programs broadcast by Radio Okapi to cast their vote (IMMAR, 2006).

The director of the polling company Experts SPRL, Serge Mbumbu, however, thinks the media need to understand that the audience has changed over the last ten years. “At the turn of the new millennium Congolese audiences had a strong interest in politics. Gradually, as television has expanded, entertainment has become much more popular.” In big cities, radios (including community radios) are losing their audience to the increasing number of private TV channels showing music videos, dramas, Nigerian movies, Côte d’Ivoire soap operas, Brazilian soap operas, Indian movies, and sports. In Lubumbashi, “radios were opinion-formers before the arrival of the big private television channels. Today, they are losing ground to the TV stations, which belong to local political figures,” observed the manager of Lubumbashi University Radio Phoenix.

**The state of the media industry**

The Congolese media “industry” is largely informal, with almost no regulation or control over media ownership and the advertising market. This environment makes the development of a professional and independent information sector extremely difficult.

50 Polydor Muboyayi, Publisher of Le Phare, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
51 Franck Pascal Mbumba, IPP Program Officer, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
52 Freddy Mulumba, general manager of Le Potentiel, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
53 Didier Kalenda, personal communication, Lubumbashi, March 2011.
Constant threats to media survival

The Congolese media do not generate enough resources to sustain themselves financially, which makes them dependent on external support, sourced from political and religious circles or from international assistance. Moreover, the increasing number of media outlets contributes to their fragility, as the advertising market is very narrow and cannot support the plethora of rival media outlets that crowd the market.

Data on media budgets

The Congolese media all have very different business models and are, for the most part, not very willing to divulge their budgets.

Apart from Radio Okapi ($8 to $13 million annually), the budgets of the local (both private and community) media are very small. The main daily, Le Potentiel, with a circulation of 2,000, has a monthly budget of between $35,000 and $40,000, while the radio and the television channels belonging to the same group (Radio 7 and TV 7) function on $10,000 a month. Radio Maendeleo, a well-known community radio in Bukavu, operates on approximately $33,000 per month. The private television Antenne A claims to have a budget of around $100,000 to $120,000 a month. At the other extreme, some newspapers survive on $200 a month, which covers their printing costs, and some community radios survive on as little as $5,000 a year.54

A look at the budgets of different media outlets shows just how economically fragile most of them are:

• The gradual depreciation of equipment is never integrated into budgets. Media outlets normally have a budget for the initial investments, but fail to secure money for maintenance or to replace defective equipment. In RT Mwangaza in Lubumbashi, the director of programs, Michel Kamwenyi, remarked: “There were four minibuses when we launched Mwangaza, all have now broken down. We had 16 cameras, but only two still work.”55

• The tax system is very heavy for those media outlets willing to try to emerge from the informal economy and play by the rules. Taxes are due to the Ministry of Communication and Media (annual license fees, copyrights), to the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (granting the frequency), to the General Revenue Department (taxing the income), to the Ministry of Culture and Arts, and to the INSS (National Institute of Social Welfare). For example, a station such as the Community Radio of Katanga has to pay multiple taxes, amounting to approximately $15,000 annually, on top of the cost of the frequency ($1,500 annually). “The State does not take into account the contribution of community radios to public service broadcasting,” complains Fidèle Banze Mutombo, from Development and Peace in Katanga.56 These fiscal burdens encourage the media to continue to operate informally, neither declaring their staff nor their income. The management of the television channel Antenne A admits that if they had to conform totally to the rules, 40 percent of the channels’ income would be devoted to taxes. Therefore, a general tendency is to “come to an arrangement” with the taxman.

Sources of income for media companies

To support these running costs, media outlets normally have five sources of income:

• Budgetary support from their owner who can generate financial resources through other economic activities (many media belong to politicians who are also businessmen—politics and business being closely connected in the DRC);

• Commercial advertising disseminated by all media, including most community and church radios;

• Sponsored reports and magazines: many programs and reports are produced in partnership with NGOs or other institutions, airtime is also “rented” to organizations so they can broadcast whatever they want;

54 See Appendix 7 for a more detailed breakdown of monthly budgets for a selection of media outlets.
55 Michel Kamwenyi, program director for RT Mwangaza, personal communication, Lubumbashi, March 2011.
• **Direct budgetary support from donors** (mainly for the community media in the provinces);

• **Concealed “advertorials” or “infomercials,”** in other words, the results of the “coupage” practiced at the uppermost level of management.

Most newspapers, like many journalists, survive on institutionalized “coupage.” The daily *La Référence Plus*, in Kinshasa, revealed to a researcher that the headlines placed on the front page by the newspaper were “for sale to the political or economic operators” concerned about their visibility in the media. “The main practitioner of this veiled form of advertising is the office of the current Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito. In doing so, *La Référence Plus* manages to gain about $7,000 a month” (Katupa, 2011: 11) more than one third of the newspaper’s monthly budget.

In the broadcasting sector, the media that are close to business circles benefit from privileged advertising contracts. For instance, TV Raga belongs to an Indian industrial group (Rawji), which possesses financial interests in many other companies. According to researcher Willy Katupa, “this affiliation allows Raga TV to gain a large portfolio of advertisers,” including telecoms, lottery, toothpastes and soaps, travel agencies, breweries, foodstuffs and cosmetics (Katupa, 2011).

**The issue of media ownership**

The Congolese media are generally the individual property of influential figures from political, economic or religious circles. But the names and sources of funding behind many media outlets are often opaque. Some media’s political ownership is well known (CKTV, CCTV and the Radio Liberté network is former presidential candidate, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s, property; *Le Soft* belongs to Deputy Kin Kiey Mulumba; and RT Lisanga to another member of parliament, Roger Lumbala). Others are the objects of speculation because straw men are invented and used to register the media. Thus, the channel TVS1 allegedly belongs to Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito, TV Nyota is allegedly financed by the governor of Katanga, Moïse Katumbi, and so on, but these allegations are unconfirmed.

• The commercial private media are generally the property of politicians. In 2006, during the elections, some of these political media played an incendiary role in the election campaign, voicing regionalist propaganda or even xenophobic hate speech, setting communities against each other and sometimes provoking them to violence. In Mbuji Mayi, where two candidates seeking the Governor’s seat had their own radio, the electoral battle was transformed into a media fight. In Lubumbashi, private channels are currently fighting each other fiercely: Nyota, Jua and Wantanshi, three private TV stations belonging to personalities involved in local politics, contribute to the local political settling of scores.

• The religious media: some stations originate from the various parts of the Roman Catholic Church (bishoprics, archbishoprics, dioceses), others from various Protestant groups, or from the local Kimbanguist Church, mainly in the west of the country. There are also a large number of radios created by pastors of diverse Evangelical or Pentecostal churches, or by prophets who have their own following. Some of these religious stations adopted strong political positions during the election campaign of 2006, supporting candidates who were keen to gain the support of these large flocks of believers.

• Community media are often only “community” by name. “They are in fact political or individual initiatives: they are not backed by a local community. They provide unfair competition to the real community radios,” says Fidèle Banze Mutombo, from Development and Peace. The “community” character of some radio stations has been a cause for concern within all provincial radio networks, as some are known for carrying commercial advertising and belonging to a single individual.

**The advertising market**

*Use of media market data by the business sector*

As indicated above, the available data on media reach and circulation is very unreliable. What data exists is largely treated as confidential by the companies and is very difficult to access. Furthermore, existing data does not always seem to influence the decisions made by economic actors. Many advertising decisions depend on personal contacts between the advertiser and the media owner, independently of the nature of that media outlet’s audience. For example, the newspaper *Uhuru*, which is hardly ever mentioned by the public in audience polls, is the almost exclusive beneficiary of advertising campaigns from the mobile phone company Vodacom because of privileged relations between individuals in charge of both companies—not because *Uhuru* reaches a particular audience.

Some advertisers negotiate exclusive sponsorship deals for certain programs on a few channels. For example, Bracongo is the “preferred” advertiser during the sports broadcasts on Digital Congo, Bralima on Antenne A and Skol on Congo Web TV.

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The advertisers also have different strategies for different media outlets. For instance, breweries place advertising only on television and charitable work—sponsored by the big companies working in the DRC—only appears as concealed advertorials and in-fomercials in the print media.58

Advertisers are accused, both by media managers and politicians of bearing a huge responsibility for the difficulties of the Congolese media. The private commercial media are dependent on the advertising market, regardless of their political tendency. This market is characterized by the low budgets invested, the recurring practice of “dumping” (companies exerting pressure to buy advertising space and airtime at the lowest prices) and the omnipresence of concealed advertising. Also companies usually negotiate directly with a presenter, a member of a TV theatre team or a journalist, in order to get their message across without visiting the marketing department of the media outlet concerned.

The main advertisers in the Congolese market

The advertising sector is poorly regulated; without legislation to influence behavior or practices, the sector is chaotic.

A 2009 study by IMMAR from which most of the following data and interviews come, estimated the Congolese advertising market was shared out as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications (4 companies)</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breweries (2 companies)</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retailing</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlines</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs and UN agencies</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks and Finance sector</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Budgets dedicated to advertising by the big companies vary from several thousand dollars to $1 million annually.

During this 2009 study, about ten advertisers from various branches of industry (telecommunications, breweries, retailing, airlines and the banking sector)59 were questioned about their relations with the media. They described the Congolese advertising market as having the following characteristics:

- **A narrow market.** dominated by a handful of major advertisers: two breweries (Bralima and Bracongo) and four mobile phone companies (Vodacom, Zain (now Airtel), Télécel and Tigo). These 6 companies represent 77 percent of the advertising resources in the Congolese market and 4 advertisers (Zain, Vodacom, Bralima and Bracongo) supply approximately 74 percent of the advertising budgets for the Congolese media.

- **A compartmentalized and centralized market.** The advertisers concentrate almost 80 to 90 percent of their advertising budgets on Kinshasa, which is in fact home to no more than 12 percent of the Congolese population. Within the media from Kinshasa, the advertisers focus on sports, musical programs and radio plays or popular serials. Other productions (newscasts, magazines, documentaries) are of no interest to advertisers.

- **A scattered market.** Because the advertising market is distributed across a large number of media outlets, development of the advertising market is slowing down and also weakening the main media outlets. Advertisers complain that their investments are scattered across numerous media, sometimes amounting to about 50 different outlets. The growth in the number of channels leads to a very scattered audience. As almost all media are oriented towards “general information” (and not thematically oriented), advertisers end up having to negotiate contracts with several media outlets “which all do the same thing.” One advertiser, interviewed by IMMAR in 2007, complained: “It’s a real juggling act because I have to present my products on 36 TV channels. The scattering of the media market is a major problem” (IMMAR, 2007).

- **A largely unregulated market.** The HAM (High Authority for the Media) tried to impose some rules on advertising. However, there is no real regulation or

58 This kind of “coupage” is substantially cheaper in the print media as it costs as little as $20, whereas a TV newscast is around $300. The print media is also the only place where calls for tender and recruitment vacancies with international institutions appear.

59 Celtel (Mr. Mojou, marketing director), Vodacom (Mr. Albert Mboyo Ekofo, head of brand marketing, in 2007 and Mr. Rossi in 2008), Tigo (Mrs. Dorcas Nsele, commercial director), Bralima (Mr. Van Bueron, marketing director), Bracongo (Mr. Soko, 2008), CFAO (Kashala, marketing manager), Marsavco (Mr. Carvalho, head of marketing), Femco (Nakhuda, commercial director), Nestlé (Mr. Michel Kashala, brand manager), Beltexo (Mr. Joe Dos Santos, head of marketing), Celpay (Mr. Katenge, deputy general director), BIAC (Mr. Sanlaville, deputy administrative president), Bravo Air Congo (Mr. Manuel Pereira, commercial director).
control over advertising contracts and deals, and relations between advertisers, agencies, and media.

- **A market with under-valued rates**: the strong competition between numerous media outlets leads to a general lowering of rates, often driven down by the advertiser. "The prices are low ($400 a month for 30 daily spots), but the work is not well done," observed one advertiser interviewed by IMMAR in 2007. Consequently: "today, the big companies who spend more than $1 million on advertising each month are put on the same time slots and on the same media as the small ones who spend hardly $50,000 a year. There is a real leveling down" (IMMAR, 2007).

- **An undeveloped and therefore affordable market**: From the advertisers' point of view, this is one of the good things about the Congolese market, especially for the near future: "The market is still immature, targets are very receptive…. It is still affordable, you get more bang for your buck, it's a very captive audience with a big impact from radio and TV" (IMMAR, 2007).

- **A market reliant on guesswork**: since there are no reliable data on media audiences, advertisers have to "make a rough guess," as one marketing agent from a telecom company put it (IMMAR, 2007). While some advertisers (such as Bralima) have set up their own polling methods and are satisfied with that, others turn to local polling organizations to order or to buy data.

At present, most of the advertising material of the major companies is produced outside the DRC. The need to turn to foreign companies increases costs significantly: 50 percent of advertising budgets typically goes to foreign agencies for producing the advertising content—a sum that could be captured by the Congolese media instead.
**Hirondelle Communication: An attempt at creating an advertising agency**

In the DRC there is no real central advertising agency that buys and sells advertising space and time. Therefore, in anticipation of the UN leaving the DRC, Radio Okapi attempted to set up such an agency in June 2009. UN regulations prevent Radio Okapi from airing commercials, but the idea was to help local partner radios gain better access to the advertising market. Unfortunately, the project, launched with a private partner in Kinshasa, failed to take off. “The advertising market is totally corrupt,” explains Nicolas Boissez from Fondation Hirondelle. “It’s an environment dominated by bribery and clientelism. Radio Okapi didn’t want to have anything to do with those practices. So we had to change the project.” Instead of the planned advertising agency, Fondation Hirondelle set up “Hirondelle Communication,” a special department that proposes to produce and disseminate institutional communications and awareness campaigns through the 51 radio stations that are now Okapi’s partners. “The elections are approaching, we are trying to convince the UNDP that they will need to get messages to voters and Hirondelle Communication could be a channel to convey those messages to local partner radio stations,” explains Boissez.

This is a considerable challenge, but crucial for Radio Okapi’s future. Indeed, since the beginning of 2011, Radio Okapi has been officially allowed to broadcast paid “institutional communications of public interest.” Even though it has not done so started yet, this is clearly an important step towards self-funding and sustainability for Okapi.

**Conclusion to Part Two**

There are a very large number of media outlets in the DRC, despite the fact that the political and economic environment does not favor the development of strong and professional media. There is undeniably an opportunity for press freedom but attacks on the media and widespread impunity prevail in what is a post-conflict fragile state, characterized by bad governance and regular attempts by those in power to control media outlets and institutions. The Congolese media also have to operate in an economic environment that is slowly recovering from war, but is still faced with substantial problems of energy supply, transport, and widespread poverty.

In such a context, the consolidation and professionalization of the media sector requires:

- **A clarification of the conditions under which media outlets can be created** (as too many media are set up without the minimum standards necessary to ensure responsible publishing and broadcasting);
- **A reduction in the number of media outlets** (as quantity seems to be an obstacle to quality);
- **Plans and strategies to consolidate financial independence and sustainability of the media** (the current financial dependency on political or economic stakeholders and foreign donors means many editorial constraints);
- **Improved internal capacities** (as skills are lacking both in content production and management);
- **Better and more appropriate technical equipment** (in a very fast-moving technical environment where innovations can greatly help to facilitate journalists’ daily work);
- **More independent and efficient regulation and self-regulation** (in a largely unregulated context);
- **Better protection for journalists** (as self-censorship related to fear is standing in the way of the press fulfilling its watchdog role);
- **Improved access to neutral, rigorous and honest information** among Congolese citizens because access to information is a necessity in a democracy.

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60 Nicolas Boissez, Project Officer, Fondation Hirondelle, personal communication, Lausanne, August 2011.
Part 3: Literature Review

There is a broader literature on the DRC media than on the media of many countries in Francophone Africa, probably for two reasons. On the one hand, there has been a journalism school in the DRC for decades (since 1974), where academic research has been produced. The Faculty of Social Communications of the Catholic University of Kinshasa even publishes a journal (Revue africaine de communication sociale), presenting research results of Congolese academics. Nevertheless, this research is mostly theoretical, with very little field research and often no grasp of Congolese media reality. But one should note, for instance, the books published by Rigobert Mukeni Lapess about coupage (Mukeni Lapess, 2009), Vicky Elongo Lukulunga about ethics in the Kinshasa Press (Elongo, 2011), Kasongo Mwema about Congolese television (Kasongo Mwema, 2009), Emmanuel Bebe Beshelemu about the press at the beginning of the 1990s (Bebe Beshelemu, 2006), and the book by Ntambue about the Internet (Ntambue, 2004). Most of this academic work has been produced in French or Belgian universities, as no Congolese institution was allowed to deliver PhD degrees until very recently. Moreover, the country’s dire economic situation, history of conflict and struggling education system continue to discourage quality field research by Congolese academics, except when they are hired and funded as consultants by INGOs or donors for specific research.

On the other hand, as will be shown in the following pages, a number of donors and INGOs have been involved in the DRC for the past 10 years, and many of them have carried out baseline assessments before starting their projects and final evaluations at the end. Unfortunately, most of this literature is not public, and there is no mechanism to centralize and make available the data included in this so-called grey literature. Some of these reports, nevertheless, have a public version that is more widely disseminated. In this regard, one of the first baseline “state of the media landscape” studies was published by UNICIF Zaire and IFASIC in 1999 (IFASIC/UNICEF Zaire, 1999). The Institut Panos Paris then published an updated report (IPP, 2004), as well as several other publications particularly devoted to the media environment’s legal and ethical frameworks (IPP & JED, 2006; IPP, 2005a; IPP 2005b). GRET published an initial census of the radio stations country-wide, in 2005 (GRE, 2005). Two other baselines were provided by BBC World Service Trust/African Media Initiative (Mweze, 2006) and FCI/FEI (Frère, 2008). Given the huge number of Congolese media outlets, one major problem of these “state of the media landscapes” is that they published figures and lists that were very quickly outdated. It is also difficult to encompass all of the activities of media companies, operating in different areas and environments throughout such a large country, in one document.

Given the lack of training of most media professionals, attempts have also been made by several INGOs to publish basic materials—dealing with ethics (GRE, 2006; IPP & JED, 2006), the legal framework (KAS, 2006), electoral coverage (OMEC & UNESCO, 2006), media monitoring (IPP, 2009) or gender issues (Gender Links & UCOFEM, 2008) for instance—that can be used during training sessions.

Three areas of research have received particular attention by organizations that have been active or interested in the media sector of the country, resulting in more data available on a regular basis. The first area centers on the issue of press freedom. Each year since it was established in 1998, JED (Journalist in Danger) has issued an annual report with a census of all attacks on the press that have taken place during the previous year (JED, 2000-2010). These reports, available on JED’s website, have become more and more detailed, and special issues have analyzed, for instance, the electoral campaign in 2006 (JED, 2006), the troubling events in Bukavu where more journalists...
have been murdered than anywhere else in the country (RsF, 2009) and the “decriminalization” of press offences (JED, 2004). JED is also the main source of information for the Freedom House Index, as well as the DRC section of the Reporters Without Borders annual report. Nevertheless, results from these international organizations do not always correspond to JED’s. As the best functioning local media organization, JED has also been given the responsibility to organize and moderate the yearly focus groups for the IREx MSI (Media Sustainability Index). In 2009, DRC scored 1.69 on the MSI, which puts it in the category of “unsustainable mixed system.” The report clearly pointed out that while freedom of the press is officially guaranteed by the constitution, and the specific clauses of this freedom are spelled out in the law, the government shows no political will to ensure freedom of the press may be exercised. On the contrary, it shows a clear intention to muzzle the independent press and stifle any opinion opposed to the government’s view…” (IREx, 2009: 71)

In the previous reports, DRC scored 1.71 in 2008 and 1.5 in 2006/2007. Out of the five sub-categories, the only one that scored as “nearly sustainable” is the one focusing on “plurality of news sources.” “Free speech,” “professional journalism,” and “business management” all score especially low.

The second area that is fairly well covered is the legal and regulatory framework. The establishment of the HAM (High Authority of the Media) in 2004 and its subsequent development resulted in many publications devoted to the analysis of different aspects of media regulation, including the presentation of all the decisions and recommendations adopted by the regulatory authority (HAM, 2005; HAM, 2006; CEMPC, 2006). Nevertheless, these publications are mainly focused on 2005-2006 cases because the situation of the HAM deteriorated following the elections and hardly any data came out from the provinces after the support from INGOs and donors was suspended. Members of the staff of the regulation authority, as well as consultants advising the institution, continued to publish material afterwards (Lwemba Lu Masenga, 2008; Bosamba Malanga, 2008; Mashini, Mbalanda & Kabongo, 2008), and the Monitoring Center also produced a few thematic reports when it was given the opportunity and the resources (IPP, 2010).

The third area from which data is available relates to audience surveys. As mentioned above, one single local institution, Experts SPRL, regularly produces data about media consumption. This data is not available for free and most media companies do not have the financial resources to get the information. Experts SPRL also produces studies to order; for instance, in 2006 they conducted research for SFCG (Experts, 2008a, 2008b). Many other local surveys certainly do circulate throughout the sector but they often have contested validity and limited credibility. Foreign survey companies also implement research regularly in the DRC, mainly for Radio Okapi and RFI (Radio France Internationale).

Two French institutes, IMMAR and SOFRES, have produced yearly data about the media in Kinshasa and in a range of other towns inside of the Congolese provinces. Even though this data is not public (except for IMMAR 2008 survey, published in Frère, 2008), the main concern of the two stations that are commissioning them (and paying high prices—more than 60,000 euros for surveys of a sample of around 2,500 citizens) is to have an idea of their own ranking in relation to other stations. The ranking argument can help convince donors that are supporting these stations that they should continue to fund. But these rankings are also slippery: they have to be carefully analyzed if used for scientific purposes; the survey questionnaires, as well as samples of citizens surveyed, may be challenged upon closer scrutiny.

Even questions on equipment ownership or internet access have sometimes been formulated in a way that is ambiguous and results in unlikely figures or contradictory data (see for instance the significant differences between ITU, 2008 and IMMAR, 2008, regarding internet access and mobile phone ownership). The data from the World Bank, including the ICT4D indicator, show a rapid increase in mobile ownership (from almost none in 2000 to a subscriber base that is almost 50 percent of the total population in 2010), and a very slow growth of internet use (6 out of 1,000 people in 2010). These are probably reliable trends but do not exactly correspond to ITU and IMMAR data. In a country without reliable census data and very poor capacity for collecting relevant information from official structures, any quantitative evaluation of access (beyond the issue of subscribers, as collective access is usual in the Congolese context and many users can share the same device) is very problematic.

Reliable data and research is lacking, especially regarding two dimensions of the Congolese media landscape. The first gap relates to the economic conditions in which the media are operating. The market issue is crucial for the future development of the media landscape.
Given that hundreds of media outlets are spread out over a very wide area, and that there are many regional particularities, it is almost impossible to obtain a complete picture of the Congolese media landscape.

sector, as shown before, but reliable data about media budgets, advertising revenue, media ownership and benefits for investors are very difficult to collect and are never published. While some data does exist regarding media outlets supported by foreign donors (for instance Radio Okapi), there is hardly anything regarding private media. Moreover, the lack of transparency in the media business likely does not encourage this type of research. If data is available, among donors, about the financial input of the main funders (DFID, USAID, France, Belgium, EU, etc.) in the media sector, it is more complicated to try to analyze how much of this investment actually impacts the local media market and the sustainability of local media industry, as many project budgets include large amounts of money devoted to expats’ salaries, foreign expertise, INGO facilities in the DRC or activities (such as training) with no real financial benefit for the actual media outlets themselves (Frère, 2009).

The second gap is linked to the huge dimensions of the country. Given that hundreds of media outlets are spread out over a very wide area, and that there are many regional particularities, it is almost impossible to obtain a complete picture of the Congolese media landscape. For instance, the conditions in which the media operate are very different in Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Kisangani or Matadi; there is not much in common between media access in big cities and in remote villages where the majority of Congolese citizens live. Therefore, much of the data available is often too focused on a single city (very often Kinshasa), or on big towns; conclusions and recommendations are often not appropriate to secondary towns or rural areas. For instance, one cannot generalize reliably from the GMMP (Global Media Monitoring Project67), a media content analysis project centered on gender issues, because it is implemented in the DRC using only a very small sample of the media.

One should note that more research has focused recently on qualitative approaches to the media audience. While anthropological work has been done for some time on popular television drama (Pyne, 2009) or TV news (Frère, 2010), new mechanisms have been established recently to better understand what Congolese citizens actually do with the media and the content they are exposed to. New research on media consumption is partially linked to the expectations of media-support providers who are interested in if and how the media actually influence the audience, mainly in the area of peace-building and encouraging citizenship (see the end of this report).

Finally, one has to note that there is a broader literature on the DRC as a post-conflict “failed state” (Trefon, 2011), much of which focuses on how the DRC hosts the biggest UN peace-keeping mission in UN’s history (Autesserre, 2010). Most of this literature, however, as well as the various INGO reports related to crisis or human rights issues (e.g. International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International), pays very little attention to media issues. Even though the media have been stakeholders in the conflict and remain a powerful agent for instability, they are usually neglected in research that focuses on the state apparatus, political authorities, institutions, and their shortcomings. Some reports have looked at the Congolese media (mainly Radio Okapi: see Orme, 2010; Betz, 2004) in the frame of international assistance and peace-building, but very little work actually attempts to present a comprehensive analysis of the DRC media landscape (Frère 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011).

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67 The GMMP is a worldwide study about the representation of women in the media. It is mainly promoted and supported by WACC (World Association for Christian Communication) and is the basis for advocacy work aiming to change these representations.
The number of initiatives by donors and operators specializing in the media sector has increased over the last 20 years.

The reasons why donors have intervened and continue to support the media sector are tied to the country’s political situation. The media have thus been supported for the following reasons:

• **From 1990 to 1997**: to encourage the democratic exchange of ideas, in particular the emergence of voices distinct from Mobutu’s, during the national conference. Support was targeted at certain media and limited during this first so-called “transition” period, at a time when international aid to the Congo was suspended and support was aimed at civil society actors. During this period, the French and U.S. Embassies, the Communauté française de Belgique [French-speaking community of Belgium], and UNESCO were among the few that supported projects aimed at strengthening the independent Congolese media.

• **From 2000 to 2004**: to promote a return to peace and reconstruction during negotiations to solve the conflict. Operators specializing in the fields of conflict and reconstruction (such as Fondation Hirondelle and Search for Common Ground) and some NGOs specializing in structural media support (Institut Panos Paris, GRET) established themselves in the DRC at this time with the explicit aim of taking part in peace-building efforts. After the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi people in Rwanda and the infamous role played by the Rwandan hate radio, many donors and specialized organizations had become concerned with the role of the media in both the conflicts and in peace-building efforts, and wanted to counteract or neutralize ethnically motivated hate media in favor of nation-building. The establishment of Radio Okapi, in the wake of the UN peace-keeping mission, reflected this concern.

• **From 2004 to 2007**: to enable the media to accompany the electoral process during the second “transition.” The creation of transitional institutions and the decision by several key contributors to put the DRC high on their list of priority countries—EU, British development aid, Belgian development aid—led to an increase in support to key actors in the media sector, essentially the High Media Authority (HAM), community radios and Radio Okapi;

• **From 2007 to 2011**: to establish a solid and responsible press likely to promote the consolidation of democracy, during this first democratically elected presidency. Operators multiplied, and intervention methods and strategies became more diversified. The sector’s donors gradually favored a more concerted and structured approach.

Over the last 20 years, interventions by donors and operators have been quite varied, essentially covering five types of activities:
• The creation of “neutral” and “apolitical” media and contents (a common strategy in post-conflict countries). This also includes the production of needs-based and behavior-change programming for education, health, agriculture, and development in general;

• Direct support (funding and equipment) for a number of media;

• Media staff training;

• The strengthening of the sector’s professional organizations and associations;

• The strengthening of public institutions in charge of organizing the sector (regulatory authority, legal reform).

Donors and media operators in the DRC

Several categories of international actors support the media sector in the Congo. Three categories are identified below:

1. International NGOs (INGOs): obtain funding and implement specialized projects;

2. Donor-operators: use their own funds to develop activities in the sector, without going through specialized INGOs;

3. Bilateral and multilateral donors: entrust their funds to private or public operators in order to implement their intervention strategy.

4. This distinction is quite artificial, however, and several organizations are not easily categorized. Thus, the sector’s primary operator is currently France Expertise Internationale (FEI), a public agency of the French Foreign Ministry, which manages essentially British and Swedish aid funds (see below), using methods close to those of INGOs.

Specialized international NGOs (INGOs)

(For detailed descriptions of the activities of the following NGOs in the DRC, see Appendix 8)

Institut Panos Paris (IPP)
The Institut Panos Paris (IPP) is a Paris-based INGO. It specializes in media pluralism and has been present in the DRC since 2000. The IPP bases its intervention strategy on a sectoral approach, which attempts to strengthen many different actors (private, institutional, community-based, or organizational) simultaneously. For its DRC activities, it derives its funding mainly from DFID (the UK’s Department for International Development), Swedish Sida, the EU, Cordaid, Irish Aid and others.

Fondation Hirondelle (FH)
Fondation Hirondelle (FH) is a private non-profit organization based in Lausanne, Switzerland, specializing in the creation of neutral and professional media in war zones and crisis states. In the DRC, it created Radio Okapi in 2002, which it manages in partnership with MONUSCO (United Nations Peace Keeping Mission in the Congo).

Search for Common Ground (SFCG)
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an international NGO created in 1982 with headquarters in the United States. Active in 20 countries, it has been present in the DRC since 2001 and started its activities in Bukavu under the name of Center Lokolé. SFCG is essentially active in the production of radio and TV programs aiming to transform conflicts and promoting dialogue.

Research and Technology Exchange Group (GRET)
The Research and Technology Exchange Group (GRET) is a French NGO based in Paris, working in the field of micro-finance, rural and urban development, as well as the reinforcement of civil society. It also includes a department dedicated to media support. The GRET has led several successive programs to support the media in the DRC, funded by the EU and the Canadian Embassy, including support to the written press.
and several training-oriented projects funded through the FEI (DFID and Sida) program.

**La Benevolencija**
A Dutch NGO based in Amsterdam, La Benevolencija aims to promote peace and reconciliation through radio broadcasting and community-based programs. In the DRC, it operates in eastern Congo (Goma and Bukavu).

**Radio Netherlands Training Center (RNTC)**
An autonomous organization that emerged out of Radio Nederland, the RNTC has implemented projects on training, equipment and support for Congolese community radios since 2007, mainly in the province of Bas-Congo.68

**Syfia International**
Syfia International is a network of nine news agencies in Europe and French-speaking Africa, whose Congolese branch is InterCongo Media (ICM). Among other activities, Syfia runs an online agency “Syfia Grands Lacs” and a publication by the same name.

**Development and Peace (Développement et Paix)**
The international development organization of the Catholic Church in Canada, Development and Peace has been present in the DRC since 1980, backing civil society in order to consolidate citizenship and democratization. Among its most notable activities it has supported the creation of seven community radios in Katanga and Oriental provinces.

**Internews**
Internews—an American NGO—established itself in the DRC in 2011 and has started implementing a large five-year media support program with a budget of $15 million, supported by USAID, in partnership with FH, JED, and a research consultancy called Albany Associates.

**Other organizations**
Besides these INGOs with specialized skills, there are dozens of other organizations that contribute selective support to certain media. Among these groups, attention should be given to charities supporting church-based radio stations. Indeed, some Catholic or Protestant radios, far from limiting themselves to evangelization, play an important role in informing citizens.

For instance, Cameco—the umbrella Catholic Media Council—has estimated that Congolese Catholic radios received more than €1.5 million between 2004 and 2008. Some of these are part of international networks, such as the Radio Maria network (Radio Maria Bukavu, Radio Maria Kananga, etc.). Many other NGOs whose activities are focused on rural development or on reinforcing civil society and human rights also support community radios for some projects. For example, Radio Maendeleo was supported for more than ten years by CNCD (an organization bringing together development NGOs in French-speaking Belgium) and is now financed by Misereor (a German Catholic NGO).

**Donor-operators**
This second category includes bilateral or multilateral donors who implement their own programs, either directly or through their chosen operators. (Again, more details can be found in Appendix 8).

**French development aid**
The French Embassy is the only diplomatic delegation that has an “audio-visual attaché” specializing in issues close to the sector as part of its aid department. The presence of this internal expertise enables it to support small media projects directly, where other donors tend to subcontract. France was therefore one of the first bilateral to show interest in the DRC’s media sector through a number of programs (detailed in Appendix 8). The largest and most important of these is a fund of £12 million GBP coming mostly from UK development aid (DFID) with some contributions from Sweden (Sida) and destined to support the media. Since September 2007, the program is implemented by the French public operator FEI (France Expertise International), previously called FCI.

**APEFE and Wallonia-Brussels International (WBI)**
APEFE (Association for the Promotion of Education and Training Abroad—French-speaking Community of Belgium) is an organization tied to the development department of the federated entity of French-speaking Belgium (the former Communauté française de Belgique, now called Wallonia-Brussels International). It is an agency that makes trainers and young experts available to Southern partners. Together with the WBI, it has supported three important projects in the media sector in the DRC (see Appendix 8).

**UNESCO**
UNESCO, which has a small branch in Kinshasa, has supported a few small media projects, including: support to the Ministry of Press and Information on the

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68 Since 1 June 2011, the RNTC has merged with two other Dutch NGOs (Freevoice and Press Now) to create Free Press Unlimited, a new Dutch NGO. Its headquarters are still at Hilversum, in the Netherlands.
drafting of legal texts, support to community radio, to the media observatory (OMEC), and to the UNPC.

**United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**

The UNDP has played a central role in the administration of funds from the international community linked to the electoral process, and has helped consolidate new institutions after the 2006 elections; consequently it has undertaken a few initiatives in the media sector. See Appendix 8 for further details. Equipped with a substantial budget by UK’s DFID (£50 million) for democracy and accountability work with the Congolese Government, UNDP did not, however, secure the funds allocated by DFID for the media, which were given instead to the French Foreign Ministry via FEI (see above). Indeed, the British wanted to avoid going through a bilateral organization because they regard the media as a sensitive sector which should be tackled without being dependent on government cooperation.

**Bilateral and multilateral donors**

This third section focuses on the bilateral development aid agencies which finance projects in the media sector but are not operators themselves: they thus entrust the execution of their policy in the field to specialized INGOs.

**DFID: Department for International Development (UK)**

Although it has now been superseded by USAID, for years DFID was the largest donor in the media sector in the DRC, a priority country for the UK. Since 2004, DFID has injected more than €2.5 million annually into the Congolese media sector.

From 2004 to 2007, direct support was provided to three beneficiaries:

- Radio Okapi: DFID contributed up to 50 percent of the Fondation Hirondelle side of the budget, which represented some £1 million annually;
- Center Lokolé (SFCG): benefited from direct support worth some £1.38 million from 2004 to 2007;

From 2007 to 2012: support for the program “Media for Democracy and Transparency” (FCI/FEI) worth £12 million.

Since 2007, DFID has pursued a strategy of “harmonization” with other donors. Thus, as regards the rest of its support in the DRC, DFID now entrusts the management of its democracy and governance program to the UNDP, except for the sensitive media sector. Given the presence of French development aid in the media sector since 2001, DFID entrusted the management and administration of this fund to FEI.

**Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Belgian bilateral federal development aid has provided structural support to Congolese organizations since 2004. In sum: from 2004-2005, support to UPEC (Production Unit of Civic Education Programs), which produces civic awareness-raising audiovisual elements; from 2004-2007, support for the HAM, entrusted later to APEFE, including an amount reserved for *Journal du Citoyen* (in 2005); support for Syfia International / ICM / Infosud Belgique (2007-2009; 2010-2011); support for the newspaper *Le Souverain* and the production center “Les 3 Tamis” in Bukavu (2008-2009). Apart from these special financing lines (granted by Brussels on the budgetary line “Conflict Resolution and Preventive Diplomacy”), support has also been given to local/community media in the provinces through a small project fund (micro-intervention et expertise program) of the Belgian development agency BTC (Belgian Technical Cooperation), the main executive agency of Belgian development aid.

**USAID**

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided extensive support to various initiatives over the past years. Through its Washington-based program “Democracy and Governance,” USAID has supported mainly Radio Okapi (from 2002 to 2006) and Search for Common Ground, of which USAID is, through various offices of the U.S. administration, the chief contributor. The United States invested more than $5 million in the media sector between 2004 and 2008, putting it in second place behind the UK’s contributions. In April 2010, USAID issued a call for proposals won by a consortium led by Internews and Fondation Hirondelle. The project, which began in January 2011, focuses on five areas of activity (see Appendix 8 re: Internews) for a total of $15 million over a period of five years. Additionally, the U.S. Embassy has a financing line called “Public Diplomacy” which funded several short training interventions for journalists before the 2006 elections (with the support of ARS—African Regional Services—based in Paris). It gave temporary support to ARCO (Association of Community Radios in the Congo) and AMI (African Media Institute, an NGO defending the freedom of the press) and the HAM. It is also now backing Amicus, a local organization of lawyers and human rights activists who are lobbying for the adoption of a law on access to public information.
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

Switzerland has focused its support for the Congolese media on:

- Radio Okapi (FH being based in Switzerland, Swiss development aid has been an ongoing donor since its creation);
- InterCongo Media (independent press agency that is part of the Syfia network);
- The HAM, which received backing until late 2004 (through a project supporting the regulatory authorities of the Great Lakes region implemented by IPP);
- A regional project for freelance journalists in DRC, Burundi and Rwanda.

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Swedish development aid (Sida) has supported Radio Okapi and SFCG since 2007 to the tune of some €1 million. Since 2009, its contribution to the sector was transferred to the FEI basket fund, alongside DFID. Sida also supports IPP in implementing regional programs (2005-2008; 2009-2012) aimed at increasing cooperation between the media of the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi.

European Union

Through calls for proposals managed from Brussels on the budgetary line EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights), the European Union has supported several projects involving Congolese media in projects implemented by the GRET, IPP and Syfia International at the regional level.

In light of the decentralization strategy of European development aid, local calls for proposals are now published by the delegation in Kinshasa in the context of support for non-state actors, in particular reinforcing the “role of society in the promotion of human rights and democratic reform, the support for peaceful reconciliation of particular interests, and the extension of political participation and representation.” A project in the media sector has been selected at this level: submitted by RFI, it aims to work on the development of renewable energy for community radios.

Other occasional donors

Some other bilateral and multilateral development agencies have occasionally opened up financing opportunities to the Congolese media sector:

- UNICEF, the FAO (UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization) and ADB (African Development Bank) also organize occasional training and awareness-raising for the media;
- Canadian development aid (CIDA) supported the JDC newspaper and Radio Okapi with small grants (except in 2008, when CIDA was Radio Okapi’s primary donor, with a grant of around €2,130,000 before suddenly ceasing its support);
- BTC, the executive agency for Belgian development aid, supported the creation of two neighborhood radios in the suburbs of Kinshasa;
- Japanese development aid has donated some equipment to community radio and to the state broadcaster, the RTNC.
### Summary of the support provided by donors to the media sector: 2004-2010 estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Operators, institutions, projects supported</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Approx. total amount (not detailed)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong> (DFID)</td>
<td>Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle)</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>€18,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institut Panos Paris (support for local actors)</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center Lokolé (Search for Common Ground)</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FCI (France Coopération Internationale)</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>privileged partners: IPP, Okapi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other partners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>FSP – Support for Congolese audiovisual media (ICA, training, community radios)</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td>€2,200,000 (France also provides offices, telecommunications, and other in-kind contributions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan Radio Afrique (8 countries, incl. the DRC)</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RFI : support for community radios</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HAM</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle)</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FCI (France Coopération Internationale)</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td>HAM (via APEFE)</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>€4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(federal and community level)</td>
<td>Journal du Citoyen (via APEFE)</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for the press (on-site training with OIF)</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPEC</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Tamis</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Maendeleo</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syfia Grands Lacs</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La Benevolencija</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center Lokolé</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Okapi</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Switzerland (SDC)</strong></td>
<td>Syfia Grands Lacs</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>€5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle)</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institut Panos Paris (regional projects)</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle) (USAID)</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>€7,500,000 (just started)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center Lokolé (State Department + USAID)</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HAM</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internews</td>
<td>2011-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle)</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>€1,880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center Lokolé</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FCI/FEI</td>
<td>2009-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle)</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>€4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journal du Citoyen (Institut Panos Paris)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GRET: co-funding EU project</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Development and Peace (support for radios)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69 This table was created using the amounts found on the various agreements binding the beneficiaries to their donors, given in a wide range of currencies (US$, €, £, Swedish crowns, CAN$, CHF, etc.). As a result, the amounts converted into euro are estimates, given the variations in exchange rates at the time these various amounts were transferred. Moreover, these amounts do not take into account the potential balance established at the end of the project. For projects and grants running beyond 2008, the estimates were calculated by counting an amount corresponding to the proportion of the project executed as of 31 December 2008 (in relation to the total amount granted).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / Source</th>
<th>Organization / Project Details</th>
<th>Years Supported</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Netherlands                                 | RNTC (Informorac - DRC project)  
Niza / WorldCom  
Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle)  
La Benevolencia  
Center Lokolé                      | 2007-2010  
2010-2015  
2004-2006  
2003-2010  
2007-2008  
2007-2008                      | €1,700,000                           |
| Ireland (Irish Aid)                         | Institut Panos Paris                                                                     | 2006-2008             | €360,000              |
| Germany                                     | Radio Okapi                                                                                | 2009-2010             | €750,000              |
| European Union (EU)                         | GRET: national program DRC  
GRET: regional project  
Syfia Grands Lacs / ICM  
Institut Panos Paris (regional projects)  
RFI (Local calls for proposal)  
Institut Panos Paris (regional project) | 2004-2007  
2007-2009  
2007-2008  
2001-2004  
2009-2012  
2010-2009                      | €3,445,000                           |
| UNDP/AIT (UK, Italy)                        | HAM  
Radio Okapi (Fondation Hirondelle)                                                      | 2005-2006             | €1,562,000            |
| United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) | Ministry of Press and Information: support for the elaboration of the Master Plan         | 2005-2006             | €135,000              |
| UNESCO (funding: Belgium)                   | 3 community radios in Bandundu (via Ministry of Rural Development / Ministry of Press and Information)  
Support for the press – “on-site” training  
Support fund for the Southern press: Le Potentiel | 2002-2004  
2003-2007                      | €500,000                           |
| OIF (La Francophonie)                       | Community and denominational radios                                                        | 2004-2010             | €2,000,000            |
| Total                                       |                                                                                             |                         | €63,432,000 [approx. USD $82,880,250] |

Note: this table presents the main donors and programs they supported. It does not list occasional support provided by small NGOs to isolated community radios. One should note that cumulative support to Radio Okapi has amounted to more than USD $31 million.
The Inter-Donor Media group was created to start a mechanism for coordinating amongst donors. It turned out to be very useful as a dialogue organization and as a means to enable donors to adopt agreed positions on certain issues related to the government’s handling of the media sector.

**GIBM - A forum on media support among donors**

Given the number of donors that have entered the Congolese media sector over the last decade, most in a disorganized and largely uncoordinated fashion, the idea of creating a collegial dialogue amongst donors was proposed in 2004 at the time of the National Press Conference. Initially entrusted to UNESCO and the Belgian development agency, the initiative failed to materialize, however, and it is thanks to DFID and the French Embassy that the Inter-Donor Media Group [Groupe Inter-Bailleurs Médias] (GIBM) finally started functioning properly in late 2005.

A forum for information sharing, the GIBM allows all donors in the sector to present the initiatives they are promoting in the media sector, in order to avoid overlap and encourage cooperation. The GIBM’s guidelines, adopted by its members in December 2006, put France in charge of coordinating the group (presidency). The French-speaking Community of Belgium (WBI) holds the co-presidency. The active members are, besides DFID, France and the WBI, the Belgian federal state, UNDP, USAID, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain. The above distinction between INGOs, donors and donor-operators is meaningful in this context since operators are not normally allowed to take part in the GIBM’s meetings, reserved for donors.

DFID’s initial ambition was to establish, through the GIBM, a basket fund to which many donors could contribute to the media sector. But this strategy was greeted with reluctance by several participants, who were open to the idea of coordination and sharing information, but not to that of a joint financing mechanism. Nevertheless the GIBM turned out to be very useful as a dialogue organization and as a means to enable donors to adopt agreed positions on certain issues related to the government’s handling of the media sector. For instance, the GIBM worked together to support the HAM’s involvement in the financing of the electoral campaign in the media in 2006. GIBM issued a communiqué deploring the decision by the Ministry of Information to suspend 38 radio and television stations in early 2007. In 2010, six ambassadors from EU states also visited President Kabila to express their concerns following an increase in the number of press freedom violations. This procedure was discussed at a GIBM meeting, but not all participants wanted to take part. Participants thus have different agendas.

However, the GIBM brings together delegates based in Kinshasa who can only follow events in the provinces from a great distance, helping address problems that result from a lack of consultation and coordination among donors and operators.

**Strategies for supporting the media sector**

Most support centers around five types of activities:

1. The creation of new media outlets, new content or new programs;
2. Material, technical or financial support for existing media companies;
3. Capacity-building and training of media staff;
4. Support for professional organizations in the media sector (including local and international networking of existing organizations);
5. Support for regulation and legal reform.

**The creation of media outlets or media content**

This strategy aims to establish media outlets or disseminate new content, given that none of the local media seem capable of giving citizens professional, rigorous and impartial information.
In this category one notably finds:

- Radio Okapi
- Search for Common Ground
- *Le Journal du Citoyen*
- *Syfia Grands Lacs*

The objective in creating these media is threefold:

- To provide a news product which did not exist before and which was not possible to create through support from an existing media outlet;
- To serve as a training center for personnel working there;
- To provide a model and set a standard of professional quality for local media to emulate.

**Direct support for existing media**

Many Congolese media outlets receive direct aid from partners and donors. This aid can take four forms:

- Structural budgetary support for media operations (funds allocated to pay salaries, electricity bills, rent, and so forth);
- Technical and material support (equipment): these donations can be targeted at a single media outlet or can involve sharing equipment among several outlets (through the establishment of resource centers, press houses, etc.);
- Support for the production of certain types of programs (field reports, awareness-raising reports on certain themes, thematic dramas, etc.);
- Support for the broadcasting of certain programs (paying media outlets to distribute content—e.g. public service announcements).

The primary beneficiaries are the community radios, some of which have signed more than a dozen partnerships with different donors.

**Radio Maendeleo** in Bukavu, for instance, receives all four forms of support:

- Budgetary support: from Misereor (€150,000 annually);
- Equipment grants: from various partners (RFI, SFCG, GRET, etc.) as well as shared maintenance tools;
- Production support: regional “freelance journalist” project (financed by Swiss development aid SDC);
- Broadcasting support: from La Benevolencića.

The private commercial media receive much less direct budgetary help or equipment, for two reasons:

- They are meant to be able to get by on commercial advertising (the latter being—in theory—not allowed for community media);
- The uncertainty surrounding ownership of these media (i.e. influence of politicians and shady business practices).

Thus, for instance, **Radio Television Mwangaza** in Lubumbashi—a commercial station—receives no direct aid for its operations. However, it has signed several partnerships with donors and operators which enable it to access substantial revenue. Belgian development aid (BTC) and USAID backed awareness-raising campaigns on various themes broadcast on Mwangaza.

For the private print media, the only direct support has been by the OIF (*International Organization of La Francophonie*) through the Support Fund for the French-speaking Southern Press, which several newspapers benefited from.

In television, support opportunities are also limited, the overwhelming majority of channels belonging to political or religious figures. Since 2008 FEI has supported some independent productions for TV. These are very costly, and some of them have to struggle to be broadcast on local TV stations.

**State media (mainly RTNC)** have not been the object of any specific support, except for the ACP (Congo Press Agency), which the GRET supported with IT equipment. Several studies have been commissioned by donors (the WBI in 2004 and French development aid in 2007), but none of these studies convinced donors to establish a support mechanism for the RTNC. The fund managed by FEI had originally planned a budget line for this purpose, but has struggled to find initiatives by the RTNC worth supporting. According to the FEI project manager, Olivier Lechien, “The RTNC is a symbolic failure of media support strategies in the Congo. No one has dared tackle it. Of course there are huge needs. But the fact that it has not evolved has led to an increase in the number of private channels created by politicians looking for a showcase that the RTNC refuses to offer them. Hence the excessive number of private media outlets, which destabilizes the market,
is also due to the stagnation of the RTNC, which not a single partner has helped reform.\textsuperscript{70}

**Capacity building and training**

Training is a key concern for many donors and operators.

There are four types of support given:

- **Support for journalism schools** (essentially, for Kinshasa’s Institute of Information and Communication Sciences, IFASIC) and the Catholic Faculty of Kinshasa (FCK-UCC);

- **Support for long-term training institutions**: targeted at active professionals as refresher training (e.g. ICA);

- **Thematic limited training sessions**: seminars, workshops, etc. A few of these training sessions are organized abroad, either because they are associated with visiting the institutions hosting the training (e.g. International Criminal Court in the Netherlands, BBC in London, RFI in Paris, World Bank in Washington), or because the donor country is organizing it through its own local institutions;

- **“On-site” training sessions**: this type of training—involving accompanying the daily production and management process from within a media outlet—was set up by various operators (APEFE-WBI-OIF, IPP, RNTC, etc.) for the print media and radio stations, probably as a result of the lack of impact that thematic short-term training sessions was having.

Support initiatives for journalism schools have been rather scarce. IFASIC is the oldest journalism training school in the DRC. Created in 1974, it received considerable support from Canadian and French development aid and from UNESCO during the 1980s. The end of this support in 1990 marked the beginning of the Institute’s decline, while the emergence of private media led to an increased demand for communication professionals. Training organizations have expanded within public or private universities, which are emerging in ever-greater numbers due to the liberalization of the higher education sector. The problems encountered by these training departments are substantial (e.g. large class sizes, a lack of technical equipment to provide practical training, a shortage of qualified teachers, etc.) but this has not discouraged a growing demand for their courses.

Support for long-term training institutions has been limited given the absence of competent institutions in this field, but also the lack of interest among Congolese media managers in encouraging (and helping to pay for) long-term training for their employees. According to Pascal Berqué, the IPP program director, the absence of effective long-term training programs, after ten years of media supporting the DRC, reveals a lack of vision on behalf of operators: “There have been hundreds of training initiatives, including trainers’ training, but there is still no training center that is likely to fulfill the sector’s current needs.”\textsuperscript{71}

Instead, donors have funded many short-term trainings. As in other French-speaking countries, Congolese journalists have benefited from many journalism seminars organized either by NGOs specializing in the professionalization of the media (IPP, GRET, RFI, etc.), organizations aiming to make journalists aware of their own concerns (UNDP, UNICEF, etc.), or specializing in elections (Carter Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), Independent Electoral Commission (CEI)).

As an example, here is a list of training sessions followed by RCK journalists in Lubumbashi just over the last two years:

- UNICEF: the coverage of information relating to children;
- UNDP: controlling the circulation of weapons;
- Vision Mondiale: raising awareness about HIV/AIDS;
- MSF: coverage of MSF’s activities;
- USAID/SOCIKAT: decentralization and the control of small arms;
- RCN: sexual violence perpetrated against women;
- PNMLS: the fight against AIDS;
- Voice of America (VOA): coverage of HIV/AIDS;
- Red Cross: covering the Red Cross’s activities;
- IPP: investigative journalism – joint reporting;
- RFI: team management of community radios.

\textsuperscript{70} Olivier Lechien, FEI project manager, personal communication, August 2011.

\textsuperscript{71} Pascal Berqué, IPP program director, personal communication, August 2011.
Lastly, a number of donors and operators have developed “on-site” training operations, where the trainer moves between companies and trains the personnel by accompanying their daily activities in terms of production and management. The main initiatives are the following:

- The “on-site” training in the newspapers of Kinshasa (APEFE-WBI-OIF) (2004-2007): a trainer (a professional journalist) spent a month with each newspaper, taking part in the publication's daily affairs to strengthen, through ongoing advice, certain sectors of the editorial office or of the company;

- The “on site” training of community radios in journalistic and management techniques (IPP, RNTC, etc.): after being trained as trainers (on the basis of an On-Site Trainer’s Guide issued by IPP in 2008), Congolese journalists visit other radios for several weeks to accompany their daily work and help on editorial or management issues.

Support for local organizations of the media sector

Many professional Congolese organizations receive the support of donors and operators.

There are three types of support:

- **Structural support** (operations);

- **Support for activities** (temporary funds allocated for a specific activity and from which the organization will be able to deduct some implementation fees);

- **Support for capacity-building** (of the staff of the organization).

Most Congolese organizations in the media sector have benefited from the first two types of support, a more limited number from all three.

For example, JED receives:

- **Structural support**: with an annual operating budget of €200,000 and no revenue of its own, JED relies entirely on funds from its partners for its survival. JED has successively been financed by GRET (EU subsidies), National Endowment for Democracy (USA), Open Society Foundation, FEI, etc.

- **Support for activities**: JED also receives specific funds for the implementation of particular projects.

IPP has thus supported the implementation by JED of a warning system for press freedom violations in Central Africa;

- **Support for capacity-building**: JED received support from IPP and now FEI, to improve its administrative capacities and internal organization, notably project elaboration and financial prospecting.

Support for regulation and legal reform

This type of support aims to establish certain norms a chaotic media landscape, through two types of activities:

- **Reinforcing the regulator** (material, technical expertise, and budgetary support for the HAM (High Media Authority), the transitional regulatory authority (2003-2006);

- **Supporting legal reform** (provision of expert advice, lobbying initiatives, financing of workshops and of consultation meetings, etc.).

Despite the fact that the Ministry of Information and the Press launched a National Press Master Plan in 2005, drafted with the support of UNESCO, no donor was willing to support it, for three reasons:

1. Lack of confidence in the capacities of the Ministry to implement it;

2. Divergent priorities of donors who all had their preferred “operators” already;

3. Elections were imminently approaching and there was uncertainty about how much the post-election government would integrate plans made by its predecessors.

This, as well as the fact that the HAM was receiving a lot of donor support at the time (unlike the Ministry), contributed to deteriorating relations between the Ministry and the HAM.

Indeed, the HAM received continuous support in the following areas:

- **Budgetary support** totaling some €500,000 per year for the two years spent preparing and monitoring the electoral process (2005-2006). This support enabled total coverage of the operating costs of several of the HAM’s departments: the listening and monitoring center, the complaints secretariat, the ten HAM branches in the provinces (four staff
The impact of donor support to the media sector is seen positively by most people interviewed.

members each), the equipment of all these departments (IT equipment and media receivers), and the costs related to their activities;

- **Support through expertise** thanks to the long-term presence of two experts (allocated by APEFE-WBI) and a multitude of short-term missions: foreign expert missions in the DRC and study trips by the HAM to many other countries in Africa and Europe;

- **Privileged and constant access to the GIBM** (donor group) in order to explain its problems and mobilize partners to find solutions. This allowed, for instance, the President of the HAM, Modeste Mutinga, to get funding from some donors for hiring a private personal security service when he was physically threatened during the tense electoral period.

Following the elections and the departure of Mutinga, the institution became lethargic, but a number of its operational costs were still covered by donors until late 2007.

Local experts seconded to the HAM by the APEFE-WBI continued their activities in order to accompany the reform of the legal framework, through various consulting and lobbying activities. But the process was slow, notably because of numerous changes at the head of the Ministry of Communications and the Media, with each new minister steering the sector in a different direction. A single law was adopted—and passed in January 2011—during this term of office, establishing the CSAC.

Positives and negatives of donor support

**Positives and negatives of support by INGOs**

The impact of donor support to the media sector is seen positively by most people interviewed. “Given the state’s total absence from the sector,” says Aziza Bangwene (IPP), “it is donor support which allows quality media to exist. The funds injected are probably bigger than the results obtained, but at least the media are functioning.”

If we include support to Radio Okapi (financial support through FH and operating support through the UN), we conclude that almost $80 million has been injected into the Congolese media sector during the last decade. According to Nicolas Boissez, from FH, “If it seems to be a lot of money, it is necessary to put that into perspective. What is that amount if you compare it with the total aid budget received by the Congolese government for other sectors? What is it compared to the cost of the whole UN operation in the Congo (MONUSCO) ($1 billion a year)? What is it if you take into account the size of the country and the high degree of deterioration of the sector from the start?”

When analyzing the media sector’s development it is difficult to divide the effects of donor-funded projects from contextual factors. Media or organizations which have received funds from donors have generally been the ones that have made the best progress. This does not mean, however, that all media receiving aid have converted this support into qualitative progress, nor that there are no examples of projects (especially select examples of community radios in remote places) which function usefully for their community without benefiting from any backing.

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72  Aziza Bangwene, IPP program coordinator, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
73  Nicolas Boissez, Project Officer for the DRC, Fondation Hirondelle, Lausanne, personal communication, August 2011.
The creation of media or media content

The creation of new media or media content (e.g. Radio Okapi, Journal du Citoyen, Syfia Grands Lacs, the programs of SFCG and La Benevolencija) has had positive impacts and some negative effects, as follows.74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive impacts</th>
<th>Negative effects</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• These projects have encouraged the circulation of professional, neutral and</td>
<td>• The presence of these media created by INGOs, relying on support from donors,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rigorous news and information in a context in which most local media are</td>
<td>unbalances market conditions. For instance, although Radio Okapi does not accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heavily politicized and have spread many rumors and biased information.</td>
<td>commercial advertising, it has taken market share from local radios, who claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The attention given by each of these projects to gaining as large an audience</td>
<td>they have lost value in the eyes of their advertisers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>as possible throughout the country has contributed to a better circulation of</td>
<td>• These international projects have lured skilled human resources away from many</td>
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<tr>
<td>news and information between regions of the country.</td>
<td>local media outlets by offering higher salaries. (This is especially the case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These media and programs have repeatedly drawn attention to events ignored</td>
<td>with Radio Okapi and SFCG, the JDC and Syfia Grands Lacs having only used freelance</td>
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<tr>
<td>by other media and have highlighted subjects which are “taboo” for the local</td>
<td>journalists who remained within their newspapers).</td>
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<tr>
<td>media;75 they have contributed to the presence of more complete, rigorous and</td>
<td>• Some believe that coverage by donor-funded media is always favorable to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional news and information in the DRC.</td>
<td>donors. It is alleged that these media fail to criticize the role played by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The concentration of support for a single media outlet (and its network of</td>
<td>international community in the DRC and reinforce the idea that the DRC is a state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>broadcasting relays) or a sole producer of information (which then uses local</td>
<td>under international trusteeship.</td>
</tr>
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<td>media as relays) has made it possible to reach more individuals with professional</td>
<td>A crucial question for media created by INGOs is that of their impact on local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and rigorous information than if the support had been dispersed among a multitude</td>
<td>media. Although they are often referred to as “models” and can elicit emulation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of local media.</td>
<td>they do not always help strengthen the capacities of local media. On the contrary,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outside media have provided models to which young journalists can refer:</td>
<td>local media are often seen by the INGOs as just a pool of talent to draw on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newcomers have the opportunity to have professional models rooted in local</td>
<td></td>
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<td>realities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• These projects have acted as a training space for dozens of young Congolese</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>journalists.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• The presence of these media created by INGOs, relying on support from donors,</td>
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<td>many local media outlets by offering higher salaries. (This is especially the</td>
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<tr>
<td>case with Radio Okapi and SFCG, the JDC and Syfia Grands Lacs having only used</td>
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<td>freelance journalists who remained within their newspapers).</td>
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<td>• Some believe that coverage by donor-funded media is always favorable to the</td>
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<td>donors. It is alleged that these media fail to criticize the role played by the</td>
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<td>international community in the DRC and reinforce the idea that the DRC is a state</td>
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<td>under international trusteeship.</td>
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<td>A crucial question for media created by INGOs is that of their impact on local</td>
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<td>media. Although they are often referred to as “models” and can elicit emulation,</td>
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<td>they do not always help strengthen the capacities of local media. On the</td>
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<td>contrary, local media are often seen by the INGOs as just a pool of talent to</td>
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<td>draw on.</td>
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74 Many reports by these INGOs attempt to justify their (relatively expensive) projects on the basis of the attitudes and behaviors of audiences and citizens in general. Nevertheless, most of these INGOs' assessments involve basic interviews with listeners which means they are based on what the listeners say they are doing and not on listeners' actual behavior change(s).

75 These media have, for instance, given air time to rebels and armed movements that, otherwise, had no chance to be heard on the government media. They cover the fighting that is still occurring between the army and some militias in Eastern Congo, as well as the violent behavior of government soldiers, who are often guilty of raping and looting the local population.
**Support for existing media**

As explained before, donors and operators have focused their direct action on community radios. Some initiatives were developed for the print media, but almost nothing for television, which is not considered a truly mass media in a poor low-income country like the DRC.

All support for existing media outlets has had both positive impacts and negative effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive impacts</th>
<th>Negative effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• This support simply makes it possible for good quality independent local media to exist, in a context in which it would not be possible without that aid. It thus helps to guarantee pluralism and protect fragile initiatives. This is evident in the case of Radio Maendeleo, for example, whose listeners are convinced of its essential role in the community.⁷⁶</td>
<td>• Core funding can kill the media's capacity for reflection and its ability to generate resources locally. It can put the media outlet in a situation of dependency on aid, where support is seen not as temporary, or just a step on the road to independence, but as something it is owed as a right for now and perhaps forever—or as long as donor aid to development continues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For many community media, structural support also makes it possible to oppose pressure and not be at the mercy of local authorities. Thus, Radio Maendeleo has always managed to withstand pressure, notably threats from rebel movements when the Kivu region was occupied. The same holds for RCK in Lubumbashi, one of the only radio stations that is not subject to the local governor’s propaganda.</td>
<td>• Outside support can also overwhelm the absorption capacity of the local partner and destabilize it by injecting too much money, the handling of which then generates corruption and internal conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The consistent support received by some radio stations has also enabled them to provide quality work, and to act as a model at the local level, generating the creation of other radios concerned with community development. These radios also have a positive impact on their environment, often pulling the other stations upwards.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

⁷⁶ See all audience surveys completed in Bukavu, and the reports of the FCI panels.
Equipment donations
Access to appropriate, updated technical equipment is an essential element of the professionalization of the DRC’s media sector. Equipment donations are an important part of direct support provided by funders—in part, because they are easy to quantify, because they are truly needed by media outlets, operating often on such low budgets. Yet they are not without problems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive impacts:</th>
<th>Negative effects:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The appropriate equipment makes it possible to improve the quality of content, work capacities and technical operations. For instance, many media outlets recognize the usefulness of an internet connection, to have access to national and international sources of information. Sometimes, it also gives the media new opportunities to generate financial resources: for instance, by opening a “cybercafé,” thus generating a new source of income. The projects aimed at improving the presence of ICTs in the media (IPP, GRET, etc.) and alternative power (FEI, RFI) have been seen positively.</td>
<td>• Some media outlets receive equipment that is unusable, inappropriate or cannot be used or repaired for lack of adequate skills can experience stagnation or can even deteriorate technically. Community radios are full of discarded equipment that is sometimes in mint condition. The community radio of Kolwezi received a V-Sat from GRET which was meant to enable a stable internet connection. According to one of the Kolwezi journalists, “The objective was to have an internet connection to set up a cybercafé and to be able to generate funds. Yet the V-Sat does not work. It is a costly piece of equipment which raises the issue of maintenance, hence the question of the project’s durability.”77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The possibility of diversifying the quality of the media offerings (i.e. field reports recorded with quality recording equipment, programs taking place and broadcast live from public spaces, participative programs made possible thanks to telephone insert tools, etc.). The synergies of community radios developed and technically equipped by IPP have enabled radio stations to create programs recorded live in public and outdoors, with interaction by the public, and broadcast simultaneously by several partner stations.</td>
<td>• Some radios also regret not having been consulted in advance about the equipment they are given, and sometimes receive the same item several times.</td>
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<td>• The donation of unwanted equipment or equipment makes “beneficiaries” feel they are on the receiving end of a fool’s bargain. “You have to consider what we do for our partners, and what our partners do for us,” remarks a journalist with the community radio of Bas-Congo. “For instance, when RFI installed the “Ordispace” equipment which would enable us to receive their programs but not broadcast anything, or do anything else with it, it was a project more useful for RFI than for the partner radio, which was the sole beneficiary.”78</td>
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77 Dieuvis Kalend, journalist with the RCL of Kolwezi, collective interview, Lubumbashi, March 2011.
78 Nelson Thamba Makaya, journalist with the community radio of Moanda (Bas-Congo), collective interview, Lubumbashi, March 2011.
Collective donation of equipment

In several cases, operators and donors have asked media outlets to group together to avoid having to equip each organization individually. This collective initiative was behind a group of PARIs [Poles d’Appui aux Radios Indépendantes] (Support Centers for Independent Radios) set up by IPP and also a number of initiatives by Maisons de la Presse [Press Centers]. The CPK (Press Center of Katanga) was supported by the GRET, the Belgian development agency, and also by the businessman Georges Forest, all wishing to avoid backing a large number of small papers. This made it possible for the CPK to be equipped with equipment (e.g. a Riso duplicator) to put at the disposal of all publishers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive impacts:</th>
<th>Negative effects:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Leading publishers and media directors work together. The media synergies set up during the 2006</td>
<td>• In some places, collective equipment donations</td>
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<td>elections with IPP support made competing radios work together for election coverage. For instance,</td>
<td>have led to divisions within the media sector about the manner in which the collective resources</td>
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<td>in Katanga, rival radios before 2006 now cooperated through “synergy” programming. Every three</td>
<td>should be managed or how the equipment should be used by each party. Thus, in Katanga, initially, it</td>
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<td>months the radio stations in the Lubumbashi area broadcast a program simultaneously on all partner</td>
<td>was the installation of the PARI by IPP which caused trouble between community radios. Some media</td>
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<td>stations. This is an operation that was set up at the time of the elections, overcoming much reticence,</td>
<td>refused to take part in the project.</td>
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<td>and which worked so well that the radios have continued doing it.</td>
<td>• In some cases, one or more specific media outlets appropriated the collective tool for itself. Several</td>
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<td>• Making it possible for media which would not all have been able to benefit from individual support to</td>
<td>radios in Kivu accused Radio Maendeleo of this.</td>
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<td>acquire technical resources. For instance, the small radios in and around Bukavu cannot get access to</td>
<td>• Some media outlets also do not appreciate the pressure from the donors and external to “coordinate”</td>
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<tr>
<td>the internet easily, nor to equipment to organize live broadcasting of an event, so this equipment was</td>
<td>and “get together,” when they are distinct outlets. In Lubumbashi, some partners even went so far as to</td>
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<td>made available at the PARI- Radio Mandeleo.</td>
<td>suggest grouping of several titles or several media into a single company in order to access support.</td>
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<td>“Some see that as an attempt to limit the freedom of expression of the partners,” observed a reporter</td>
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<td>with Fraternité in Lubumbashi.</td>
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Support for the production of targeted programs

Several projects enabled Congolese media to create programs or reports they would not have been able to complete on their own. IPP developed the practice of “joint reporting,” allowing Congolese journalists to go into the field to report alongside fellow journalists from other countries (Burundi, Rwanda) or other provinces in the Congo, on the consequences of the conflict which ravaged the country. Dozens of Congolese journalists thus had the opportunity to travel abroad or to other places in this huge country, which had previously been inaccessible to them. Other projects aimed to give journalists the means to practice investigative journalism or to cover certain themes, often with the aim of contributing to the consolidation of peace or good governance. Some partners also signed agreements with a number of media which, in exchange for a certain sum, pledged to produce articles or programs on crucial but under-reported topics, such as children’s rights, gender-based violence, and environmental issues.

**Positive impacts:**
- Some Congolese media outlets were enabled to cover topics of public interest they would never have thought of covering or would never have had the means to cover. Yves Kalikat, director of *Journal du Citoyen*, will never forget how, in December 2006, thanks to a joint reporting workshop organized by IPP in Nairobi at the signing of the Peace Treaty within the context of the Great Lakes Conference, he was able, with his fellow Congolese journalists, to be “the first Congolese journalists to do the first interview of the first democratically elected president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila,” at a time when the latter reserved his interviews exclusively for Western journalists.

**Negative effects:**
- The fact that the media can receive money to cover certain topics has led some journalists and media managers to systematically associate coverage of certain topics with financial “compensation.” As a result, some outlets make no effort to continue covering certain issues once the funding runs out; worse still, they believe the topics worth considering only if they receive financial compensation for doing so.
Some radio stations are much in demand, their schedule is full of “sponsored” programs with little airtime left for their own programming.

Paid broadcasting of programs

Not all radio stations are lucky enough to have core funding from donors or to receive donated equipment. Many are thus compelled to perform many commissions to fill their coffers, or to sell airtime to various organizations so that they can broadcast their own programs. In Bukavu and Goma, La Benevolencija pays radios $60 per broadcast program, a large sum for a radio with a limited budget like Kivu One in Goma (where $60 is more than a month’s salary for a journalist). SFCG does not pay to have its programs aired, but offers equipment to partner radios in exchange for airtime.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Positive impacts:</th>
<th>Negative effects:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The radios stations’ output are more appealing thanks to these external productions of good technical and editorial quality, despite the limited capacity of the stations, who would not be capable of producing such programs themselves.</td>
<td>• Some radio stations are much in demand and their schedule is full of “sponsored” programs. Radio Maendeleo has just terminated its collaboration with SFCG after a ten-year partnership: “We received far too many programs to broadcast, up to six per week, yet received nothing in exchange, except once in a while some equipment and training sessions. We believe it's a partnership which costs us more than it benefits us, because it takes up too much time on our schedule at the expense of our own programs. In any case, after ten years, this project should have achieved its objectives,” explains Kizito Mushizi.79</td>
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<td>• These paid partnerships make it possible for the most fragile stations to generate additional revenues, which are sometimes essential to their survival (for many community radios it is their only stable source of revenue).</td>
<td>• Radio stations are sometimes persuaded to broadcast programs that are not aligned with their editorial line or with their audience’s interests. Many of these sponsored programs are awareness-raising programs with a sermonizing tone. “We are journalists, not school teachers. Listeners don’t want to be lectured all the time,” explains a journalist from Radio Maendeleo. “If offers of donations accompany programs which do not meet our editorial line, we turn them down.”80 But not all radios can afford to be so selective.</td>
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79 Kizito Mushizi, director of Radio Maendeleo, Bukavu, personal communication, May 2011.
Training staff

As described above the four most common training formulas are:

- Support for basic journalism training organizations;
- Support for long-term training institutions;
- Short-term thematic trainings;
- “On-site” training sessions.

Journalism training

Very few donors have chosen to support journalism schools in the DRC, even though some of these schools were established years ago. Donors are probably frightened (as they are with RTNC) by the critical problems these training institutions have (i.e. total lack of technical capacity, thousands of students, tradition of theoretical teachings with no link to practitioners, high degree of corruption, etc.).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Positive impacts:</th>
<th>Negative effects:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• A few teachers have been able to travel abroad and be hosted in foreign universities to complete research projects and produce scientific literature (Ph.D. theses, scientific publications) that have helped them in their academic careers and increased the scientific literature available about Congolese media.</td>
<td>• The benefits of these projects have been more directed at a few individuals, who have monopolized the opportunities to travel abroad (participating in an “international J-school-jet-set”) than at the students. It is difficult to identify any positive change in the quality of the training for the students attending the classes.</td>
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<td>• Contacts with foreign institutions (inside and outside Africa) have helped the Congolese training institutions to step out of their “scientific isolation,” join international networks and participate in several forums that could help them to reform their programs and training methods.</td>
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To improve the contents of media marred by “purchased information,” the international partners paradoxically seem in fact to participate in the practice of rewarded journalism known as coupage. Journalists taking part in training courses receive a per diem, which compensates for the coupage they will have missed out on by not working that day.

### Short-term thematic training sessions

Many actors within the sector are very critical of the short-term trainings, although the criticisms that follow should certainly not be taken as applying to all of the initiatives.

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<tr>
<th>Positive impacts:</th>
<th>Negative effects:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The training of trainers (by IPP, GRET, RNTC and others) has benefited a small group of journalists who have learned new skills and then helped their colleagues improve. The country now has a pool of local skilled personnel to ensure the training of media professionals in a wide range of domains.</td>
<td>• Many training courses are seen as a temporary loss of human resources by media directors: staff members (of which there are already too few) are taken outside the newsroom for several days, only to learn things that will not always benefit their media outlet. The training themes often reflect the donor’s or organizer’s interests rather than the media’s most pressing needs.</td>
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<td>• The appropriation of ICTs in the newsrooms constitutes a major benefit of these initiatives. Most training sessions have used technological tools and familiarized a number of the Congolese journalists with these tools.</td>
<td>• Such training mechanisms just involve the passing on of institutional information and do not develop a critical journalistic spirit. Thus, on Nyota TV, “journalists were trained by the Red Cross. After the training, they created the Red Cross Friends’ Club and these journalists then continue to monitor closely the activities of the Red Cross,” the director explained. The same holds for UNICEF. The risk is thus that certain editorial boards will have journalists specializing, not on certain themes, but on the (positive) coverage of activities of certain institutions of which they become the privileged relays within their outlet. “This is not training,” claims the editorial manager of Radio Okapi in Katanga, “this is advertising for donors.”</td>
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<td>• Coverage of the 2006 elections was improved thanks to the many training sessions which took place beforehand, especially in the provinces where the media did not know how to deal with the elections.</td>
<td>• The better trained journalists leave media outlets that do not have the means to pay them sufficiently, to go and use their new skills elsewhere, in more profitable sectors. The short-term training sessions reinforce the skills of individuals without ensuring the insertion of these new skills in the media company.</td>
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<td>• The training sessions have had a “liberating” effect on many Congolese journalists, allowing them to open up to the outside world, whether by leaving their city or their province.</td>
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<td>• Overall, the impact of training sessions remains positive at the individual level: Pascal Berqué believes that “over ten years, hundreds of people have been trained. Even if they then leave the sector or go to work elsewhere or even leave the country, skills have nevertheless been acquired by these individuals, and they remain useful to the country one way or another.”</td>
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81 Source: Pierre Nsana, who was personally affected by this question because, following a trainers’ training session, he was selected as a good trainee and recruited by IPP as its program coordinator.

82 Pascal Berqué, IPP programme director, personal communication, Paris, August 2011.

83 Agnès Nkoy, Director of Programs, Nyota TV, personal communication, Lubumbashi, March 2011.

Negative effects (continued):

• The fact that most training programs pay a “per diem” to participants compromises the sincerity of their motivation. But when their salary at the radio station is uncertain, it is difficult to prevent a journalist from taking part in a paid training session, even if it is of no use to him or her. Some interlocutors underlined this paradox: to improve the contents of media marred by “purchased information,” the international partners implement actions which seem to integrate the practice of rewarded journalism known as coupage. Thus, journalists taking part in training courses receive a per diem which compensates for the coupage they will have missed out on by not working that day.

• Organizing these training sessions is costly, since most require renting the training halls, accommodation, and transport by plane to the capital from the provincial cities. For some, “these trips to the capital are like holidays,” an observer reported. The cost per trained participant is often high (between $1,000 and $10,000), completely disproportionate to the media economy which participants come from.

• The training sessions put the burden of responsibility of improving media content on the shoulders only of journalists, although the problem may lie elsewhere—often with the bosses. This is the point made by Polydor Muboyayi, “The journalists know perfectly well what they should do, but they do not respect the profession’s rules because they have to obey their employer... In order for such training sessions to have an impact, bosses need to be compelled to leave journalists some room for maneuver.”

- The choice of participants has often caused conflicts between the organizers and the beneficiary media.
  
  - Either the organizers themselves identify the participants they wish to have: this causes problems because it is always the same journalists who are chosen. “Some organizations say who must participate in the training without leaving the radio’s manager a choice. The same person can be invited to ten training sessions. This means that if he leaves the radio, all the skills will be lost at once,” laments Goddy Ngosa, the RCK coordinator.
  
  - Or the media is free to send the person of their choice and the manager can try to share training opportunities among the staff: but then the chosen person may not have the required profile or adequate basic skills to benefit fully from the training. “With our partners, at the time of the elections, we organized training sessions for news directors,” explains Richard, the HAM delegate in Lubumbashi, “but a newspaper sent us a music critic because it was his turn to attend a training. Participants come to the training sessions for the per diems and do not feed back to their colleagues.”

85 Emmanuel Kabongo, Communications expert for APEFE/WBI, personal communication, August 11, 2008.
86 Polydor Muboyayi, Le Phare’s director of publication and president of OMEC, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
87 Goddy Ngosa, RCK, personal communication, Lubumbashi, March 2011.
The number of “not for profit” organizations has increased in the hope of benefiting from various forms of support. Opportunistic organizations born in such circumstances with the sole aim of collecting funds are more inclined to satisfy the donor’s agenda than to provide adequate responses to local needs.

Support for professional organizations

Many Congolese organizations and associations have received either core support or support to enable them to implement certain activities.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Positive impacts:</th>
<th>Negative effects:</th>
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| • Some organizations, which were once obscure, have become visible to their members, the authorities and their audience. They have become able to operate, to implement activities, and to represent their members. This is the case with AFEM-SK (Association of Media Women in South Kivu), which, in a short time, has become one of the most dynamic organizations of women journalists in the country. | • Some organizations feel they have had to fundamentally alter their activities in order to secure funding, despite this funding being only short-term. When the partnership ceases, the organization might wish to continue these new activities but finds itself with no funds to do so. For instance, for a while JED published the bulletin *Plume et Liberté* (“Quill and Liberty”), but had to cease publication when the funding stopped. JED’s president explained, “This does not mean that the activity no longer had any use for ourselves or for our members, but simply that donors were no longer interested, so we had to stop.”

• Some organizations have become more professional and are now capable of setting up and monitoring projects, and have enhanced skills (in drafting terms of reference, using evaluation methodologies, etc.), which enhances their chances of survival since they can now prepare and submit project applications to donors. This is the case with JED. Founded in 1998, it functioned without any support until 2000, with no office and with no salaried stable personnel. From 2004 to 2008, JED received institutional backing thanks to GRET, covering salaries and operating costs, and since 2008 the organization has had FEI support. “The stabilization of the organization has been possible thanks to donors,” recognizes Thivis Tshivuadi, its executive director.

• The management capacities of some organizations have also improved due to the administrative and financial requirements of the donors. “Thanks to the demands made by donors and partners, we have really learned how to manage a media outlet,” claims Godefroid Bwiti, the director of ICM.

• Many organizations have become dependent on donor support and have shown they are incapable of functioning alone at the end of a project. They even refuse to undertake anything on behalf of their members if they are not paid to do so. This is the case with UNPC and OMEC. For Florence Minery, Head of the Media Department at GRET, “all this support has generated a parallel economy, |

88 Thivis Tshivuadi, executive secretary, JED, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
89 Godefroid Bwiti, Director ICM, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
90 Donat M’Baya, president of JED, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
91 Chouchou Namegabe, President of AFEM-SK, personal communication, September 2011.
Negative effects (continued):

the economy of media support. There was a lot of
core funding to help local organizations to operate,
so the beneficiaries now view it as an established
system, something that will go on forever.92

• The number of “not for profit” organizations has in-
creased in the hope of benefiting from various forms
of support. Opportunistic organizations born in such
circumstances with the sole aim of collecting funds
are more inclined to satisfy the donor’s agenda
than to provide adequate responses to local needs.
When a niche seems promising, dozens of similar
organizations are created. “Here, when you create
an NGO, it is not to defend a cause, it’s to make a
living!” concludes Aziza Bangwene from IPP. Orga-
nizations have also multiplied following internal con-
flicts. “When there is an argument inside an organi-
ization, people leave it to go and create a similar one
on the side, instead of trying to solve the problem
inside the group,” notes Olivier Lechien, Head of the
FEI Project.

• Some organizations have been overwhelmed by
the substantial support they have received. Rapid
growth or short-term funding that entails substantial
financial advances can completely destabilize an
organization. As Pierre Nsana observes, “Some or-
ganizations have failed because of the mismanage-
ment of funds or disputes, divisions and conflicts
born with the arrival of funds. If they had not received
the funds, they would probably have survived.”93

92 Florence Minery, GRET media Program Officer, personal
communication, Paris, August 2011.

93 Pascal Berqué, IPP, personal communication, Paris, Au-
gust 2011.
Legal and regulatory reform has become an important element of Congolese media development projects in recent years, as donors have recognized that direct support to journalists and media outlets cannot take hold in the absence of a supportive enabling environment for media.

Support for the regulator and legal reform

Legal and regulatory reform has become an important element of media development projects in recent years, as donors have recognized that direct support to journalists and media outlets cannot take hold in the absence of a supportive enabling environment for media (including laws and regulatory institutions).

Positive impacts:

- The principle of public regulation is now accepted by the different actors in the sector, which was far from the case when the new regulatory authority was being established. While the HAM no longer exists and the CSAC is not yet fully operational, the absence of an appropriate legal framework and of an effective regulator is now lamented by the various actors of the media sector, whereas in 2003 they were wary of the arrival of a new potential censor.

- The legal and regulatory framework has somewhat filled out. Monitoring and regulation of the media at the next elections will be able to benefit from past experience.

- The attention of the sector has been drawn to a series of important issues. Thus, thanks to GRET, in 2004 and 2005, discussions were held on the issue of the collective agreement of news professionals and some media pledged to sign work contracts with their employees. Even if this type of measure is not effective, in practice, at least the topic has been discussed. JED launched the debate on the decriminalization of press law offences, and later on the right to access information. Neither has as yet been translated into law, but many media professionals are now aware of these issues.

Negative effects:

- A few recent moves on legislation may have given the impression that the government is concerned with the media sector, whereas in fact few guarantees exist of the state’s commitment to clean up the sector. It could have done this by clarifying the criteria for the creation of media outlets, and by classifying media in terms of contents (which would have reduced the number of media outlets overall), but nothing has been done to this effect.
Problems with media development in the DRC - The beneficiaries’ point of view

Some beneficiaries are very critical of the manner in which development aid functions and in particular the so-called “difficult” or “distorted” relationship between Northern partners and donors and Congolese media actors. These critics say that the choices made by the different donors have often been guided by their own institutional strategy, sometimes even in order to compete with other donors, rather than out of a concern for effectiveness or usefulness in the local context or to complement what has already been achieved.

For some, media support mechanisms just reflect opportunistic interests. “There is complicity between donors, operators and a number of Congolese beneficiary organizations in order for the money to be spent, but with no real concern for effectiveness. Mostly it is clientelism,” believes the director of the daily newspaper Le Potentiel, Freddy Mulumba.94

Others see good intentions, but the skills transfer within projects is neither sufficient nor clearly defined. Many beneficiaries have referred to themselves as “prisoners” of a dependency on expatriate technical experts who, on the one hand, have not always been very competent or, on the other hand, were intent on holding on to their knowledge to justify their presence and their pay level (an expatriate salary).

A feeling of dependency

Local NGOs say they often feel in an extremely ambiguous situation with regard to important INGOs and donors. Godefroid Bwiti, director of ICM, says: “The hand that gives is always above the hand that receives. The Northern partners see the Southern partners as simple underlings. Because the money comes from outside, we have to be subjected to everything.”95

Some beneficiaries say they are subjected to the “diktats” of the donors in the identification of their “needs.” For instance, the Swedish development agency (Sida) puts all its support for the media and, more widely, culture, in the context of their “poverty reduction” objective and the MDGs (millennium development goals). The issues of gender and HIV/AIDS must be present in projects it funds. This has led Andre Ipakala Mobiko, leader of the local organization Aneco, to claim that “the activities performed are in fact the activities desired by a donor and not those submitted or desired by the partners themselves. If our projects do not fit into the donor’s priorities, they have no chance of being supported, although they may be important to us” (Frere, 2006).

Conflicting priorities and strategies

The UN agencies engaged in media support (especially the UNDP and UNESCO) favor work with governmental partners, which can be problematic in a sector where the actors say they are defending their independence from all authority. Thus UNESCO has repeatedly supported projects to revise the legal framework within the ministry in charge of information, which was not supported either by the professionals themselves, or even by the HAM. Instead of generating dialogue and information sharing, the actors were encouraged to remain separate.

The donors’ strategies have also led to significant geographic concentration of support in some areas of the country. “Everyone wants to work in the East,” remarks one employee of an INGO, “although there are lots of problems for the media in Equateur (north-west). But no donor has shown any interest; what matters is being present in the regions which have been through war or which still face armed threats. It’s important, it’s true, but why concentrate all the help there?”96

Unequal access to funding

Northern INGOs are often the only ones capable of fulfilling the increasingly heavy administrative requirements set out by donors in their calls for proposals. The publication of local calls for proposals by the EU in Kinshasa, for smaller amounts, illustrates the gap between the (low) capacities of potential applicants and EU requirements. “We have no training in matters of project design,” says Godefroid Bwiti, director of InterCongo Media. “We do not know how to prepare a submission, how to present it to a donor. As long as we have not mastered that, we will always be dependent on those who are negotiating on our behalf, in the North.”97 Indeed, even these “local” calls have often been won by Northern organizations, such as RFI for its project on renewable energies for community radios.

The necessary role played by INGOs as intermediaries between donors and local organizations comes at

94 Freddy Mulumba, General Manager of Le Potentiel, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
95 Godefroid Bwiti, director of InterCongo Media, personal communication, March 2011.
96 Anonymous INGO employee, personal communication, March 2011
97 Godefroid Bwiti, director of InterCongo Media, personal communication, August 13, 2008.
a cost: “When working with large Northern INGOs, we know that 50 percent of the budget will be spent on the project administration, the expats’ salaries, the renting of their offices, the remuneration of experts… What the Congolese media will really receive is only a small part of the budget,” complains Tshivis Tshivuadi from JED.98 Several local organizations also believe that the INGOs take over completely from local partners to perform activities which they could do themselves. For instance, trainers often come from abroad, even though there was a local partner who could have provided this service. However, “because of a lack of trust, the local partner was not allowed to manage a single franc.”99

Substitution phenomena

Sometimes, foreign companies send “experts” who have little knowledge of the historical context or location where they are working; this has a number of frustrating and harmful implications on interventions, one of which is that they consequently do not take into account what has already been achieved. JED recently partnered with a Belgian INGO that obtained funding from the EU, “and yet, 80 percent of the activities planned for this project are at the heart of JED’s work, which we have been doing alone for years. However, this foreign organization is keeping the bulk of the work for itself, as for instance the popularization of new legislation on the CSAC or the training of journalists on the new legal framework.”

Inappropriate procedures

Local organizations are also unsatisfied with bureaucratic procedures imposed on them: “The slowness in decision-making and payments are discouraging,” claims Clarisse Museme, president of UCOFEM, an organization of women professionals who are working in the media. “We submit a project but don’t get an answer. Or else it comes much later, at a time when the activity has become obsolete. When we do get support, we are asked to put up part of the money and to finalize the activity before we receive a second payment. We can’t work like that. We have no financial reserves” (Frere, 2006). The UNDP’s bureaucratic red tape is a particular complaint. The former president of the regulatory authority, Modeste Mutinga, explains that on several occasions he preferred to do without a grant for office stationery from the UNDP than to have to fill in complex order forms “just to buy some pens and paper.”

Local actors are frustrated by the absence of continuity in the way their dossiers are managed by donors and some INGOs. Expatriates often move, and sometimes interlocutors change from one year to the next. As a result, institutions do not always remember what they have done or financed in the past.

Ready-made ideas and projects

Some beneficiaries also have the feeling that INGOs and donors arrive with preconceived ideas, which may have been trialed, or even successfully implemented, in other countries but are not appropriate in the DRC. For instance, some training sessions on electoral coverage were given by trainers with no knowledge of the Congolese context.

Others have the feeling that donors are avoiding topics that are too sensitive, such as press freedom violations. “When we are faced with a case of muzzling of the press and we turn to our partners, they prefer to send us to JED and not to get involved,” believes Michel Kamwenyi, with RT Mwangaza.100

Opaque management

The local media actors interviewed frequently voiced frustrations over a lack of transparency. If some local organizations have been suspected of mismanagement, the suspicion of opaque practices also weighs on relations between INGOs and local partners. The INGOs are believed to receive large grants, most of which are spent on their own administrative costs, or on their headquarters in Washington, Brussels, or Paris, and to share only these trimmed budgets with their local partners. “We do not have access to all the information that concerns us. Since we are the weaker partner in these partnerships, we cannot demand to see the complete financial reports. We tell ourselves we just need this money and that we have to accept that our partners believe they are not accountable to us,” concludes the executive secretary of JED, “but how can we be partners and work in a spirit of mistrust?”101

Lack of coordination

Lastly, given the high number of ongoing projects, more coordination is needed to avoid duplication and conflicting dynamics. The presence of the donor group GIBM has encouraged the circulation of information, but has not prevented duplication or put an end to the competitiveness among operators in which local actors

98 Tshivis Tshivuadi, executive secretary of JED, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
99 Aziza Bangwene, IPP project coordinator, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
100 Michel Kamwenyi, program director for RT Mwangaza, personal communication, Lubumbashi, March 2011.
101 Tshivis Tshivuadi, JED Executive Secretary, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
are sometimes exploited. This competitiveness is all the stronger now that there are many operators in the Congo and tensions pit INGOs, donor-operators and Congolese organizations against each other for funds from the same donors.

Problems: Donors’ and international operators’ point of view

On the other side of the coin, donors and INGOs also emphasized the difficulty of implementing projects in the DRC.

Unrealistic Expectations

If an INGO consults local partners before designing a project, the process often generates expectations among the Congolese partners that the INGO may not have the means to satisfy. For instance, before launching the regional project “Ondes des Grands Lacs” [Great Lakes Airwaves] (which involves six Congolese radio stations), the IPP organized consultation workshops with all its partners. The stations all expressed the desire for core support for their running costs, but this type of support was not among the eligible costs. When the project started, some stations believed they had not been listened to and that the project “would require much effort for no results at a time when the radios were struggling to survive.”102

Misunderstandings

Some operators underline the fact that it is difficult to make Congolese organizations understand the nature and limits of a possible project. For instance, operators are not inclined to support projects aimed at increasing the volume of commercial advertising on community radio stations’ schedules (this practice being contrary to their mission and their statutes), whereas certain stations see advertising as a fundamental strategy for their survival.

Competing consortia of INGOs

Congolese actors sometimes take advantage of the competition among operators and request the same thing from several INGO partners in order to be sure they get at least a portion of this request. During calls for proposals, the same Congolese partner may sign up to several competing consortia (despite the signed statements of exclusivity), all responding to the same call, in order to ensure that they will be part of whichever consortium may be the winner. This undermines the credibility of some proposals.

“Paranoia” of some Congolese media partners

Among the Congolese elite, there are a large number of people who are convinced that there is a conspiracy by the international community to exploit the DRC’s natural resources. Foreign support is therefore viewed as “due” from Western countries which are presently benefiting from Congolese resources. “That does not help people to take charge of their own destiny,” remarks Olivier Lechien from FEI.103

Limited capacity of many leaders of Congolese organizations

INGOs claim to have to spend a lot of time (re-)writing reports, when the Congolese partners should be doing them. There is also a lack of competence in matters of financial management, as some organizations are incapable of managing even modest amounts. It is the INGOs, however, who are held accountable by their donors for the transparency and accountability of a project, the quality of the accounting and the rigor of the balance sheets. Administration is often heavy, complex and time-consuming, and Congolese partners, as they are struggling to get by on a daily basis, are reluctant to take on additional administrative work. Moreover, local organizations struggle to hold onto competent administrative and accounting staff, because they have difficulties paying attractive salaries. The better trained people leave for other jobs; this is frequently demonstrated when community radio station staff leave their position—often after being trained—to work for commercial or private media outlets.

The polarization of Congolese organizations

The phenomenon of polarization among Congolese media groups makes it difficult to entrust the implementation of a project to a single local organization that might not wish to associate with other competing organizations or media companies.

The high cost of implementing programs in the DRC

The size of the country, the price of all goods and services, the high cost of logistics (hotels, flights, etc.)

102 Kizito Mushizi, Director of Radio Maendeleo, personal communication, Bukavu, May 2011.
103 Olivier Lechien, FEI project manager, personal communication, August 2011.
Most INGOs think that the evaluation process can be useful and inspiring, but also that it is sometimes expensive and time-consuming, without generating consistent impact on the quality of the projects.

raise budgets higher than in any other African country. Sometimes, the amount granted to a local organization to organize a single workshop could have paid the salaries of all the members of the organization for two years. Pascal Berqué, IPP Program Director, explains, “People here live with less than a dollar a day, and we come with huge budgets that will sometimes put these same people in a completely artificial situation—where they stay in a $100/night hotel room or where they have to handle thousands of dollars to organize an event for us. Therefore, it’s not surprising there is some mismanagement sometimes.”

**Corruption**

The overall context is one of widely reported corruption, bribery and embezzlement of funds. The DRC is among the “top countries” for corruption and that has an impact on all sectors (Transparency International, 2007). It is difficult to implement projects (in any sector) in a country where the state, the rule of law, and the local institutions are so weak. INGOs have to provide for everything that the state should provide for (but does not) while also coping with constant instability.

**Evaluation methods**

The principle of evaluation is generally a contractual obligation demanded by the donor and it sometimes constitutes a separate activity. In the case of long-term projects (for example, those of FEI, IPP, GRET, SFCG, etc.), the assessments are produced at mid-term (often internal assessments) and at the end of the program (external assessments). These evaluations give special attention to the implementation of planned activities and the production of results, rather than verifying the impact of programs, which tends to be more difficult to observe and document. They limit themselves to an overview of the activities covered by the evaluated program, and typically do not take into account the other projects in which the beneficiaries are involved.

Most assessments focus on:

- **Effectiveness**: have the planned activities been performed and are the results which should have been produced really delivered?
- **Efficiency**: have these results been generated by mobilizing the appropriate resources in relation to the expected results? This question is a delicate one for some interlocutors. In many cases, “with that money, it should have been possible to do better.” But how are we to be sure?

Assessment is quite a new thing in media development and methodologies have been changing. “When we first started in the DRC in 2000, recalls Pascal Berqué, no donor was asking us about a logical framework. The “log frame culture” has expanded recently, along with increasing demands regarding reporting, monitoring, and evaluation which are hugely time-consuming.”

Donors want INGOs to be more and more accountable, and the INGOs have to involve their local partners in order to respond to these new demands. Most INGOs think that the process can be useful and inspiring, but also that it is sometimes expensive and time-consuming, without generating consistent impact on the quality of the projects.

Submitted to increasingly heavy reporting requirements, INGOs wish to share the burden with local NGOs. But, as stated earlier, neither the limited number of staff of local organizations nor their technical proficiency allow them to take up this challenge. Conflicts often arise between Congolese partners and operators who deplore the poor quality of final reports or the absence of reports by Congolese partners. Strengthening the follow up and assessment capacities of the local organizations requires training and skills transfer between INGOs and Congolese partners.

There are now generally two levels of assessment:

104 Pascal Berqué, IPP Program Director, personal communication, Paris, August 2011.
105 Nicolas Boissez, Program Officer at Fondation Hirondelle, personal communication, Lausanne, August 2011.
106 Steve Matenga, former IPP Delegate and Foundation Hirondelle Program Officer, personal communication, Kinshasa, 2011.
107 Pascal Berqué, IPP Program Director, personal communication, Paris, August 2011.
Impact can be identified for the stakeholders of the project: individuals who were trained, media outlets which were supported, and organizations that were strengthened. This level is quite easy to grasp and many assessments conducted at the end of programs find a lot of data to confirm this type of impact.

Impact can also be identified at the level of the “final beneficiaries:” the Congolese citizen who, in theory, is supposed to be the one benefiting from more professional and democratic media. That impact, even though an increasing number of donors want it to be assessed, is more difficult to identify. “At best, you can check if people have better access to information,” says Nicolas Boissez, from Fondation Hirondelle, “but it will be almost impossible to identify if your project actually helped to reduce conflict or to promote good governance!”

Three operators have set up mechanisms in order to capture the complex issue of impact.

1. SFCG has always paid attention to the assessment of the impact of its activity, for instance, by means of monitoring the broadcasting of programs, gathering listeners’ reactions by text message, and regular organization of focus groups and polls (performed by the company’s experts).

2. FEI has developed, over the last three years, a mechanism for monitoring the evolution of the media sector and of the contents on offer to ordinary listeners through citizen panels in ten localities where projects are supported: five towns (Bukavu, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi, Mbuji-Mayi) and five rural villages. These audience-oriented panels have been set up and meet every six months. Additionally, the project has hired an expert who is monitoring media content in order to identify the qualitative evolution of the media outlets. According to Olivier Lechien, “these are good tools, but they are slightly disconnected from the projects we are supporting. On the other hand, if they were too focused on the projects, they would be beyond the views of a “normal audience member.” We have to speculate… because, anyway, we don’t know how the sector would have changed if our program had not existed.

3. Lastly, in eastern Congo, the IPP has attempted to set up an audience monitoring mechanism through groups of listeners playing the role of interviewers in their own environment. The project was launched in May 2011 in two Congolese towns (Bukavu and Goma) and aims at identifying how “ordinary citizens” are using the media, their favorite programs and journalists, the perception they have of what “quality journalism” is, and the information they feel is lacking on the airwaves.

These assessment methods have been established mainly to answer the queries of donors that are becoming more and more concerned about the impact of their projects. But it is quite ambiguous: “Donors have to understand that the role of the media is not to prevent or solve conflicts. The aim of the media is to inform. A journalist shouldn’t aim at changing the behavior of his audience. That is not what his job is about. That is not professional journalism,” insists Nicolas Boissez of FH.

Besides this, all INGOs have a wide collection of “mid-term” reviews and final assessments that provide stories from the field, about the impact of media support within each program. But are these reports actually able to identify real impacts? According to Florence Minery from GRET, “Identifying impacts needs time. It is not during the project or right at the end that you can measure the impact: it is years later.”

There is also the issue of what happens to assessments. Several INGOs complain that there is no “collective” or “individual” memory of all activities or of the assessments that have been done on those programs. “When someone moves from an Embassy or from an INGO, it’s often the whole memory of what that donor or INGO has done in the sector that vanishes.”

Conflicts between donors and government

The activities and aims of donors and operators sometimes clash with those of the government. The GIBM has had to stand up to the Congolese government on several occasions. Recently, a new regulation about the accreditation of foreign journalists was adopted by the Ministry of Communications. It stipulated that foreign journalists would be tried in a military court for some

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108 Nicolas Boissez, Program Officer at Fondation Hirondelle, personal communication, Lausanne, August 2011.
110 Nicolas Boissez, Program Officer at Fondation Hirondelle, personal communication, Lausanne, August 2011.
111 There is currently an initiative in Germany to collect and put on a wiki all assessment studies and literature produced about assessment of media support projects in the world (See the Mediame website: http://www.mediame-wiki.net/wiki/index.php).
113 Pascal Berqué, IPP, personal communication, Paris, August 2011.
types of offenses. The ambassadors of several countries participating in the GIBM have protested. But, as Olivier Lechien notes, “People are often divided, and it’s not easy to build a common argument. Indeed, even within the same bilateral institution, positions can be different: the diplomatic arm will prefer the status quo, while the aid people will want to take a stand.”

Positions are therefore not always clear.

Sustainability of donor-funded activities

The issue of sustainability is a key one for donors and practitioners in the media sector, especially for media outlets that have been created outside the real economy in order to respond to the pressing need for neutral, plural, and peaceful information.

Radio Okapi has come to symbolize these kinds of difficulties. The local economic fabric cannot allow Radio Okapi to continue its current modus operandi at present levels, even though its annual operating costs have diminished over the past few years (from $13 million in 2008 to $8.5 million in 2010). Survival will be threatened as soon as support from external partners decreases and if the logistical support offered by the UN disappears.

The issue of Radio Okapi’s “sustainability,” which the FH has been reflecting on for some years, has three dimensions:

• Administrative and institutional: how to turn Radio Okapi into a “Congolese” media? Under what administrative form and with what statutes?

• Economic: how to ensure that Radio Okapi finds the means necessary for its survival?

• Editorial: how to ensure that Radio Okapi will preserve the neutrality of its editorial line and its level of professionalism?

In recent years, two mechanisms have been implemented for the financial viability of Radio Okapi:

• Development of an advertising sales division (implemented in June 2009);

• Authorization by the UN (MONUSCO) of (paid) institutional communications (although Radio Okapi has been accused of abusing its dominant position);

The question of Radio Okapi’s future not only raises administrative, financial and budgetary issues, but also professional ones.

• On the one hand, how can one guarantee that the skills developed within Radio Okapi will remain if job security or pay levels are no longer guaranteed? Will those who have been paid at “UN” levels for years and have developed valuable skills stay on at lower pay levels?

• On the other hand, how can one guarantee the security of journalists after the departure of the UN and the blue helmets? “Who will ensure the security of Radio Okapi journalists when MONUSCO is no longer here?” asks the program manager of Radio Okapi in Katanga. “Today already politicians tell us: ’you are proud because you are protected by the United Nations, but we’ll see once MONUSCO leaves.’ I fear we will then be turned over to politicians who will find it easy to take their revenge.”

Radio Okapi’s future is thus not only linked to the financial support of donors, but also to a learning process that must still occur among the Congolese authorities in order for a critical press to survive.

The issue of sustainability also concerns professional organizations, whose institutional fragility has already been underlined. The Observatory of Congolese Media (OMEC), a self-regulatory authority set up in 2004 in the wake of the 1990 Conference that has received relatively consistent support from international partners, has struggled for survival since its funding ceased. “We made the mistake of copying the modus operandi of observatories in Europe,” says its executive secretary, “and now it’s no longer tenable.”

Conclusion to Part Four

While donors and INGOs have undeniably played an important part in the development of the Congolese media landscape over the past ten years, they have not yet addressed—and in many cases may even have contributed to—one of the primary challenges to the establishment of a quality media sector: that is, an uncontrolled, chaotic proliferation of media outlets. Ac-

114 Olivier Lechien, FEI Project manager, personal communication, Paris, August 2011.

115 OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States: “International actors should especially seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as bypassing national budget processes or setting high salaries for local staff which undermine recruitment and retention in national institutions.” (Principle no. 8)


117 Pr. Bernard Munsoko, executive secretary of OMEC, personal interview, August 12, 2008
Donors and operators often do not seem to bother trying to tackle new approaches to development or creative project models. To prepare the DRC journalists who would be covering the 2006 elections, the media sector received significant support and attention from the international community. In 2011, as new elections are being organized, it seems that exactly the same programs have to be supported again.

Access to information has increased for the past twenty years, thanks both to political liberalization and to technological developments. The expansion of the Internet, mobile phones, satellite TV, as well as the development of local media (on the national, regional, local and community levels) has had a tremendous impact on the diversity of information that is now available thanks to digital equipment.

However, this expansion has also been chaotic, largely uncontrolled and unregulated, and the media content that is now abundantly available to Congolese citizens is increasingly uneven in quality. A significant majority of the media face survival problems and the absence of effective regulation has encouraged the spread of sensationalist or propaganda-oriented media, unconcerned about professional ethics.

Media support has been available in the DRC for the past 20 years, but more strongly over the past ten years. A wide range of initiatives has been implemented by a large collection of donors and INGOs, including the establishment of new media or media contents, training, support to professional organizations, support to local media, and support to institutions and to the legal framework. These initiatives have certainly encouraged pluralism, but they have arguably not encouraged quality journalism and have instead favored models that support the scattering of media outlets rather than the convergence of a strong, self-sufficient, media sector.  

Moreover, donor support has not dealt with two of the most crippling challenges facing the DRC media environment: growing corruption among media organizations and the development of financial dependence on international donors rather than local organizations or people. The dynamics of aid have created a parallel economy for the local media (both formal and informal). Aid seems to be a well-established system that no one dares to question anymore.  

Donors and operators often do not seem to bother trying to tackle new approaches to development or creative project models. The 2006 elections demonstrate this. To prepare the DRC journalists who would be covering the polls, the media sector received significant support and attention from the international community. Now, five years later, as new elections are being organized, it seems that exactly the same programs have to be supported again: the regulatory body has to be completely re-established, journalists have to be trained once more in electoral coverage because so many have left for other jobs, “synergies” to group local radio stations together have to be organized and funded again, and a joint monitoring commission for ethics has to be created and sent to the provinces in order to monitor the electoral campaign. “It was all the same in 2006. Is it going to be the same thing in 2021, then in 2026?” wonders Pascal Berqué from IPP.

With more than 400 radios, 100 television channels and hundreds of registered newspapers, the DRC media landscape is particularly difficult to professionalize because the country is so large and the needs are infinite.

However, the following are some suggestions for reform:

**The necessary commitment by the government**

No sustainable impact can be reached without the political commitment of the government. The donors’

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118 Chouchou Namegabe, President of AFEM-SK, personal communication, Bukavu, May 2011.


120 Pascal Berqué, IPP program director, personal communication, August 2011.
Donors should also understand that media support in the DRC should focus on supporting access to information rather than using the media merely to promote issues of peace-building, poverty reduction or good governance. Media have to be supported for what journalists are supposed to do: ensuring the right of citizens to access reliable news and information.

Efforts will only be sustainable if they view their grants as a supplement to governmental budgets. This approach is crucial:

- To guarantee the long-term existence of "public service" broadcasting;
- To clean up a sector where the media are at present created without control and without constraint.

Except for some rare cases (e.g. the regulator (HAM) during the 2006 electoral period), public institutions have arguably impeded more than supported the development of the media sector.

**Political pressure by donors**

Donors must dare to add political pressure to their monetary support. It is a sensitive issue, as long as "many foreign states supporting the Congo prefer to close their eyes to corruption and fraud, in order to protect their economics interests," as a diplomat noted. Media support has to be done in parallel with raising awareness at the level of the political decision-makers, so that they provide the journalists with the necessary freedom to play their role in the construction of a new DRC. "If there is true political will, the progress could be very fast because the media are ready," says Pierre N’Sana, "the experiences of Radio Okapi and of the JDC demonstrate that, if correctly paid and well coached, Congolese journalists can produce very good journalism." But, without this political pressure and commitment, it is pointless to think that the media can turn into the fourth estate. "The Congolese press cannot, by itself alone, make the government accountable, and preach morals to politicians in the face of corruption and bad practices to which even the donors themselves close their eyes," concludes Tshivis Tshivuadi from JED.

**The need to tackle the real problems of the Congolese media**

Both donors and operators recognize the need for quality programs produced under good professional conditions.

This requires both improved training sessions (that so far have proved to be largely inappropriate), and tackling the coupage issue. As underlined by the General Secretary of the SNPP Union, "If the purpose is to strengthen the responsibility and the independence of the Congolese media, it is not the penalties imposed by the HAM that are needed; we need to confront the issue of journalists’ poverty, but that issue is not taken into account in those global programs" (Frere, 2006)

Furthermore, the financial transparency of the media business needs to be taken seriously. Media companies’ capital, shareholders and budgets should be transparent. "Once the capital and shareholders are known, and the basic criteria are set up to regulate them, media companies will be forced into thinking about media development," says Emmanuel Kabongo from the APEFE/WBI.

**Targeting a limited number of media to generate more impact**

Given the multiplicity of actors in the media sector, most interviewees suggest that support should be more targeted. But it requires courage to support only some selected companies or organizations, because it will leave behind others ones who will complain, maybe loudly. According to Florence Minery from GRETS, "We shouldn’t worry about supporting selected media as long as we can explain our position. It’s not as if we were going against media pluralism because media multiplicity does not really reflect a true diversity of opinions right now."

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121 Pierre N’Sana, IPP Program Officer, personal communication, August 8, 2008.
122 Tshivis Tshivuadi, executive secretary of JED, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
124 Florence Minery, Media Proframme Officer, GRET, personal communication, Paris, August 2011.
Focusing attention on media as an industry

Advertising still operates on the basis of criteria other than those typically employed in more sustainable media environment (i.e. audiences and market shares). Broadcasting rights are not respected and television stations broadcast programs illegally that they have pirated. Trusted polling institutions could help by providing data that could allow advertisers to turn to the most popular media, which would then gain enough money to improve their programs, while small media which are saturating the market would disappear. These concerns can only be addressed if the DRC has strong (but democratic) regulation of both the market and the content.

Developing, not instrumentalizing, the media

Donors should also understand that media support in the DRC should focus on supporting access to information rather than using the media merely to promote issues of peace-building, poverty reduction or good governance. Media have to be supported for what journalists are supposed to do: ensuring that the right of citizens to access reliable news and information is a reality.

Giving real responsibility to local organizations

Whatever the findings of the INGOs about the weaknesses of their local partners, the frustration felt by a number of Congolese organizations towards the way aid programs are set up must be confronted. The feeling of dispossession felt by certain categories of actors (even if not totally justified) and the feeling of submission to objectives and procedures imposed by foreigners must be taken into account. Better coordination and longer-term projects could help improve the situation, allowing prolonged partnerships and a real transfer of expertise, less focused on results than on the processes of consolidation.

Taking into account the challenge of media access

Although several projects have increased the broadcasting capacity and the circulation of certain media, very few projects have tackled the issue of increasing access to receiving devices (e.g. equipping centers for collective listening or television viewing, distribution of clockwork or solar radio sets, etc.). While mobile phones have become widespread, they are used for interpersonal, private or professional communications. No project has so far aimed at using them in a systematic way to collect or disseminate news and information.\footnote{This contrasts strikingly with donor projects in Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda that are investing heavily in innovative mobile interventions.}

One of the studios of the RTNC (National Congolese Radio Television) in Kinshasa (credit: Philippe Delchambre, 2007)
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# Appendix 1: List of Interviews and Methodology

Field research by Marie-Soleil Frère
(March 20th-29th 2011: Kinshasa / Lubumbashi)
(May 10th-17th 2011: Goma / Bukavu)
Previous field research and interviews conducted outside the context of this project are not mentioned here (even though some of them are referred to in the report).

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<th>Type of Organization</th>
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<td>• Pierre Nsana and Franck Mbumba (Institut Panos Paris), Kinshasa</td>
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<td>• Norbert Wibyala (IPP), Lubumbashi</td>
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<td>• Fidèle Banze Mutombo (Development an Peace), Lubumbashi</td>
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<td>• Louise Brunet (Internews), Kinshasa</td>
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<td>• Godefroid Bwiti (InterCongo Média), Kinshasa</td>
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<td>• Paul Banze (Center Lokole, SFCG), Bukavu</td>
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<td>• Kizito Mushizi (RATECO / Radio Maendeleo), Bukavu</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Pascal Berqué (Institut Panos Paris), Paris</td>
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<td>• Florence Minery (GRET), Paris</td>
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<td>• Seydou Sarr (Infosud Belgique), Bruxelles</td>
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### Media organization (NGO or for-profit)
- Journalists, producers, editors, managers from media that receive donor funding:
  - Press
  - Radio
  - TV
  - Internet
  - Mobile
  - Newspapers or magazines

### Associations
- Professional association

### Participants:
- Freddy Mulumba (*Le Potentiel*), Kinshasa
- Yves Kalikat (*Journal du Citoyen*), Kinshasa
- Bruno Minas (RFI) and Fabienne Pompey (France 24), Kinshasa
- Didier Kalenda (*Radio Phénix Université*), Lubumbashi
- Rose Lukano and Michel Kamwenyi (*R.T. Mwanga*), Lubumbashi
- Agnès Nkoy (*Nyota TV*), Lubumbashi
- Benoit Luhembwe Kimwanga, Grégoire Sumba Nyangula, Antoine Mukunga, Antoine Kapenda Mambwe (*RTNC Katanga*), Lubumbashi
- Denise Maheo Mwasi and Tahirou Diao (*Radio Okapi Katanga*), Lubumbashi
- Jean-Pierre Kabange (*Le Patriote*), Lubumbashi
- Frédéric Mpoy (*Quiproquo*), Lubumbashi
- Goddy Ngosa (*RCK*), Lubumbashi
- Jean Majama (*Canal de Vie*), Lubumbashi
- Fortunat Shimba (*ACP Katanga*), Lubumbashi
- Roger Nsenda (*Radio Hosanna*), Lubumbashi
- VBR (*Virunga Business Radio*), Goma
- Henriette Odia (*Mishapi Radio Television*), Goma
- Magloire Paluku (*Kivu One*), Goma
- Kizito Mushizi (*Radio Maendeleo*), Bukavu
- Roger Ngandu (*Radio Tele Inter Viens et Vois*), Lubumbashi
- Sœur Brigitte Nsenga (*Radio Chem Chem*), Lubumbashi
- Dieuvis Kalend (*RC Libre de Kolwezi*), Kolwezi
- Mukaya Nduba (*Radio NCD / Hosanna*), Lubumbashi
- Ephraïm Bisimwa (*Radio Maendeleo*), Bukavu
- Fortunat Kasongo Ndaou (*Radio Canal Mont Sion*), Mbuji Mayi
- Nelson Thamba Makaya (*Radio Communautaire de Moanda*)
- Maguy Libelele (*Radio Mwangaza*), Kisangani
- Patrick Nzazi Kiama (*RTNC*, Kinshasa)

### Round-table about media development (within IPP training session, Lubumbashi)
- Francine Ilunga (*RCK*, Lubumbashi)
- Sandra Komba (*RT Canal de Vie*, Lubumbashi)
- Laurette Kasongo (*Radio Phoenix Université*, Lubumbashi)
- Roger Ngandu (*Radio Tele Inter Viens et Vois*, Lubumbashi)
- Sœur Brigitte Nsenga (*Radio Chem Chem*, Lubumbashi)
- Dieuvis Kalend (*RC Libre de Kolwezi*, Kolwezi)
- Mukaya Nduba (*Radio NCD / Hosanna*, Lubumbashi)
- Ephraïm Bisimwa (*Radio Maendeleo*, Bukavu)
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- Nelson Thamba Makaya (*Radio Communautaire de Moanda*)
- Maguy Libelele (*Radio Mwangaza*, Kisangani)
- Patrick Nzazi Kiama (*RTNC*, Kinshasa)
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<td>Experts on the media and media development</td>
<td>• Baudouin Hamuli (Cenadep / Niza / IPP), Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>• Steve Matenga (Former IPP and Radio Okapi), Kinshasa</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Modeste Mutinga (Senator, Former President of HAM, Founder of <em>Le Potentiel</em>, Radio 7 and Tele 7), Kinshasa</td>
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<td>• Isidore Ndaywel e Nziem (Professor at the University of Kinshasa), Kinshasa</td>
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<td>• Fulgence Mungenga and Jean-René Mputu Biduaya (Department of Communication, University of Kinshasa), Kinshasa</td>
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<td>• Jean-Chrétien Ekambo (IFASIC), Kinshasa</td>
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<td>• Mary Myers (DFID Expert on Media and Development), Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Media Industry Research</strong></td>
<td>Conduct research and data collection used by the media</td>
<td>• Serge Mbumbu (Experts Sprl), Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• IMMAR, Paris</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Case Study Report Template

For the research consultant: This document provides the overall structure for your report. Your role is to focus primarily on the following:

1. Pulling together the evidence needed to describe how donors have contributed (or not) to media development in the country: who were the major players, what were the major trends, over the last 20 years.

2. Incorporating the perspectives of donors, local NGOs, international implementers, and aid recipients to describe in these interventions: what worked, what didn’t work, and why. When possible, collecting the reports, data and other evidence on which these conclusions are based.

3. Diagnosing the state of media as a business in the country. What are the business models? What are the major challenges? What data do people base business decisions on?

PART ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1-3 pages)
I. Summary (bullet points are fine) of the major findings of the study, focusing on the areas in the box above

PART TWO: MEDIA OVERVIEW
II. (suggested length: 2-3 pages) Brief historical and development background – tie into information / media culture
a. What are the key political, social, and economic events and trends that have shaped the last 20 years of the country’s history?

b. What are the country’s key development challenges (general development, media development)?

c. What donors are most active in the country (economic development, not just media development)? What are their development priorities for the country overall (e.g. poverty, health, governance)?

III. (suggested length: 5 pages) What does the media landscape of the country look like?
   a. Brief overview: What are its major features? Developments and trends over the last 20 years? Is it able to hold government and business accountable? How well does it provide essential information to the population? Who does information reach and not reach? What forms of media are most prominent?

   b. What is the state of journalism in the country? Is the media relatively free from corruption? What are average salaries for journalists? How good is the overall quality of reporting? How safe is it to be a journalist?

   c. In what ways is the political economy / enabling environment of each country supporting or detracting from the development of the media sector?

   d. Brief overview of related laws, regulations and major developments over the last 20 years

   e. To what extent are laws and regulations that are in place put into practice?

   f. Describe the information culture of the country. How do different groups of people get information? What are the major challenges? Do they feel that they have a say in decision-making? How important is news vs. entertainment?

IV. (suggested length: 2-3 pages) What is the state of the business of media?
   a. What are the business models? What are the major challenges?

   b. What are the trends in media ownership, major issues there?

   c. What do people base business decisions on? What is the state of data on media?

   d. What kind of data on media is there in the media system (audience / market research)? What data do different stakeholders use? How do they use it? How did its use develop?

   e. If possible, please try to get copies or access to any of this data that media enterprises are using (audience/reach for various types of media, advertising numbers, etc.)?
PART THREE: DONOR-FUNDED MEDIA DEVELOPMENT (suggested length: 20 pages)

IV. Given the media landscape, why have donors intervened in the media space? What was perceived as missing / needed?

V. What have been the donor-funded media development interventions with the most impact over the last 20 years?
   a. What were the major activities? What were these activities meant to achieve, in both the short and long term? What local media or media-related organizations were created / supported (brief description – profiles of key orgs can go in the appendix)?
   b. What have foreign donors’ roles been? What have foreign NGOs’ roles been?
   c. How have donor investments supported or impeded media development? To what extent have these activities addressed the major challenges outlined in Part One? What approaches did they take? What worked? What didn’t work?
   d. Why? How do various actors opinions’ converge or diverge about the success or failure of different MD interventions?
   e. By what criteria are stakeholders judging the success or failure of interventions? How do they assess impact?
   f. Any sense of interactions / conflicts in goals or direction with other forces, such as private investors, public diplomacy, strategic communication, etc.
   g. What are the key issues around sustainability in donor-developed media? Differences in business model or approach between donor-developed media and the rest of the media?
   h. How have the actors, activities, and impacts evolved over the last 20 years?
   i. Where do donor-funded interventions seem to be going in the future?

VI. (suggested length: 1 page) Gaps, further questions that should be asked, issues to investigate

VII. (suggested length: 1 page) Conclusions: What role did donor-funded media development interventions play in shaping the overall media landscape? How do these interventions fit into the overall development of the country?

VIII. Literature review: Brief overview of previous research on media development in this country
   a. What research has been done? What conclusions has it reached? What questions has it asked? How has it framed and assessed the question of impact of MD interventions? What are the gaps in the research?
   b. Who has conducted the research (academics, implementers, donors, etc.) and how has this shaped the perspectives?

IX. Methodology: overview of approaches used
   a. List of stakeholders interviewed

X. Profiles of key media organizations and NGOs (suggested length: one paragraph)

XI. Chart – overview of major donors, implementers, local partners, and activities

APPENDIX

XII. Literature review: Brief overview of previous research on media development in this country
   a. What research has been done? What conclusions has it reached? What questions has it asked? How has it framed and assessed the question of impact of MD interventions? What are the gaps in the research?
   b. Who has conducted the research (academics, implementers, donors, etc.) and how has this shaped the perspectives?

XIII. Methodology: overview of approaches used
   a. List of stakeholders interviewed

XIV. Profiles of key media organizations and NGOs (suggested length: one paragraph)

XV. Chart – overview of major donors, implementers, local partners, and activities
## Sampling guide - Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Category</th>
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<th>Ideal interview quota</th>
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**Total** 10-15
Appendix 2: List of Registered Newspapers in Kinshasa and the Provinces (2008)


In the provinces, the main newspapers are:

- in Lubumbashi: Mukuba, Quiproquo, Fraternité and Le Lushois,
- in Bukavu: L’Etendard, Karibu, Kasuku, Kivu Safari and Le Souverain,
- in Goma: Info Plus, Le Souverain Primaire, Le Pacificateur, Jonction and Les Coulisses,
- in Kisangani: Mwangaza, Le Nationaliste, La Tshopo, La Libre Orientale and Le Thermomètre,
- in Mbuji Mayi: Congo Wetu, Lubilanji, Plume d’Or, Le Défi, Transparence,
- in Matadi: Mbwetete, Le Périscope, La Cité africaine, L'Embouchure,
- in Bandundu: Kimpangi
- in Mbandaka: Ekanga Ngenge, Mabenga
# Appendix 3: Number of Radio Stations (2008)

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<th>Provinces</th>
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<th>UN</th>
<th>Private broadcasters</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Community</td>
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For the complete list, see Frère (2009)
## Appendix 4: Television Stations in the DRC

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<td>-</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
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The UNPC is a key professional structure, which heads all the other associations and the professional groupings of the media sector. Its mission is to federate the whole profession and its main power is to grant or remove the professional ID card. Several financial partners initially supported the implementation and activities of the UNPC: to support the administrative team, to set up delegations in the provinces, and to participate in international meetings. After disputes arose within the management team and because of the flawed budget management, the UNPC went through an important crisis, both within the organization and with its donors. The mandate of the current leaders expired in 2008, but the UNPC has not been able to organize the meeting of its General assembly, lacking the resources to cover the travelling expenses of the delegates from the provinces. It suffers from a lack of legitimacy and is almost paralyzed.

The self-regulatory body, the OMEC aims to monitor the journalists' adherence to the Code of Ethics, adopted during the 2004 Conference. The OMEC implements activities to popularize the code and to raise awareness among journalists about specific themes (for instance, the OMEC has published a Practical guide for the journalist covering an electoral period, with the support of UNESCO). It monitors the media contents and is supposed to answer any complaints lodged by any individual or organization which is unsatisfied with the coverage of a news item. It publishes reports made by its monitoring team. Despite substantial resources provided by donors when it was first created and lasting until the end of the electoral period, its activities and its ability to react have remained limited. Its recent lethargy coincides with the end of the support it received.

The ANEAP is an organization promoting private broadcasting companies, especially through support to the digitalization of equipment and the training of staff. It is a fragile structure, which neither has an office, nor any financial resources. It has failed to mobilize its members to support the organization, mainly because of the huge competition and because of political affiliations in the broadcasting sector.

The ANECO's main vocation is to reinforce the print-media companies. It has so far conducted two main projects. One was the adoption of a harmonized price list for advertising in the print media, in order to try to limit unfair competition. It was not a great success, as none of the companies actually respected the fixed rates. The second was a project of joint distribution of newspapers, in which only three papers from Kinshasa eventually participated.

The ARCO aims to provide training, equipment and support for the community and associative radio stations. In 2004, it had 120 members and started the implementation of provincial coordination. The association is in a state of lethargy today, after the management by its president was heavily questioned by the members and by donors. The president has moved abroad but was never replaced at the head of the organization.

This federation was born in November 2006, wanting implicitly to provide an alternative to the dysfunctional ARCO. The FRPC is a federation not of radio stations, but of networks of radios set up at the provincial level (see below).
UCOFEM (Congolese Union of Women in the Media) (1997)

UCOFEM gathers women working in the media and aims to fight against discrimination towards women at several levels:

- as media professionals: women journalists suffer from diverse forms of discrimination in the companies where they work;
- as subjects in the media: the Congolese media often convey a stereotypical and negative image of women;
- as members of the media audiences: the women are perceived as secondary audiences, and the messages are not always adapted to their expectations and needs.

UCOFEM has around 20 active members. Four other organizations are devoted to women in the media in the DRC: AJPF (Association of Journalists in the Women’s Press), the Congolese branches of FEMMED/WOMMED (African Network for Women in the Media) and the APAC (Association of African Communication Professionals), as well as AFEMECO (Association of the Women in the Media in the Congo).

SNPP (National Labor Union for Media Professionals) (1998)

The SNPP is a trade-union organization which defends the rights of the Congolese journalists as media workers, in the public and private sectors. Its mission is to ensure “the defense, protection and promotion of the professional and moral interests of its members for a constant improvement of their working conditions and their standard of living.” The SNPP is the only labor union specializing in the media sector. It currently gathers 480 members emanating mainly from public media. “We have great trouble approaching journalists from the private sector,” recognizes Stanis Nkundiye. “They have no contract, there is no collective agreement; they are working in insecure conditions.”

Provincial organizations

Feeling abandoned by national organizations that are too centered on the concerns of the Kinshasan media, journalists in the provinces have begun to get organized independently. The problems met by the media deep inside the country are different from those of Kinshasa; so journalists and media managers in the provinces wish to have their own organizations to tackle their specific issues. The main provincial organizations are the following:

- local branches of national associations (UNPC, OMEC, ARCO have established local delegations);
- networks of community radios: Rateco (Network of Community Radios and Televisions from Eastern Congo); Remacob (Network of Associative and Community Media of Bas-Congo); Remacpo (Network of Associative and Community Media of the Oriental Province); Remack (Network of Community Media of Katanga); Rateproka (Radios and Televisions of the Province of Kasai);
- associations of women journalists: Afemek (Association Of Women in the Media in Katanga), Afem-SK (Association of Women in the Media in South Kivu);
Four texts are currently being drafted or adopted by the DRC Parliament, which will fill some of the current gaps:

- A law on the broadcasting sector (called “Loi Mutinga”), which is presently being discussed at the National Assembly, having been studied by the Senate;

- A draft bill on the freedom of the press (introduced by Deputy Bofassa), which should update and replace the law of 1996 by integrating the issue of the “decriminalization” of the press law violations. However, it is not even on the agenda of the legislative assemblies;

- A draft bill to improve the public service remit of the national broadcaster, the RTNC a draft bill aimed at guaranteeing access to public information.

- In addition, in November 2010 the HAM organized a workshop on the ‘cahier de charges’ of the broadcast media, in which participants drafted texts specifying the obligations and constraints of every type of broadcaster. These texts are awaiting validation by ministerial decree.
Appendix 7: Figures from Media Budgets

Monthly budget of Le Potentiel (Kinshasa): $40,000 / month
- 30% of the amount is for paper and printing costs ($13,000)
- 50% is spent on salaries ($20,000 for a staff of 50 persons)
- 6% on rent and supplies ($2,500)
- 14% on running costs (transport, telecommunication, taxes)
The expenses of the newspaper are covered as follows: 70% by advertising income, and 30% by sales.

Monthly budget of Radio Maendeleo (Bukavu): $33,000 / month
- 40% is dedicated to salaries (27 employees) and freelancers (5 correspondents) + taxes ($13,000)
- 40% to operating costs (consumables, rent of relay transmitters, electricity, telecommunications, transport) ($13,000)
- 20% to investments (equipment, training, radio clubs) ($6,500)
The budget is covered: 12% by the income generated by the radio (through communiqués and local partnerships) and 88% by foreign donors.

Monthly budget of Radio Television Mwangaza (Lubumbashi): $25,000 / month
76% is devoted to salaries (96 employees of which 40 are journalists) ($19,000);
6% to rent ($500) and other operating costs (electricity and fuel for the generator : $1,000);
10% to taxes (including 10% of advertising income) ($2,500);
8% to operating costs ($2,000).
The budget is covered for up to 75% by advertising (including advertorials). The remaining 25% are generated through special partnerships with local institutions (The Governorate, UNICEF, etc.) or local announcements.

Monthly budget of Radio Phoenix University (Lubumbashi): $700 / month
- “Bonuses” for 4 permanent employees
- The radio is based on the grounds of the university (and pays neither rent nor electricity expenses).

RCK (the Community Radio of Katanga) has an annual budget of $31,000 which covers the following expenses: bonuses for journalists and presenters, transport, rent, taxes, electricity and water, etc. The resources come from the subsidy received from the main donor (Development and Peace), member contributions (local organizations) and paid messages. The radio also receives income from co-productions, from selling airtime to organizations, from paid media coverage, from commercials and from greetings read on air.
Institut Panos Paris

The Institut Panos Paris (IPP) is a Paris-based INGO. It specializes in media pluralism and has been present in the DRC since 2000. The IPP bases its intervention strategy on a sectional approach, which attempts to consolidate simultaneously different actors (private, institutional, community-based or organizational) in the media sector. Its interventions have been organized through five successive programs:

2002-2004:
Two regional programs involving nine Central African countries, including the DRC:

- Rights and Institutional Strengthening of the Media in Central Africa (DRIM);

These two programs, which received funds worth €900,000, benefited from the support of many donors (EU, Cordaid, DFID, CCFD, French Foreign Ministry, SDC-Switzerland, etc.).

2004-2007:
An important national program run at the request of DFID, aiming to strengthen the media sector in view of the elections and, in particular, to support the HAM. This ambitious project, worth £4,200,000 (€6 million), had an impact on a large number of media actors, in Kinshasa and the provinces, especially in the following fields:

- regulation (support for the HAM and its provincial branches) (over £1 million);
- self-regulation and freedom of the press (JED and OMEC);
- strengthening the capacities of the organizations of media professionals (in Kinshasa and the provinces);
- training of the personnel of four provincial radios;
- access to information (strengthening the connectivity of community radios through the installation of PARI – Support Centers for Independent Radios – in five provinces);
- production of civic information in partnership with the local media (Journal du Citoyen – JDC).

This program received additional support, for certain activities, from Irish development aid (DCI: Development Cooperation Ireland), Cordaid, SDC-Switzerland, SIDA-Sweden and the Embassies of Canada and the Netherlands.

2007-2010:
A national program supported in the context of the project set up by DFID and “France Coopération Internationale” (FCI) and by Irish Aid (2007-2008). The priority actions focused on the following:

- transformation of the JDC into a “training paper” for students of IFASIC (Institute for Information and Communication Sciences);
- creation of a radio program “Le rendez-vous du citoyen,” in partnership with the community radios;
- consolidation and networking of local radios.
The IPP is also pursuing other initiatives in the DRC through several regional and sub-regional programs, backed by a wide range of donors: besides DFID and Irish Aid, ACDI (Canadian development aid), SIDA (Sweden), SDC (Switzerland), CORDAID (Netherlands), the EU, and Belgian development aid are among the donors.

The IPP has a permanent office in Kinshasa consisting of four employees, a regional office in Bukavu, and two provincial branches in Bas-Congo and Katanga. Its approach, based on developing local capacities, implies that its local offices are always entrusted to local citizens, not to expatriates.

**Fondation Hirondelle**

Fondation Hirondelle (FH) is a private non-profit organization based in Lausanne, Switzerland, specializing in the creation of neutral and professional media in crisis-ridden countries.

It launched its first project in Zaire in 1995, establishing a radio in the Rwandan refugee camps of the Kivu (Radio Agatashya), which was taken down once the camps were dismantled in 1996. In 2002, Radio Okapi was created. Radio Okapi’s statute and operations are defined by a MOU (memorandum of understanding) signed by FH, the UN and the Congolese government. According to the MOU, FH is, in theory, in charge of professional questions within the radio, but it also has technical and economic responsibilities. As mentioned above, the editorial line, which remains the responsibility of the UN, has repeatedly been the object of disagreement between FH and the UN; indeed, the UN’s Department of Public Information being in charge of the radio means that, for some UN staff members, it should enhance the visibility and promotion of the UN’s activities in the DRC, while FH is concerned that Radio Okapi be a neutral and professional medium.

Radio Okapi employs two full-time staff members in Lausanne. From its inception in 2002 to 2010, more than $31 million has been raised and managed by FH for Radio Okapi.126 This amount has been matched by a UN contribution, mainly based on “services:” buildings to host Radio Okapi in Kinshasa and in the provinces, salaries for the staff, access to electricity and telecommunications, access to UN flights in order for the journalists to travel, vehicles and other equipment. The UN contribution has always been difficult to estimate but is probably double the budget raised by FH from the bilateral donors.

**Years of contribution and approximate funds from donors to Fondation Hirondelle for Radio Okapi (2001-2010) (in USD)**

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<td>$31,498,000 Approx. Grand Total</td>
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</table>

126 Given the diversity of the currencies in which the contracts were established and the changing exchange rates to Swiss Francs (the currency in which Radio Okapi’s budget is elaborated), the total amount in USD received by Fondation Hirondelle for Radio Okapi is approximate.
Since 2007, Fondation Hirondelle has tried to develop a sustainability strategy for Radio Okapi, whose future notably seems to depend on increased cooperation with local radios.

FH is also active in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic and in Sudan.

**Search for Common Ground**

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an international NGO created in 1982 with headquarters in the U.S. Active in 20 countries, it has been present in the DRC since 2001 and started its activities in Bukavu under the name of Center Lokolé. SFCG is essentially active in the production of radio and TV programs aiming to transform conflicts and promoting dialogue to solve problems, and as a result, is not seen by all as an operator supporting the media sector, although it supports around 100 partner radios country-wide. SFCG has grown steadily in the DRC and, in 2010, had a budget of $3 million.

The Center Lokolé gradually established two production centers (Bukavu and Kinshasa) and seven offices in Moba, Uvira, Baraka, Dongo, and Goma. It totals more than 80 employees, including an expatriate director. It aims to bring communities closer to one another by various means (comic strips, mobile cinema, participative theatre, cultural and sporting activities, etc.), and in particular through radio and TV productions. SFCG produces ten weekly radio shows, some in several languages (Lingala, Swahili, French, Kikongo, Tshiluba), which are broadcast via 98 partner radios nationwide: news programs on peace, civic rights, and women and children's rights; pavement radio giving citizens a voice; sketches and shows aimed at raising awareness and promoting civic education. These programs fill a void in the schedules of many local radios which have neither the means nor the capacities to create programs demanding important preparatory work, field work, or editing work. In exchange for broadcasting these programs, the partner radios receive training courses offered by SFCG and an annual equipment donation suited to their needs. Since 2008, SFCG has launched the production of televised shows, using reality TV and fictional formats, broadcast on Digital Congo.

Center Lokolé’s main donors are the governments of the U.S. (State Department and USAID), the UK, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland, as well as UN organizations such as the HCR and UNIFEM. Private foundations and INGOs (Amnesty International, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, etc.) also support some of its activities. SFCG has also benefited from one of the grants of the DFID-FCI project, for 2008 and 2009, with co-financing from DFID’s Global Transparency Fund.

**GRET: Research and Exchange of Technologies Group**

The Research and Technology Exchange Group (GRET) is a French NGO based in Paris, which is very active in the field of micro-finance, rural and urban development, as well as the reinforcement of civil society. It also includes a department dedicated to media support. The GRET has led several successive programs to support the media in the DRC, funded by the EU and the Canadian Embassy, including support to the written press and several training-oriented projects funded through the FEI (DFID and Sida) program.

**2003-2007:**

A support program for the DRC’s print media totaling €1,650,000 over three years, 80% of which was funded by the EU and 20% by the Canadian Embassy. An expatriate project manager led this project, based in Kinshasa, from 15 January 2004 to 30 June 2007.

The main supports concerned: the National Press Conference (2004); “Journaliste en Danger” (JED; 2004, 2005, 2006); Syfia International (InterCongo Media); HAM; OMEC; UNPC; ACP (Congolesse Press Agency); the provincial press houses in Kisangani, Lubumbashi, and Goma. A training program, implemented by the Lille Journalism School (writing techniques, electoral coverage, newspaper / radio management, training trainers) and the creation of a press distribution service (distribution of print media in Kinshasa) completed this project.
2007-2009:
A regional program, also backed by the EU, aiming to support the audiovisual media of four countries (DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi, Rwanda). The program essentially focused on the training of journalists from private radios and tried to develop regional dynamics through JED and the OMAC (Organization of the Media in Central Africa). The project was managed by a Program Officer based in Kinshasa.

2010-2011:
The GRET is currently implementing two other projects, selected during the calls for proposals posted by FCI in Kinshasa:

- a long-distance training project (over the internet) of eight radios from Katanga;
- a training project for politicians and journalists from West Kasai;
- a capacity building project aimed at supporting press companies in Katanga.

The GRET's Media Department has an office in Kinshasa and a Head office in Paris.

**La Benevolencija**

A Dutch NGO based in Amsterdam, La Benevolencija aims to promote peace and reconciliation through radio programs. In the DRC, La Benevolencija is established in Eastern Congo (Goma and Bukavu). Its programs (radio plays and a program on justice) aim to encourage citizens to oppose, in a thoughtful manner, any attempt at manipulation inciting them to perpetrate violence so as to play a role in reconciliation. The total program implemented by La Benevolencija in the Great Lakes region has a budget of €2.5 million, of which some €800,000 goes to their Congolese office which also negotiates complementary funding.

La Benevolencija produces two weekly programs destined for some 30 partner radios. The partner radios are rewarded financially for broadcasting these shows. La Benevolencija employs 13 people in the DRC, six of which are directly involved in the programs (journalists, writers, and awareness-raising personnel). The audio programs are involved in awareness-raising activities in the field: groups of listeners are constituted, and are encouraged to react and reflect on the programs.

La Benevolencija’s programs in the DRC are supported by the Netherlands and Belgium thanks to a structural financing program based in Amsterdam. The DRC office also has two “thematic” donors: FCI (an awareness-raising program in the three zones of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri) and Rejusco – Restoration of Justice in the Eastern Congo – (to support a program on justice, “Sheria ni Dawa”).

**RNTC: Radio Nederland Training Center**

An autonomous organization which emerged out of Radio Nederland, the RNTC has implemented projects on training, equipment and support for Congolese community radios since 2007, mainly in Bas-Congo. Its intervention has been structured as follows:

2007-2010:
Support for 13 radios in Bas-Congo in the context of the Informorac program, which also involves Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Congo-Brazzaville. The project stretched over four years (2007-2010), with a budget of €4 million from the Dutch Foreign Ministry. In the DRC, the program had a budget of €850,000. The local partner is REMACOB.

2010-2011:
Support for 25 radios in Bandundu, Equateur, East Kasai, Maniema, North Kivu with funding from FCI/FEI (€199,000).
2011-2012:
Support for the community radios of Bas-Congo (media and civil society, electoral coverage) and management training in order to strengthen the viability of commercial radios in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.

Funding: the Dutch Foreign Ministry (€150,000 + €750,000 until 2015) and FEI (€182,000 + €199,000).

**Syfia Grands Lacs**

Syfia International is a network of nine news agencies in Europe and French-speaking Africa, whose Congolese branch is InterCongo Media (ICM). The main activities of Syfia in the DRC include an online agency “Syfia Grands Lacs,” the publication of *Syfia Grands Lacs*, a 12-page bi-monthly paper; the creation of partner agencies in Bukavu (Proximédias Libres) and in Goma (SYMPA), founded and run by correspondents of Syfia Grands Lacs and a “training paper” in Kisangani called *Mongongo*, launched in April 2009.

ICM performs autonomous activities with its own funds, and others in the context of the Syfia network. In 2006, with the support of Swiss development aid (SDC), Ici-Là-Bas Médias (French branch), and Infosud Belgique (Belgian branch), ICM launched the project “Syfia Grands Lacs” (Syfia Great Lakes) with the aim of reinforcing the production and circulation of quality news in the region. The program grew and, between 2007 and 2009, received the support of the EU and of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, totaling a budget of some €1 million. A second program, covering the 2011-2013 period, received partial support from SDC and the Belgian Foreign Ministry.

The main actions of “Syfia Grands Lacs” in the DRC are the following:

- The online agency “Syfia Grands Lacs” ([http://syfia-grands-lacs.info](http://syfia-grands-lacs.info)), which covers three countries (DRC, Rwanda and Burundi) and which is fed, on the Congolese side, by the ICM, overseeing some 30 correspondents spread out nationwide. These productions are broadcast electronically to hundreds of newspapers in French-speaking Africa, which can publish them for free, and to several dozen radios. Thanks to Syfia’s relay agencies in Europe, they are also sold to French, Swiss, and Belgian newspapers.

- The publication of *Syfia Grands Lacs*, a 12-page bi-monthly paper which publishes some of the reports and articles produced by correspondents of Syfia Grands Lacs in the three countries. It has a circulation of 4,000 copies in the DRC and is distributed freely to organizations which can make it available to many readers (schools, parishes, libraries, NGOs, local associations and authorities) in ten out of the 11 provinces in the Congo. It is sold to private individuals at news agencies for FC200, much less than the price of a private newspaper (around $2).

- The creation of partner agencies in Bukavu (Proximédias Libres) and in Goma (SYMPA), founded and run by correspondents of Syfia Grands Lacs.

Next to Syfia Grands Lacs, Syfia International also obtained from FCI a €200,000 budget to set up a “training paper” in Kisangani: launched in April 2009, *Mongongo* is a bi-monthly which, like *Syfia Grands Lacs*, aims to give the audience field reports on social and everyday issues.

**Développement et paix**

The international development organization of the Catholic Church in Canada, Development and Peace has been present in the DRC since 1980, backing civil society in order to consolidate citizenship and democratization. Among its most notable activities it has supported the creation of seven community radios in Katanga and Oriental provinces.

It has been involved in the media sector since 2001 by supporting “Media for Peace,” an organization founded by Modeste Mutinga, director of *Le Potentiel* and future president of the HAM. It then turned to the radio sector by supporting the creation of seven community radios (three in Katanga and four in the Orientale province). Initially managed by Development and Peace, the radios were gradually transferred to local organizations and encouraged to seek other sources of funding. Development and Peace is essentially financed by the ACDI (Canadian development aid) and the Christian community. From 2008 to date it has also benefited from FEI support to develop certain civic programs on these radio stations in Katanga and Oriental.
Internews

Following the publication, in April 2010, of a call for proposals by USAID, the American NGO Internews was selected in consortium with Fondation Hirondelle, the local NGO “Journaliste en Danger” (JED) and the research consultancy Albany Associates. Internews has thus just established itself in the DRC and in 2011 started implementing a five-year project with a budget of $15 million. The project will focus on:

- reinforcing 55 community radios in four provinces (Katanga, South Kivu, Maniema, and Bandundu);
- strengthening professionalism (providing support for JED, AFEM-SK, the provincial radio networks, thematic round tables, etc.);
- reinforcing the legal and regulatory framework (and training lawyers specializing in media law);
- the creation of technical resource centers for the media in the four provinces; media monitoring.

French Foreign Aid

The French Embassy is the only diplomatic delegation, which has an “audio-visual attaché” specializing in issues close to the sector as part of its aid department. The presence of this internal expertise enables it to support limited projects where other diplomatic delegations and cooperation departments tend to subcontract when it comes to media support. France was therefore one of the first bilaterals to show interest in the DRC’s media sector through a number of interventions.

2001-2004:

The Support Project for the Congolese Audiovisual Sector was the first structured and long-term support program for Congolese media. Run by an expatriate worker, it focused on re-equipment and the restructuring and stimulation of the ICA (Congolese Audiovisual Institute, formerly Sevoza: “Studio Ecole de la Voix du Zaïre”). The ICA grew into a training center equipped with digital audiovisual equipment, with a range of regular training programs for the whole of the audiovisual sector’s professionals (including trainers’ training). Moreover, in the context of this program, French development aid supported the activities of ARCO, in particular in the field of training, in order to help the community radio sector organize itself better. France also set up a cooperation program with IFASIC in order to set up a higher education and doctoral training program to ensure academic continuity in this field. Furthermore, it backed the equipment of 28 partner radios of Radio France Internationale (RFI) which were equipped with the “Ordispace” system, making it possible to download RFI’s news broadcasts and programs in order to re-broadcast them.

2004-2008:

Plan Radio Afrique extended the presence of France in the sector with the implementation of a regional support project for community radios managed from Paris in partnership with RFI’s international training department. This four-year project totaled €2.4 million. It had two objectives: to support national radios and to support community radios (through RFI). However, following tensions between the donor and the RTNC during the identification of the activities, this first part was cancelled in the DRC.

2007-2012:

Media for Democracy and Transparency (also called “FCI Program” by the beneficiaries). France Coopération Internationale (FCI), since 2011 France Expertise Internationale (FEI), is a French public operator emanating from the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. Since September 2007 it has managed a fund of £12 million coming essentially from UK development aid (DFID) and destined to support the media. Despite the Franco-British desire to set up an open fund which other donors might contribute to, only Sweden (SIDA) has decided to put its funds since 2009 in this “basket fund,” which thus has €16 million at its disposal for a program running until 31 December 2012. The program’s activities started in January 2008 in fact, managed by an expatriate based in Kinshasa since August 2008. They evolve around five axes:
• professionalization of actors in the media sector: management, thematic journalism, “training papers;”

• production of programs on peace, democracy and good governance: TV and radio fiction series, magazines and documentaries, awareness-raising campaigns, internet blog, bulletin;

• consolidating the regulation and self-regulation of the media sector: support for JED, HAM-CSAC (mission statement); OMEC/UNPC (freedom of the press award);

• promoting the economic viability of the media sector: renewable energies for radios, audience surveys, marketing and advertising;

• promoting independent public-service media: local radios, Radio Okapi (FH), RTNC.

The program initially operated on the basis of two mechanisms:

• direct support for historic or unique partners in the sector (IPP, JED, FH);

• support for projects presented by other partners through international calls for proposals.

Since 2010, two new financing mechanisms have been established:

• Media Support Fund (FAM): national calls for proposals for short-term activities;

• “Maximizing impact:” extension of the most pertinent or strategic projects through additional grants.

Besides the DFID’s historic partners, the calls of the FCI project made it possible to support many operators: La Benevolencija, Development and Peace, the Lille Journalism School (to set up a Master’s in Media Management), Remacob, SFCG, Sukal (a Belgo-Congolese audiovisual production agency), UCOFEM, Uniprocz (Film Production Unit), CFI (Canal France International), Syfia International, RFI Talent+, Samwaki, GRET, RNTC, Experts SPRL, IMMAR.

Lastly, the French Embassy supports a range of other limited initiatives, as thematic regional workshops (sports reporting at the time of the World Cup) or the establishment of a Fund for Radio Afrique which enabled the distribution of equipment from RFI to the community radios (managed by FH).

**APEFE and Wallonia-Brussels International (WBI)**

The APEFE (Association for the Promotion of Education and Training Abroad – French-speaking Community of Belgium) is an organization tied to the development department of the federated entity of French-speaking Belgium (the former Communauté française de Belgique, now called Wallonia-Brussels International). It is an agency which makes trainers and young experts available to Southern partners. Together with the WBI, it has supported three important projects in the media sector in the DRC.

**2003-2007:**

**On-site print-media training.** Initiated by the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), in partnership with the APEFE, this project to “strengthen the capacities of the Congolese print media” aimed to support the professionalization of newspapers by making available to them a specialized trainer capable of accompanying them in their daily work within the company for a sufficient length of time (four weeks per newspaper and per sector). Launched in 2003, this project ended in November 2007 after the passage of three trainers and interventions to help manage the newspaper and strengthen the editorial office.

**2005-2007:**

**Le Journal du Citoyen:** The APEFE launched, in partnership with IPP, an operation aimed at ensuring the circulation of civic information throughout the electoral period thanks to the publication of a supplement on electoral news, **Le**
Journal du Citoyen (“The Citizen’s newspaper”), prepared in partnership with the local newspapers. The JDC received the support of a Belgian technician for the first 18 months before being run by a Congolese journalist. The APEFE, which backed this project with funds from the Belgian federal authorities, ceased its participation in the JDC, believing that the project was tied to the elections and thus temporary and that keeping it running was unjustified. In 2009, the JDC was turned into a “training paper,” a print-media support of IFASIC students.

2006-2011:
Support for the High Media Authority. This intervention, worth more than 1 million Euros, made it possible to provide a constant expertise to the regulatory authority with the aim of accompanying the creation of a media monitoring center (CMMPC), as well as the Complaints Investigations Secretariat, two technical departments that are essential to the regulator’s job. Two Congolese experts were assigned to this project by the APEFE and later continued to accompany the reform of the sector’s legal framework: support for the elaboration and adoption (lobbying and pleading) of the new organic law governing the CSAC (High Audiovisual and Communication Council), participation in works aimed at revising the 1996 press law.

UNESCO

UNESCO, which has a small branch in Kinshasa, has supported a few small media projects, including:
- a €135,000 budget from the Belgian delegation to UNESCO to support the “Master Plan” for the national communications of the Ministry of Press and Information. This grant, terminated in 2006, made it possible to support the work of a group of experts assigned to draft the new “fundamental texts” of the media sector;
- support for ARCO (to encourage the creation of radios in areas which have none) and OMEC (publication of a practical guide for journalists during elections, availability of internet connections for OMEC branches in the provinces);
- the organization in 2007 by the UNPC of an evaluation workshop on the media’s contribution to the electoral process;
- the finalization of the Strategy for the Development of Broadcasting in the Congo, whose results and suggestions were approved at a workshop in May 2008. With UNICEF and the FAO.

UNDP

UNDP’s media support has mainly consisted of direct subsidies to Radio Okapi (in 2005 and 2006: €1.5 million) and support for the development of joint projects between the regulator (HAM) and the CEI (Independent Electoral Commission), such as workshops on the elaboration of referendum directives and the electoral law, support for the referendum campaign, production of awareness-raising videos, creation of the electoral information bureau within La Maison des Elections [Elections House], setting up of three provincial branches of HAM. This intervention ended in December 2006. The overall project, worth $2.5 million, was financed as follows: $1.7 million from the UK, $300,000 from Italy and $500,000 from the UNDP’s own funds. After the 2006 electoral process, UNDP started on the implementation of a “good governance” program, which includes a number of short-term activities involving the media.
Appendix 9: Successes and Failures of Media Support in the DRC

This appendix aims at identifying more specifically the projects that were pointed out during the research process as “successes” or “failures.” Several beneficiaries and operators interviewed were surprised by this question and answered with another: what is a success or failure? In whose eyes and according to what criteria?

For Pierre Nsana, “some projects functioned very well at the time of their implementation, but their long-term impact was limited or nonexistent because of individual factors, people who didn’t play their role. For instance, the 2004 Press Congress mobilized and motivated participants, but the organizations which emerged from it did not function properly because of the people chosen to run them.” By contrast, the IPP’s PARI were seen as failures at the end of the project, because the mechanism did not work as expected. But the technicians trained within that project are now called on to set up studios everywhere and to support them technically, which is a positive aspect of this project.127

As noted by one observer: “If all projects which claim to have been successes had really been successful, the presence of specialized operators would no longer be necessary after ten years of massive donor support.” And yet operators are present more than ever before. “Not only are INGOs still there, but they are still doing the same things,” remarks Pascal Berqué. “After ten years, this is not as it should be.”128

Media support agencies find themselves in a paradoxical situation: Either their project is functioning well and achieving the desired results, in which case it would be logical for them to pull out, thus losing their raison d’être; or there are still needs, which means the INGOs should stay, but also means that the project has not been a total success, or that it has been poorly designed or did not take into account the realities of the field.

The successes129

Radio Okapi

• Stands out through the quality of its news and the fact that it offers public service information that is indispensable to many Congolese.

• From its inception, it rapidly made an impact in a context in which it was difficult to have access to balanced information and to know what was happening nationwide.

• Radio Okapi makes it impossible for the government to have a monopoly on broadcasting and ensures there is a place for pluralist information.

• Radio Okapi also serves as a model for other radios, which are thus “pulled upwards:” it is the model radio. It has room for maneuver, which the others do not have. “There are things which only Radio Okapi can say.”

• It has also led the government to understand the benefits of communicating. The authorities used to refuse to talk to the media; now they answer questions and even notice when Okapi is not present at a press conference or at an event. Even government members tune into Okapi to know what is happening in the country.

127  Pierre N’Sana, Program Coordinator at IPP, personal interview, Kinshasa, March 2011.
128  Pascal Berqué, Program Director at IPP, personal interview, Paris, August 2011
129  Many projects were mentioned by the persons interviewed. We list here the projects which were mentioned repeatedly, and by people who were not connected to them. The ideas mentioned here will remain anonymous. Of course, not all the interviewees agreed and some critiques were mentioned by only one person.
• It has shown that professional quality can secure a large audience. Audience polls show that Radio Okapi is among the country’s favorite radio stations (which is not the case for other radio stations established by the UN in other post-conflict countries as Côte d’Ivoire or the Sudan).

• It has trained hundreds of Congolese journalists, many of them having found job opportunities elsewhere and are now in strategic positions in international organizations or national institutions.

But: this success is tempered by some criticism:
• Okapi is considered hegemonic by local media actors.

• It has taken the place of the public radio, but is not entirely independent, since it is connected to the United Nations.

• Its partnerships with local community radios sometimes make it harder for these stations to pursue community vocations. Until now, the partnership with local station is limited and has not helped to reinforce local media.

• It is a project designed and implemented outside the realities of the local economy.

• The project was established with no concern for its sustainability, since the radio initially was not meant to survive beyond the presence of the UN peacekeeping force. Its current desire for durability has changed things.

• It has poached good journalists from their previous jobs in local media.

JED
• The organization plays an enormous role in defending the freedom of the press: it has ensured that press freedom violations in the DRC are not forgotten and that the diplomatic and international authorities deal with this concern. Its influence has led to the initiation of legal proceedings following the assassination of journalists into which there had previously been no investigation.

• JED has a clear vision of what is to be done and its main members are “models” of commitment and courage for all the ones defending press freedom and human rights.

• It’s a small but well managed structure, which remains fragile and dependent on donors but does not need any INGO support to design its plan of action or organize its activities.

But:
• Its active presence has not made it possible to eradicate or even significantly to diminish the number of press freedom violations.

• The organization remains very fragile and tied to its two founders. Some partners have doubts about the organization’s survival if these two people were to quit the job.

Radio Maendeleo
• It is one of the rare truly community-oriented radios, run by local organizations concerned with development.

• It operates on democratic principles, bringing together its board of directors, consulting its members regularly, being held accountable for its financial management.

• Its network of radio clubs (more than 100) makes it an exception in the Congolese landscape. It is the only media which listens closely to its audience.

• It is a pool of human resources for the whole country: many leaders of media support programs in INGOs and many communication officers in big institutions originally come from Radio Maendeleo.
But:
• After nearly 20 years since its creation, it is still entirely dependent on foreign donors and is thus in a state of permanent financial insecurity.\textsuperscript{130}

Community radios (Development and Peace)
• The stations established with the support of Development and Peace in Katanga are viewed as successes because the project did not aim just to set up technical equipment but to ground the stations in a committed local community. D&P has worked for years with the local organization so that ownership of the radio would be developed. The D&P methodology has thus integrated all the components necessary for the successful establishment of those radio stations (from local grounding to training and programming, coaching the management and relationships with the audience.)

• These stations can now behave as models for other community stations in the region.

But:
Some of these stations still have sustainability problems and have a hard time resisting the pressure of local political authorities.

The HAM
• Thanks to the support of its partners, this institution was able to play its role during the 2006 elections, even after it was completely ransacked 48 hours before the first round. It adopted the appropriate regulatory texts and certainly made it possible to avoid some excesses, in Kinshasa and some provincial cities.

But:
• It has shown what difficulties the regulator can have when faced with political pressure, essentially from the ruling authorities. Some of the HAM’s actions have been seen as serving those in power. In other cases (for instance, the lack of balance in the public media), it has simply been impotent.

• The positive impacts faded as soon as President Mutinga left the institution, which shows that the institution was not solid and that its effectiveness depended on a single individual.

• There was no real will to keep the regulatory body functioning after the elections. “The HAM had so much capital five years ago, so much knowledge and skills, so much equipment in Kinshasa and in the provinces, but everything is lost now,” complains Pascal Berqué from IPP.

The JDC (Journal Du Citoyen) (in its initial formula):
• It was a short-term project (2 years) which was not meant to last but which fulfilled its mission to inform citizens during the electoral process by becoming - in just a few months - the bestselling paper of the Congolese press. It was not meant to replace or become a competitor to local newspapers and, even though it was very much appreciated (and became the paper with the biggest circulation in the DRC), the project came to an end as planned without an extension.

• The transfer of expertise was a real success: after 18 months, the Belgian technical assistant who launched the project left and his two Congolese colleagues continued the task while maintaining the same level of quality.

• The JDC reinforced the capacities of participating journalists. It made it possible for journalists to show that they were capable of quality work if they were placed in appropriate conditions. In particular, it made journalists (and their newspapers) able to work without a typing department (before, journalists used to write by hand on paper and pass their copy to a typist) by familiarizing journalists with computer typing and designing.

• The JDC generated a positive impact for participating newspapers: it brought about temporary increases in circulation for the partner newspapers that would carry the insert, especially during the elections. It led a number of newspapers from all sides and political trends to work together.

\textsuperscript{130} During the present research in Bukavu in May 2011, the radio’s journalists had not been paid in over three months.
But: 
The participating newspapers and journalists did not all keep up their efforts and many fell back into their old routines once their association with the JDC was over.

The IPP’s joint reporting sessions

- These training sessions through accompanied production implemented by IPP and grouping together journalists from various provinces, but also from Rwanda and Burundi, were often cited as a “transformative” professional experience. Several beneficiaries cite this experience as “liberating,” as enabling contact with the world. “The joint reporting workshops enabled me to fulfill my dream, which was to travel, to gather information from distant places, to explain what is happening elsewhere.”131

- IPP’s ELMED132 project, also founded on the principle of accompanied field reporting, makes it possible for information to circulate from one province to the next, for journalists to meet. “This opening up to the other provinces of the Congo is very important,” says the director of Radio Maendeleo, Kizito Mushizi.

But: 
- Such projects are costly, and only a limited number of journalists can benefit from them.

Legal reform:

- Some interviewees see success in the fact that the organic law on the regulator, the CSAC, has been passed after a widespread debate in which members of the profession took part but also delegates who had no particular knowledge of the sector and who came to understand the importance of the new legislation.

But:
- Not all parliamentarians are aware of the stakes despite years of negotiations.

- The quality of the debates on the adoption of the texts was very low at the National Assembly (it was a lot better in the Senate).

- Only this one piece of legislation has been adopted in the media sector in five years: “The law of 1996 has not been revised in the past 5 years. It shows that the political authorities are not very concerned about the necessity to improve the media landscape,” notes Pascal Berqué.

Sector-wide programs: which worked simultaneously with a range of actors from the media sector in a sector-wide approach (like those of IPP, GRET and FEI)

- They are seen as positive because one segment of the media cannot develop alone, without other actors evolving simultaneously. These “holistic projects” are viewed as successes because they build the capacities of several types of actors simultaneously.

- Even though they are “global,” they still focus on a limited number of targets which they follow in the long-term (sometimes during a year or several years).

But: these same programs have also been criticized because:

- they lead to a scattering of resources (on too many local organizations and media outlets);

- they require management by costly Northern-based organizations which are like intermediaries between the local media actors and the sources of funding, without necessarily contributing any added value. “A lot of energy is put into this type of programs, but for what kind of results?”133

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131 Lucien Maheshe, journalist with Neno la Uzima, Bukavu, personal interview, May 2011.
132 ELMED: ‘Election, Médias et Démocratie’
133 Steve Matenga, forme IPP and Foundation Hirondelle, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
• they favor Northern operators. For instance, among the beneficiaries of the funds allocated in the context of the FEI fund, there are many French organizations: IPP, GRET, RFI, CFI, IMMAR, Syfia International, Lille Journalism School (ESJ), etc.

Many other limited short-term initiatives were seen as “successes,” but were only raised by interviewees who took part in them and are either unknown or unmentioned by others.

The reasons for these successes

The individual factor
The success of certain initiatives is often justified by the individual qualities of the organizers. The most frequently cited example is that of JED: the organization grew out of the will of some Congolese journalists, with no external impulse, and was able to develop thanks to the motivation and commitment of people who set up the project and for whom it had meaning. “This is not the case with many other organizations, where individuals reach the top to serve their own careers.” In many cases, explains Florence Minery from GRET, “we have given too much credit to some charismatic and persuasive delegates from the profession, but they were unfortunately acting only in self-interest.”134 By contrast, JED’s organizers realize that the organization consolidated itself because it rests on a personal commitment and shared values. “These are things that are not related to funding, that cannot be bought,” recognizes the executive secretary.135

The amount of support and continuity in support
The interviewees we met believe that a key factor for success resides in the length of the project and being able to mobilize sufficient funds. Thus, Radio Okapi would not have been able to develop as it would not hold the place it has today if it had not been supported massively for the past ten years. All projects deemed successful lasted a certain length of time: from several months to several years. “If we had to add all the funds that were invested in one-shot short-term training sessions, for sure we would reach a comfortable amount of money that could have been injected in setting up an efficient local training center.” As for the community radio supported by D&P, it is also the continuity in support that has helped to firmly establish these stations. “D&P has paid for operating costs, for the rent, for the salaries, and has done it for years. The people involved were given the skills and the tools to keep the project going. When donors avoid supporting operating costs, claiming that the media has to be sustainable by itself, it is not a strategy which is appropriate in the local context.”136

Consulting local partners at the moment of the elaboration of the project
Media professionals believe that the projects they have most benefited from are those with which they were associated from the start: they were able to express their needs and make suggestions which were taken into account; they were made responsible for the implementation of these actions with sufficient flexibility to allow for redirections if necessary.

The accompaniment and control mechanisms in the implementation of projects
All successful projects have paid strong attention to the skills transfer and emphasized the development of local capacities, making it possible to do without foreign expertise. Moreover, the transfer process has focused not only on professional skills, but also on implementation, control and assessment procedures, thanks to detailed monitoring.

134 Florence Minery, GRET Media Program Officer, personal communication, Paris, August 2011.
135 Tshivis Tshivuadi, executive secretary, JED, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
136 Nicolas Boissez, Fondation Hirondelle and former French Embassy in Kinshasa, personal communication, Lausanne, August 2011.
Failures and their reasons

Questioned on the projects which may be seen as failures, the interviewees (notwithstanding some nuances) cited the following initiatives more than once.

Limited training sessions

- Despite many training initiatives, the media’s professionalism has not increased.

- Short-term seminars “only sustain opportunistic NGOs which train people who do not have newspapers,” believes the director of one newspaper.¹³⁷

- These projects do not benefit the media in operational terms, but deprive them of their human resources for several days, thereby becoming a hindrance to the proper operation of the newsroom instead of a benefit.

- These sessions are often based on the donors’ priority and not on the needs of the media (for instance training about sexual violence towards women).

But:
- Other interlocutors believe that, whatever the case may be, participants always get something out of it.

Consolidating professional organizations

- Despite the support they have received, the profession’s collective organizations are still incapable of fulfilling their missions (ARCO, SNPP, UNPC, OMEC). They have been unable to build their own legitimacy within the profession. Most of them were also guilty (or suspected) of financial mismanagement and torn apart by internal conflicts.

But:
- Although these organizations do not work, some of them (such as the self-regulatory authority) have at least raised an issue among journalists. For instance, “The existence of a professional code of ethics, the fact that the job is codified is now known to all,” argues Polydor Muboyayi, president of OMEC.

The RTNC: the establishment of a public service broadcaster

- No one has dared to work with the RTNC. As Olivier Lechien notices, “The fact that no one has tried to get the RTNC become a little more pluralist has generated huge negative impacts on the media landscape. All the politicians who don’t have access to the national media create their own outlets to make their voice heard. It is the main reason for the creation of this huge amount of private media which is making the sector so hard to consolidate and professionalize.”

- The only attempt to work with the RTNC, which was the restructuring of ICA (Congolese Institute for Broadcasting) was a failure because and did not generate the expected impact on the Congolese media landscape (except maybe on some denominational radio stations which have sent their technicians and presenters to be trained there).

But:
At least the ICA continues to provide training sessions to individuals who can increase their skills and hope to find a job (even if not in the media sector).

¹³⁷ Freddy Mulumba, CAO of Le Potentiel, personal communication, Kinshasa, March 2011.
The reasons for these failures:

The poor identification of problems and of potential solutions

Several interviewees come back to the lack of consideration of the reality in which local journalists find themselves. The donors, operators and expatriates, who receive stable salaries, fail to measure the complexity of having to live with $50 per month, in precarious security conditions. It seems inappropriate, for instance, to want to solve the question of the shortage of investigative journalism in the DRC only through training initiatives. Salary issues and security issues are crucial.

Initiatives that are too limited

Most critics denounce intervention mechanisms that are too focused on the short term and do not take into account the "long time" of consolidation and professionalization of the sector. Prolonged accompaniment is often hindered by the restricting contractual methods of donors, which limit the intervention period and demand a certain type of quantifiable, measurable and verifiable result. The IPP, for instance, has led a project on the reinforcement of capacities of seven local organizations in the media sector: for nine months, these organizations were the subject of specialized accompaniment allowing them to better structure themselves, to define their plan of action and integrate the methodology of the project cycle. This length was deemed largely insufficient by all the associations which, at the end of the process, felt incapable of bringing to its end, and alone, the process that had been initiated. “But the contract binding Panos to its donor was for nine months. We could not continue,” explains an IPP delegate.138

The lack of any concern for sustainability

Most projects fail to take into account the issue of sustainability. “The IPP’s PARI did not work because the emphasis was on the question of access to information (equipment, internet connection) without sufficiently considering the issue of durability and viability,” explains Steve Matenga. As regards local organizations, most of them soon find themselves outside the law, for not being able to respect internal democratic principles (holding general assemblies, renewing the leading authorities, etc.) and lose their legitimacy in the eyes of those they are meant to be representing. “Donors prefer to support us for precise activities, not to provide support to pay for fixed costs,” remarks the vice-president of UCOFEM (Congolese Union of Women in the Media), “although we have to pay our rent and our salaries to be able to work.”139 Sustainability for media organizations and media industry has not been a concern for donors and operators. “We have not done enough to strengthen the media market,” notes Olivier Lechien from FEI. “The economic dimension of the media companies has been underestimated in all programs which deal with media mainly as information producers and not as enterprises that have to settle on a competitive market.”

The shortage of models

A society’s reflections and evolution depends on the models it is familiar with. The degree of isolation in which many Congolese media actors find themselves has often been underestimated. The operators have too often thought in terms of their own models without trying to understand the mental patterns of Congolese journalists. For instance, the reasons why people join organizations are different in the Congo than in the countries the donors and operators come from. The press distribution service project defended by GRET was mentioned as an example: which publishers have any real knowledge of what a press distribution service could bring them? Are most of them even concerned by the distribution of their paper to the public, or are they only interested in printing a few copies to give to the edition’s sponsors?

139 Francine Umbalo, vice-president of UCOFEM, personal communication, August 12, 2008.
The Media Map Project is a multi-faceted two-year pilot research collaboration between Internews and The World Bank Institute, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. This report is a product of that research. The findings and conclusions contained within this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the World Bank or Internews.

The Media Map Project draws together what we know and precisely defines what we do not know about the relationships between the media sector and economic development and governance. The research also examines donors’ roles in supporting the media sector over time and provides an evidence base for their future decision-making about media support. Through research, public events, and the data made available on the project website for public use and extended research, the project aims to engage the development sector in greater understanding and exploration of the role of media and information in development.